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SUMMARY
Thirty years ago, research in designing operating systems to defeat malicious soft-
ware was very popular. The primary technique was to design and implement a small se-
curity kernel that could provide security assurances to the rest of the system. However,
as operating systems grew in size throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, research into security
kernels slowly waned. From a security perspective, the story was bleak. Providing secu-
rity to one of these large operating systems typically required running software within that
operating system. This weak security foundation made it relatively easy for attackers to
subvert the entire system without detection.
The research presented in this thesis aims to reimagine how we design and deploy
computer systems. We show that through careful use of virtualization technology, one can
effectively isolate the security critical components in a system from malicious software.
Furthermore, we can control this isolation to allow the security software a complete view
to monitor the running system. This view includes all of the necessary information for
implementing useful security applications including the system memory, storage, hardware
events, and network traffic. In addition, we show how to perform both passive and active
monitoring securely, using this new system architecture.
Security applications must be redesigned to work within this new monitoring architec-
ture. The data acquired through our monitoring is typically very low-level and difficult to
use directly. In this thesis, we describe work that helps bridge this semantic gap by locating
data structures within the memory of a running virtual machine. We also describe work that
shows a useful and novel security framework made possible through this new monitoring
architecture. This framework correlates human interaction with the system to distinguish
legitimate and malicious outgoing network traffic.
xiii
CHAPTER I
SYSTEM SECURITY OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH
VIRTUALIZATION
1.1 Motivation
Computer security is in a state of crisis. State-of-the-art malware is now able to evade
network security monitoring software [128]. Botnets are manipulating critical network ser-
vices such as the domain name system (DNS) to eavesdrop on and steal information from
users [46]. Companies supporting signature-based host security software (e.g., anti-virus)
are unable to produce signatures as fast as new malware is created [122, 101]. And operat-
ing systems are routinely completely subverted by malware, making it nearly impossible to
provide trusted execution environments for any security critical computations ranging from
online banking to security software [131]. The average computer user has no meaningful
way to respond to these threats because the fundamental building blocks needed to ensure
system security are either broken or missing.
However, an opportunity now exists to provide these building blocks by reimagining
system security. This thesis explores how this can be done through the proper use of modern
virtualization technology. In particular, we demonstrate how to leverage virtualization to
allow security software to run with a reduced risk of subversion, while still providing rich
monitoring and response capabilities.
1.1.1 The Modern Era of Virtualization
Virtualization originally became popular in the 1960’s and 1970’s as a way to share a
single expensive computer among many users. As personal computers grew in popularity
through the 1980’s, along with computer architectures that were more difficult to virtualize,
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the popularity of virtualization waned. However, it has seen a resurgence over the past
decade as desktop computers became powerful enough to run multiple operating systems
concurrently. Virtualization has also seen a resurgence on the server side of the market
where it is used to consolidate operating systems on fewer hardware resources, improve the
manageability of large data centers, and enable new computing paradigms such as cloud
computing. Hardware manufacturers have responded to this trend by creating a variety of
virtualization-specific capabilities in recent processors, helping to ensure the longevity of
this renewed interest in virtualization.
Identifying this paradigm shift towards virtualized computing, many companies and
researchers are identifying new services that can leverage this new layer of abstraction.
Techniques such as virtual machine migration, rapid operating system provisioning, im-
proved backup capabilities, improved user desktop experiences (e.g., VMWare’s Unity),
and new software deployment techniques (e.g., using virtual machine appliances) are all
enabled through virtualization. Virtualization has also enabled new business models such
as cloud computing, where a user builds multiple virtual machines and pays to run them in
a data center. Each of these developments has security implications specific to their design,
however we must also consider the security implications of virtualization in general.
1.1.2 Security Implications
While many people have touted virtualization as the solution to today’s computer security
problem, closer inspection reveals that it is not quite that easy. In fact, when designed or
deployed poorly, virtualization can negatively impact security. This is because using virtu-
alization means adding more software to your computer, which means more opportunities
for vulnerabilities. Furthermore, as data centers consolidate their servers, it is possible to
now have multiple systems separated by software instead of an air gap. The end result
could be quite damaging to security.
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Fortunately, the picture is not all bad. When designed and deployed properly, virtualiza-
tion can be very useful for both security and, a related topic, overall system management.
Getting it right is not always trivial. As part of this thesis, we consider what it means to get
it right, and suggest some strategies for getting the most security benefit from a virtualiza-
tion platform. The key goal here is to ensure sufficient isolation between virtual machines
to prevent malware from crossing this boundary.
1.1.3 External Monitoring
If we can ensure this isolation between virtual machines, then the next logical step is to
use this isolation to separate untrusted software from security critical software. Perhaps the
most security critical software on a system today is the software responsible for monitoring
for security threats. This broad class of software, which includes anti-virus software and
intrusion detection systems, is usually run within the same operating system that it is work-
ing to protect. However, this execution environment does not provide sufficient protections
to stop malware from disabling or tampering with this security critical software.
Moving this software into its own virtual machine introduces new challenges. For ex-
ample, we must balance the isolation needed to protect this software with the access needed
for the tool to perform useful monitoring. In addition, we must identify the best way to al-
low the security software to access the information it needs, when it is needed. One of the
primary contributions of this thesis is a framework that addresses these problems, enabling
the development of robust security applications that can protect the operating systems run-
ning in multiple virtual machines while reducing the risk of malware subverting the security
software.
1.2 Challenges and Opportunities
Moving security software outside of its original operating system and into an isolated vir-
tual machine presents a variety of difficult research challenges. We discuss the most im-
portant high-level challenges below:
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• Accessing the information that is needed for the software to operate. This informa-
tion includes the system’s memory, disk contents, network traffic, hardware events,
and display buffer. In a traditional setting, the security software could access all of
this information using the interfaces provided by the operating system. In this new
setting, none of these interfaces exist so we must build both the interface and the
mechanism for access to each piece of information that is needed.
• Knowing when to access this information is just as critical as being able to access
it. When operating within the monitored operating system, security tools can eas-
ily place execution hooks throughout the system to receive notification of important
events such as new process execution or file creation. In this new setting, there is no
established way to perform active monitoring between virtual machines.
• Much of our access to information will be at a very low-level, so we need to bridge
the semantic gap to extract useful information from these low-level bytes.
• New types of attacks are always a concern with a new architecture. For example,
simply viewing data generated within the untrusted virtual machine introduces the
possibility of data-driven buffer overflow attacks against the security tools. We must
be careful to understand the security tradeoffs associated with this new architecture.
• Performance is always a concern for real-world systems. In this case, the security is
only useful if the performance impact is acceptable to the users and administrators
that will be working with the resulting systems.
The potential opportunities resulting from pursuing this new architecture for security
software far outweigh the challenges described above. By protecting critical security soft-
ware, we can restore trust in the fundamental building blocks for securing both server and
desktop systems. This, in turn, limits the capabilities of today’s malware while enabling a
new generation of defensive techniques that can potentially combine more advanced host
and network monitoring to defeat tomorrow’s malware.
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1.3 Dissertation Overview
This thesis investigates a practical approach to enabling simple, flexible, and compre-
hensive active monitoring and memory analysis techniques for security software in a
virtualized environment. A simple approach is critical to the acceptance of this technol-
ogy by allowing these techniques to be accessible to any programmer through a high-level
API that provides a useful interface for security software. This interface must also be flex-
ible by providing a variety of techniques for active monitoring and providing a common
way to perform memory analysis for both live memory views and snapshots, as well as
a common way to perform memory analysis on different operating systems. Finally, the
interface must be complete to allow for active monitoring of any critical system event com-
bined with passive monitoring of the entire system’s memory. This completeness require-
ment provides security tools with an unobstructed system view while preventing malware
authors from hiding behind the view provided by any particular API.
After discussing the related work in Chapter 2, we present our secure active monitoring
framework in Chapter 3. This framework allows developers of security applications to
perform event-driven, active monitoring by installing protected hooks in the monitored
operating system, intercepting hardware events, and intercepting network traffic. It also
provides passive monitoring capabilities, allowing developers to view the complete runtime
memory state of the monitored operating system and all of its applications. We discuss the
security and performance of this framework, and also provide small example applications
to demonstrate how developers can utilize the framework.
In Chapter 4, we present a memory analysis technique for locating data structures
within memory virtual address space. We demonstrate how this technique can work across
various operating system versions, as opposed to previous work that relied on extensive
reverse engineering of a specific operating system version.
In Chapter 5, we discuss a novel security application framework designed to distinguish
user interactions from that of malicious software. Then, Chapter 6 demonstrates how this
5
can be used to create applications that fight spam and click fraud by correlating human
generated hardware events with network traffic, using secure active monitoring and memory
analysis.
Finally, this thesis concludes with Chapter 7 which describes the overall impact of this
work and future opportunities in this research area.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 Host-Based Security
Research in the area of host-based security has evolved somewhat drastically over the past
forty years. This evolution can be traced to the penetration of computers into government,
businesses, and private homes combined with the differing threats in these environments.
In this section, we discuss the key achievements in host-based security as they relate to the
research presented in the remainder of this thesis. However, in order to best understand
the relations between each of the topics below, we first review the major turning points in
computer security during this timeframe.
Much of the earliest work in computer security was driven by the military. This work
was primarily motivated by the problem of having computers handle data of different clas-
sification levels. For this reason there was a focus on mandatory access controls and high
assurance systems. The mandatory access controls provided a mechanism for enforcing a
policy to protect classified information. And the high assurance systems provided confi-
dence that the system was built correctly through a well documented engineering process.
By the 1980’s, there was a growing interest in applying some of these security tech-
niques to computers used in corporations. This spurred new research to understand how
the security needs of businesses differed from that of the government. While the systems
being built could largely be used in both settings, the security policies were quite different.
With the explosive growth of the personal computer in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s,
there was a perception that security was not a critical feature for these machines. Unlike
mainframe computers, these machines were often used by only one person and were either
not connected to a network or only used a low bandwidth, intermittent connection (e.g.,
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a modem). During this time commodity operating systems such as Microsoft Windows,
Linux, and the Mac OS rapid grew in popularity. At the same time, security remained
primarily the concern of the military and corporations running large multi-user machines.
As these commodity operating systems reached a critical mass around the mid-1990’s,
the Internet became available to the masses, forever changing the face of computer secu-
rity. Malicious software, previously a minor concern as it was restricted to spreading by
floppy disk, had a new propagation vector. Initially, malicious software designed to prop-
agate through the Internet was authored by hobbyists seeking bragging rights. However, it
was not long before someone realized that large groups of compromised computers could
be used to send unsolicited email advertisements (i.e., SPAM), while avoiding the detec-
tion of the major network operators. With this strong profit motive, malicious software
quickly transitioned from the domain of the hobbyist to the domain of professional crimi-
nals. The level of sophistication, along with the quality of code, for these new generations
of malicious software increased considerably. Compromised computers have themselves
turned into a commodity such that attackers will now go to great lengths to avoid detec-
tion by anti-virus software (e.g., using polymorphic code) and by the humans interacting
with the machine (e.g., throttling network utilization and even fixing system configuration
problems).
It was during this period that research in computer security ramped up significantly.
Looking beyond the idea of building a secure operating system, researchers began explor-
ing how to detect and prevent malicious software from entering the commodity operating
systems found on the vast majority of modern computers. People explored techniques for
intrusion detection systems, malicious software analysis, and for securing the larger com-
puter network infrastructure, along with many other related topics.
During this most recent period, it no longer made economic sense for the military to
develop their own operating system. Many of the government-sponsered projects of the
1970’s and 1980’s to create secure operating systems were finished and would likely not
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be revisited. Instead, the government switched to using commodity operating systems.
However, these systems didn’t offer the mandatory access controls or the high assurance
previously required by the military. Instead, the military has sought ways to harden these
operating systems, often with mixed results.
Today, host-based security research continues working to address the challenges of
preventing, detecting, and analyzing malicious software on commodity systems. However,
with the rapidly evolving threat, researchers have returned to many of the fundamental tech-
niques first used in the 1970’s in an effort to provide a stronger foundation to the security
in commodity operating systems. The work within this thesis is one example of this, as
we explore techniques for moving trusted security applications out of the user’s operating
system, and into a more protected environment. As described below, this can be viewed
as a modern day interpretation of the separation kernel concept first introduced in the early
1980’s.
2.1.1 Secure System Design
The primary goal of most secure system designs is to build computer systems that can
prevent security breaches, or at least mitigate any damages caused by such breaches. This
goal has remained unchanged for nearly fifty years. In this section we look at the steps
taken by various systems to achieve this goal throughout the years. We start by looking at
Multics, an operating system whose design dates back to the mid-1960’s. We then review
work on the use of security kernels, separation kernels, and virtualization in the 1970’s and
1980’s. Next we consider the influences from both the government and commercial sectors
during the rapid growth periods of the 1980’s and 1990’s. Finally, we look at how this
history has shaped current approaches to secure systems design over the past decade.
Multics Multics is an operating system that began in 1965 and was used through 2000
[171]. The original Multics design was presented in six papers at the Fall Joint Computer
Conference in 1965 [43, 72, 175, 47, 123, 48]. Security was one of the original design goals
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for Multics, resulting in various features that made it more secure than many of today’s
more modern systems. These features included programming the system in PL/I (a higher
level language that was effectively immune to buffer overflows), using hardware security
features such as the “no execute” bit that prevents execution of data regions, and designing
the kernel to reduce complexity. This attention to security made Multics the most secure
operating system of its time, however a security evaluation by Karger et al. [94] in 1974
revealed a variety of potential problems. The evaluators suggested that Multics be enhanced
using mandatory access controls and a security kernel to combat potential problems with
malicious software such as trojan horses. While Multics did eventually achieve a Class B2
security evaluation from the National Computer Security Center, efforts aimed at further
improving its security were eventually terminated [95].
Security Kernels As interest grew in designing secure systems, people began thinking
about the best design practices for these systems. Anderson wrote a two volume report
that detailed some of these best practices [6, 7]. This report presented a reference monitor
as an entity that that enforces all access relationships between all subjects and objects
of a system. An implementation of this reference monitor concept is called a reference
validation mechanism, and some of the earliest actual implementations took the form of a
security kernel. A security kernel is a subset of the operating system that performs reference
validation, and is small enough to be verified and audited. A security kernel runs as the most
privileged code in the system.
Security kernels quickly became a popular implementation technique for secure system
design that was used in a variety of systems including the PDP-11/45 [150], the Kernelized
Secure Operating System (KSOS) [62], the Gemini Multiprocessing Secure Operating Sys-
tem (GEMSOS) [60], the Honeywell Secure Communications Processor (Scomp) [64], and
the Logical Coprocessing Kernel (LOCK) [149] based on the Provably Secure Operating
System (PSOS) work by Feiertag and Neumann [61]. Many of these designs proved to be
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at least partially successful from a security viewpoint. For example, the GEMSOS system
achieved an A1 rating – the highest possible – under the Trusted Computer System Evalua-
tion Criteria (TCSEC) [51]. However, as Ames noted in 1981 [5], security kernels are not a
panacea to the problems of secure system design. In particular, Ames described that the ref-
erence monitor concept is too simple to fully model all of the interactions needed to secure
real multi-level systems. Furthermore, security kernel-based systems would usually make
use of trusted processes as a way to perform trusted functionality outside of the security
kernel itself. While these trusted processes were supposed to be small in both number and
size, and undergo the same security analysis as the security kernel itself, these restrictions
were typically not imposed in practice.
Separation Kernels and Virtualization Responding to the deployment concerns asso-
ciated with security kernels, Rushby proposed a slightly different approach called a sepa-
ration kernel [142]. Rushby believed that a single secure system could be reimagined as a
distributed system, where security is partly achieved through isolation between each sys-
tem provided by a specialized security kernel that he called a separation kernel. Using this
architecture, the trusted processes could run isolated from the other parts of the system,
simplifying both verification and deployment. Rushby showed formally that a separation
kernel could provide the isolation needed to achieve these goals [141].
System-level virtualization, the technique of running multiple operating systems on a
single hardware platform, is one way to implement a separation kernel. Virtualization also
has the security benefit of reducing the probability of failure for the trusted processes, as
argued by Madnick and Donovan [110]. For these reasons, virtualization has proven to be a
useful architectural component in secure system design for many years. In a related effort,
Karger et al. designed and implemented the VAX VMM security kernel [96] which was
a complete virtualization platform built to achieve an A1 rating under the TCSEC. While
this effort was more general than a separation kernel because it was not strictly designed
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to run a secure system decomposed into separate components, it could have been used for
this purpose.
More recently, two projects have implemented the separation kernel concept to create
high assurance systems, with a focus on embedded systems. The Multiple Independent
Levels of Security (MILS) architecture uses a layered approach with a separation kernel,
implemented as a micro-kernel, that runs multiple partitions, each running at one or more
security levels [4]. MILS controls the isolation between each partition by a policy that
defines data isolation, information flow control, periods processing, and damage limitations
for the entire system. The Mathematically Analyzed Separation Kernel (MASK) project
had similar goals, using a smart card as a target platform [111].
This thesis builds most directly on the idea of a separation kernel. In particular, we con-
sider the need to have trusted processes that can monitor other parts of the system in order
to ensure code and data integrity while enforcing other security policies. The separation
kernel systems discussed above, and even modern virtualization platforms in general, do
not provide adequate capabilities to support monitoring applications. This thesis addresses
this problem, showing how to securely integrate both active and passive monitoring tech-
niques into modern virtualization platforms. In the long term, we envision building on this
work to support similar capabilities for more robust and verifiable separation kernels.
Security Evaluations With a growing number of computing systems (i.e., operating sys-
tems, databases, application software, networking components) under development in the
mid 1980’s, the government wanted an evaluation procedure in place to compare the rel-
ative security offered by each of these systems. This resulted in a series of evaluation
standards, informally known as the “rainbow series” after the array of colors used for the
each publication in the series. The primary book in this series was the Trusted Computer
System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) [51], also known as the orange book. This book
provided guidelines for evaluating a system and categorizing it in a particular division.
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Divisions included D (all tested systems that failed to meet the criteria of another level),
C (discretionary access control), B (mandatory access control), and A (formally verified).
Each division contained one or more classes, further distinguishing the software into ratings
such as A1, C2, etc. Subsequent books in the rainbow series provided additional guidance
to evaluators regarding how to evaluate systems. For example, the red book provided the
Trusted Network Interpretation [120] and the purple book provided the Trusted Database
Management System Interpretation [121].
By the 1990’s several countries each had their own security evaluation process. The
United States used TCSEC, as described above. Canada used the Canadian Trusted Com-
puter Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC) [12] and several European countries used the
Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) [40]. Having different stan-
dards in different countries created confusion and difficulties for the vendors, so a new
international standard called the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation (Common Criteria or CC) [42] was developed to replace each of these previ-
ous evaluation processes. The Common Criteria is a very flexible evaluation framework
that permits the vendors to specify precisely what security properties they aimed to achieve
and how rigorous of an evaluation is desired. Successful evaluations result in the software
achieving an Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) ranging from 1 to 7, where 7 indicates the
most thorough evaluation.
All of these security evaluation processes are designed to provide some level of assur-
ance in the software development. Software assurance is defined as the “level of confidence
that software is free from vulnerabilities, either intentionally designed into the software or
accidentally inserted at anytime during its lifecycle, and that the software functions in the
intended manner” [41]. Assurance is largely centered around the process of making soft-
ware. Therefore, the work presented in this thesis on an architecture for secure active
monitoring and techniques for performing memory analysis on running systems could be
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implemented at various assurance levels as required based on the intended use of the re-
sulting software.
Commercial Growth During the 1980’s and 1990’s, the commercial popularity of the
desktop computer soared. This popularity was largely fueled by less expensive hardware
combined with more user friendly operating systems such as Mac OS and Windows. This
shift is a notable turning point with regards to systems security because, unlike the military-
driven operating system development projects described above, these operating systems
were not designed with security as a primary goal. However, as the popularity of these
systems grew, it become increasingly difficult for the government to justify the expense of
building and maintaing their own operating systems. Today, combining the price of these
operating systems with the availability of many applications, many people have argued that
it is no longer practical to build another operating system from the ground up. As a result,
by the late 1990’s systems security research shifted focus from designing a new secure
operating system, to improving the security of existing commodity operating systems such
as Windows.
Microsoft successfully achieved an EAL4+ rating for several versions of Windows,
however this was done using a narrow set of security properties. This testing also re-
quired Windows to be configured differently than how it is normally deployed in homes
and businesses today. For these reasons, many people argue that the EAL4+ certification
for Windows is not very meaningful. Similar certifications exist for Linux and Solaris.
In an effort to improve the security of commodity operating systems, some projects
have focused on adding security extensions to these existing systems. One such effort is the
Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux) project, maintained by the National Security Agency
(NSA). SELinux integrates with existing Linux operating systems to provide mandatory
access control that enables type enforcement [13], role-based access control, and multi-
level security policies. SELinux is known for being highly flexible, which has the drawback
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of requiring complex policies. Even so, it is now deployed with popular Linux distributions
such as Red Hat, albeit with a somewhat weak default policy. Sun created Trusted Solaris,
offering similar functionality as SELinux. Today, Trusted Solaris has evolved into the
Trusted Extensions that are available with Open Solaris. Efforts such as SELinux and
Solaris Trusted Extensions do provide a useful additional layer of security on top of these
commodity systems. The primary critiques of these systems are the highly complex policies
and the fact that it is hard to build security on top of an insecure system.
Nevertheless, we believe that additional research in this area is valuable and that it
would integrate well with the work presented in this thesis. For example, we completed
some preliminary research that demonstrated how layered mandatory access control poli-
cies could help to reduce their complexity [127]. A natural way to perform this layering is
to follow the existing layers in the system: the hypervisor, the operating system running in
each virtual machine, and the applications running in each operating system. Security poli-
cies such as these (i.e., access control policies, integrity policies, etc.) are useful security
tools that are orthogonal to the security monitoring research presented in this thesis. We
envision future systems where the monitoring components can verify that such policies are
working properly, or even serve as a mechanism to implement such policies in the case of
active monitoring.
The Modern Era Most recently, secure systems research has continued to work under the
assumption that users will be running a commodity operating system. Therefore, current
research has focused on many of the boundary issues associated with ensuring that these
systems remain secure from the initial boot until they are shut down. In addition, some
researchers have even gone so far as to attempt to remove the operating system from playing
a role in application-level security [34]. There is significantly more work in this space than
can be reviewed here. Entire books have been devoted to the topic [71, 86]. Instead, in this
section we provide an overview of the work that is most relevant to this thesis. The topics
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presented here are either applications that could benefit from the work presented in this
thesis, or complementary security work that could be used in conjunction with our work.
A challenging and often overlooked security problem is that of secure boot. Simply
stated, secure boot is a technique to provide assurance that the software loaded after you
turn on a computer is what you intended (e.g., a copy of Windows without any malicious
software). Arbaugh et al. addressed this problem by verifying each stage of the boot process
before it executes [9]. This ensures that the software is as intended at the time that it starts
executing, but once execution proceeds one needs other techniques to validate the software
integrity at runtime.
Various techniques have been proposed for verifying system-level software integrity
at runtime. Sailer et al. use the trusted platform module, a trusted hardware component,
to perform integrity measurements on all software from the BIOS up to the applications
[147]. Others have used a hypervisor to run trusted code that monitors or enforces software
integrity. SecVisor, for example, is a hypervisor that prevents changes to the kernel code
by interposing on transitions between user and kernel space [155]. And Petroni et al. used
a hypervisor to provide a secure monitoring environment from which to verify semantic
integrity constraints in a running kernel [130].
Researches have also explored techniques for application-level software integrity ver-
ification. Abadi et al. introduced a technique known as control flow integrity (CFI) that
validates a program’s control flow graph against a known good version [3]. Later, Petroni
et al. introduced state based control flow integrity (SBCFI) which effectively extended this
concept to work on operating system kernels using an external monitor such as the moni-
toring framework presented in this thesis [131]. Building on this idea, Baliga et al. devel-
oped the Gibraltar system to automatically infer invariants on both control and non-control
kernel-level data [15] using a modified version of Daikon [59]. Gao et al. came up with
a different approach known as behavioral distance in which the same input is passed to
multiple applications that are each evaluated based on how they process the input [67]. For
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example, a potentially malicious input could be sent to several different web servers to see
if it exploits any of them, causing their resulting behavior to deviate from the other servers.
Even when applications are behaving properly, a secure system requires a policy to
validate its information-flow integrity. Checking for this can help prevent security issues
such as allowing a system user to overwrite a critical password or configuration file. The
Clark-Wilson model was among the first to formally look at data integrity policies [37].
However, Clark-Wilson was somewhat limited in terms of practical deployment due to the
formal verification required for each application. Shankar et al. addressed this problem
by weakening the formal verification requirements and providing a technique to automate
the verification that was still needed while still enforcing a meaningful information-flow
integrity policy known as CW-Lite.
Orthogonal to the work on software integrity, many researchers have leveraged virtu-
alization to design innovative security architectures. NetTop is a Department of Defense
project aimed at deploying operating systems that can process different classification lev-
els on the same physical hardware [113]. This was done using a different virtual machine
for each operating system, and a careful assessment of the communication channels (both
covert and overt) between the virtual machines. The Terra architecture by Garfinkel et
al. uses virtualization to create a “closed box abstraction” that permitted execution of a
third party virtual machine without the risks of information disclosure or tampering [68].
McCune et al. developed the Shamon architecture which used virtualization on multiple
physical machines to create a shared reference monitor for controlling mandatory access
control across multiple machines [112]. And, more recently, several different groups of
researchers created systems that used context sensitive page mappings [139] to protect ap-
plication memory from the operating system that it runs on [184, 34]. These special page
mappings provide a different view of memory based on who is accessing the memory (ker-
nel or application) or how it is being accessed (read, write, or execute). Using this system,
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applications received a plaintext view of their memory while the kernel receives an en-
crypted view. The mediation is performed by a trusted hypervisor.
2.2 External Host-Based Monitoring
External monitoring is when the monitoring software is securely separated from the source
of the data being monitored. For network monitoring, this is relatively simple. Network
monitors can view network traffic at any point on the network, whereas the traffic is created
only at the hosts. This makes it very difficult for an attacker to compromise network mon-
itoring software. However, with host based monitoring, it is more difficult to achieve this
separation. Viewing events happening within an operating system has traditionally required
running software within that operating system. Yet running software within the operating
system makes it vulnerable to any malicious software running on the same system. For
this reason, coinciding with the shift to less secure commodity operating systems discussed
above, it has become increasingly difficult to perform secure host-based monitoring.
For these reasons, over the past decade researchers have explored ways to perform
external host-based monitoring. The primary challenge is to obtain all of the informa-
tion that one could get locally, while benefiting from some form of isolation. The two
key techniques that have been explored for secure external host based monitoring include
coprocessor-based monitoring and virtual machine-based monitoring.
2.2.1 Coprocessor-Based Monitoring
Noting the growing trend toward symmetric multi-processor (SMP) systems in 2000 (i.e.,
computers with two equally powerful processors), Hollingworth and Redmond developed a
system that utilized one processor for “oversight” and another for “applications” [85]. The
goal of this system was to provide greater protection for security monitoring software run-
ning on the oversight processor. Their architecture is effectively an early form of external
monitoring. Today’s systems running multiple processor cores that are multiplexed using a
hypervisor have many similarities to this earlier work.
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Unfortunately, SMP systems did not continue to gain much popularity at the time of
Hollingworth and Redmond’s work. It wasn’t until several years later, with multi-core
processors, that desktop parallelism began to take hold. In the mean time, researchers dis-
covered that security monitoring can achieve isolation by running on a coprocessor PCI
card. Such cards were already available to the general public, but were still somewhat ex-
pensive because it was effectively an entire computer on a single PCI card. Researchers ran
their own operating system on this coprocessor card, and showed that the host computer
could be monitored through the PCI bus, allowing for a wide variety of security applica-
tions. This idea was first proposed in 2002 by Zhang et al. [188]. Two years later, Petroni
et al. provided a more in-depth treatment and details about how the techniques could be
used to monitor runtime kernel integrity [129].
Coprocessor based monitoring was a great step forward in that we could now do host
monitoring while providing some protection for the security application. However, it also
had some rather serious limitations. Coprocessor cards are expensive, and their view
into the host is somewhat limited. To address these issues, researchers began exploring
software-based solutions to the problem.
2.2.2 Virtual Machine-Based Monitoring
Virtualization is the primary technique used by researchers today to isolate security ap-
plications from potentially malicious execution environments. A typical configuration for
both desktop and server environments starts with a hypervisor; a small software layer run-
ning directly on top of the hardware. All of the security-relavent applications are deployed
in one virtual machine, whereas the user’s desktop applications or the server components
are deployed in one or more additional virtual machines.
Virtual Machine Introspection Virtual machine introspection (VMI) is a technique where
processes in one virtual machine can view the runtime state of another virtual machine.
This term was coined by Garfinkel and Rosenblum in 2003 when they introduced Livewire,
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a host-based intrusion detection system based on VMI [69]. However, the idea of moni-
toring the runtime state of virtual machines dates back to 1973 with the Virtual Hardware
Monitor by Casarosa and Paoli [31]. The runtime state available through VMI typically
includes complete read and write access to memory, read access to processor registers, and
some meta-data about the virtual machine. In some cases, data going into and out of the
virtual machine such as network traffic or hard disk storage are also available.
The key drawbacks to VMI are performance and the semantic gap problem. Perfor-
mance is a concern with some applications because of the time required to map memory
pages across virtual machines. Monitoring activities that require a large number of page
mappings are most affected by this problem. The semantic gap problem is the problem
of extracting meaningful information from the low-level memory view typically provided
by VMI. Research in the area of memory analysis is working to address this problem, as
discussed later in this chapter.
Virtual machine introspection has proven to be a useful building block for the develop-
ment of monitoring applications that desire the isolation benefits of running in a separate
virtual machine. While these benefits have been most commonly associated with security
applications, any systems monitoring application could be built using VMI. The primary
contributions of this thesis are related to improving VMI through the addition of event
driven monitoring techniques, and building useful security applications that utilize these
techniques.
Runtime Monitoring Runtime monitoring applications use VMI to analyze and validate
the state of a system in near real time. Ideally, attacks should be detected quickly enough
to allow for defensive action to stop the attack and mitigate any side effects. The original
VMI application, Livewire, described techniques to compare kernel and user views of the
system, perform application-level integrity checking, detect the use of raw sockets, detect
invalid memory writes, and detect when the network card is placed in promiscuous mode
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[69]. Subsequent research built on these ideas and applied VMI to a variety of security
applications.
Many of these applications performed a variety of monitoring tasks to create intru-
sion detection systems. HyperSpector used VMI to develop an intrusion detection system
for a distributed environment based on capturing network traffic, mapping process address
spaces, and viewing the target system’s disks [103]. IntroVirt created vulnerability-specific
predicates that could then be used to identify intrusions at runtime or by looking at histor-
ical system snapshots [91]. The VMwatcher system has similar goals but focuses on the
semantic gap portion of the problem [88]. Xu et al. developed a usage control framework
for kernel integrity protection that runs using VMI [183]. Psyco-Virt is another VMI based
intrusion detection system that combines many of the above techniques [14]. VICI focuses
on repair techniques that can help systems recover from attack using VMI [65]. Finally,
Litty’s master thesis provides an in-depth discussion of the design, creation, and testing of
a VMI-based intrusion detection system [108].
Another application, related to intrusion detection, is process tracking and detection.
Antfarm operates from within the hypervisor, inferring process existence by detecting ad-
dress space identifiers such as the CR3 register value on the x86 architecture [89]. Similar
techniques could be implemented using VMI. The same authors also developed Lycosid to
detect hidden processes using cross-view validation [90].
VMI is also a natural fit for monitoring honeypots, many of which are already run-
ning in a virtual environment. Asrigo et al. developed an intrusion detection system for
honeypots using VMI [10]. They noted that VMI allows for good visibility, which in turn
meant that they could successfully detect intrusions in their honeypot with a small num-
ber of sensors. In related work, Jiang and Wang created the VMscope system to perform
external monitoring of high-interaction honeypots using VMI [87]. VMscope could be hid-
den from an attacker like previous external monitoring techniques, but could also provide
semantically rich information such as system call events, due to their use of VMI.
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Forensic Monitoring Forensic monitoring and analysis occurs after a system is known
to have been attacked. Instead of detecting or preventing an attack, the goals in this case are
to learn more about what happened during the attack. VMI is typically used to look at the
memory of a live, running system. However, one can also use it to simply take snapshots of
the system state while it is running. These snapshots can then be analyzed after an intrusion
occurs to determine details about the intrusion. Using VMI for forensic analysis provides
the same benefits of cross-view-diff approaches, such as Strider GhostBuster [179], in that
you can view the system from different semantic levels to identify inconsistencies. How-
ever, VMI has the added benefit that it can operate at runtime without restarting the system.
ReVirt uses snapshots obtained through VMI to enable instruction-level replay of the
system, allowing for detailed and arbitrary forensic analysis [56]. BackTracker [98, 99]
is one example of the type of analysis that could be performed on these snapshots. Back-
Tracker can work backwards from an attack’s detection point to determine the point of
entry. It can even reconstruct a graph showing the sequence of events that transpired during
the attack. In related work, Hay and Nance created the VIX tools to perform forensic anal-
ysis of virtual machines running on Xen [80]. They described VMI as being very useful
for forensics use given the fact that one can monitor the system non-intrusively.
2.3 Virtualization
The idea of virtualization was originally conceived in late 1964 by Creasy and Comeau
from IBM as a way to partition the resources of mainframe computers [169]. Initially,
and even today, virtualization was simply used to create the abstraction of multiple virtual
machines running on a single hardware platform. However, more recently virtualization has
been used as a supporting infrastructure for a variety of applications, including security.
We take this approach in this thesis, although we do so cautiously noting that off-the-
shelf virtualization solutions likely do not satisfy the requirements for a robust security
architecture. Custom solutions will be required for deployable security solutions in most
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cases. However, for the work in this thesis, we recognize that off-the-shelf virtualization
can be used to demonstrate the viability of key technologies before investing in expensive,
custom virtualization solutions.
In this section, we review previous work in virtualization as it relates to its suitability
for supporting security architectures and applications. We start with a brief history of
virtualization, then look at how it has been used for isolation purposes, and finally consider
the question of virtualization’s suitability for security applications directly.
A Brief History The earliest implementations of virtualized systems were built in the late
1960’s and early 1970’s [169]. These systems were largely motivated by the desire to allow
multiple users to work on the same hardware, while allowing each user direct access to the
hardware for applications such as operating system debugging and development, running
diagnostic software, or running a different operating system [74]. By 1974, there were at
least ten virtual machine systems either available for use or under development including
the VM/370, CP-40, CP-67, 360/30, and the PDP-10 [73]. With the shift to x86 hardware
– which is harder to virtualize – for both server and desktop machines, virtualization fell
out of favor during most of the 1980’s and 1990’s.
By 1998, VMWare had solved many of the challenges associated with virtualizing the
x86 architecture. Soon after, they released both desktop and server class virtualization
products that effectively renewed interest in virtualization technologies [172]. In the fol-
lowing years, virtualization became increasing ubiquitous, in part because of open source
projects such as Xen [16] and KVM [134]. While many people currently use virtualization
products for the same reasons cited in the 1970’s (e.g., running multiple operating sys-
tems or improved hardware utilization), a new trend has emerged with people looking at
ways to creatively use virtualization as part of a comprehensive rethinking of host-based
system architectures. Virtualization is now used to support a wide variety of services in-
cluding migration, fault tolerance, debugging, host monitoring, and sand boxing. Whitaker
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et al. designed an extensible virtual machine monitor for supporting these types of services
[182]. An ongoing debate questions if these applications of virtualization are actually turn-
ing virtualized systems into a modernized form of microkernel [79, 82]. Regardless of the
answer, this debate illustrates that virtualization is now used to support a wide variety of
applications.
Isolation Isolation is one of the key virtualization properties used to motivate its use
for security applications and architectures. Traditionally, virtualization provides complete
isolation between virtual machines. In this case, virtual machines have no more or less con-
nectivity to each other than to non-virtualized hosts. Madnick and Donovan were the first
to recognize the security benefits of this in 1973, suggesting that the isolation between vir-
tual machines would provide stronger security than the isolation between processes within
a given operating system [110]. Around the same time, Lampson defined a set of rules for
confining an arbitrary program [104]. Drawing on the work from Madnick and Donovan,
these rules would be much easier to enforce using virtualization instead of a traditional
operating system. Similarly, Saltzer and Schroeder discussed the concept of controlled
sharing noting that it is a simple concept that is difficult to implement given the mecha-
nisms required [148], but this can also be simplified using virtualization.
Many researchers have leveraged this isolation property to make stronger statements
about the security of their systems. Rushby proposed a separation kernel as a small kernel
that provides strong isolation between the various processes that it runs [141]. This sep-
aration kernel concept was implemented using virtualization by Kelem and Feiertag [97].
Shockley and Schell proposed used “TCB subsets” to simplify the process of evaluating
the security of large systems [158]. These subsets must be isolated from each other, only
communicating through well defined channels, which is easier to implement using the vir-
tualization abstraction.
Modern virtualization platforms provide for a significant amount of sharing between
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virtual machines. One technique to control this sharing, and to enable the types of isolation
applications discussed above, is to implement a mandatory access control policy within
the hypervisor. Karger discussed the requirements for this approach in 2005 [93]. Around
the same time, Sailer et al. implemented mandatory access control for Xen [146]. These
mechanisms provide the foundation for controlling interactions between virtual machines,
however identifying the techniques and policies required to achieve these goals remains an
active research area [140].
Suitability In recent years, some researchers have questioned the suitability of using vir-
tualization to address security problems. For example, Bellovin expressed concern over the
potentially vulnerable interfaces required for interaction between virtual machines and the
higher administrative burden imposed by virtualization [22]. And Garfinkel and Rosenblum
identified several ways in which the rapid provisioning of virtual machines can complicate
security administration [70]. All of these concerns are valid, but they are only critical of
specific virtualization use cases.
The architecture proposed in this thesis does not correspond to these use cases. In-
stead, we use virtualization strictly as a technique to provide controlled isolation between
the security-critical software and the user or server operating environment. This use case
leverages previous work on isolation in a virtualized environment, while also benefiting
from the application flexibility afforded by virtualization [33]. Using a custom hypervisor
could further improve on this deployment scenario by reducing the size of the trusted com-
puting base (TCB) [84]. Finally, the major challenges for implementing a secure hypervisor
on the x86 platform [138] are no longer a concern due to the recent virtualization exten-
sions added by both Intel and AMD to the base x86 architecture. For these reasons, we
believe that virtualization is well suited for supporting the security architecture proposed
in this thesis.
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2.4 Memory Analysis Techniques
As discussed in Section 2.2, virtual machine introspection (VMI) is a technique that en-
ables one virtual machine to view the runtime state of another virtual machine. The most
common runtime state information accessed using VMI is memory because it contains a
significant amount of information about the current state of the system. The major draw-
back to this approach is that it can be difficult to extract meaningful and useful informa-
tion from raw memory. This is because the memory view provided through VMI is very
low-level and it lacks any semantic information. The techniques used to extract relevant
information from a raw memory view are collectively known as memory analysis.
The field of memory analysis first became popular within the digital forensics com-
munity. This community realized that one could acquire a memory snapshot of a system
and then use that snapshot to extract forensic evidence detailing the activities happening on
the machine at the time of the snapshot. Earlier work in this space, dating back to 1999,
focused on techniques to scan memory, looking for malware signatures [164]. By 2005,
forensic analysts began reconstructing the virtual address space and extracting the mem-
ory associated with the kernel and specific processes running on the system [28, 29]. The
next major step forward was the introduction of FATKit, a framework for memory analysis
created by Petroni et al. [132]. FATKit could extract the information needed for analyz-
ing kernel data structures through static analysis of the kernel source code while providing
a generic and extensible framework for performing memory analysis. While FATKit was
never made publicly available, one of the same authors eventually released Volatility, which
provided many of the same features, as an open source project [177].
Following the release of Volatility, many people in the forensics community discovered
ways to extract a wide variety of useful information from memory. Schuster showed how
to locate processes and threads [152] and how to extract data from pool allocations [151]
in Windows. Kornblum showed how to interpret Windows page table entries to identify
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swapped and non-initialized memory regions [102]. Dolan-Gavitt described how to ex-
tract more semantically meaningful data from windows processes using their associated
virtual address descriptor (VAD) tree structure [52]. He also described techniques for ex-
tracting and analyzing the Windows registry from memory [53]. And Arasteh and Debbabi
showed how to extract a process’ execution history by analyzing its stack [8]. All of these
techniques were designed to be very practical and most included demonstration code to
show how the technique works. While these techniques are extremely useful, their primary
drawback is that they only work on specific versions of Windows. Porting the techniques to
work on other versions of Windows, or other operating systems, would require considerable
effort.
Security tools deployed using VMI must do some memory analysis to gather runtime
state information from the system. As VMI has grown in popularity, researchers have begun
searching for ways to make this memory analysis more general and more robust. Cozzie et
al. leveraged the inherent structure of program data to identify data in memory, and parse
it based on how it is referenced by other code and data [44]. And Dolan-Gavitt used a
technique similar to fuzzing to identify the portions of data structures that are required for
system operation, and therefore that are most useful for creating data structure signatures
[54].
In Chapter 4, this thesis explores general techniques for locating data structures in mem-
ory across a wide variety of operating system versions.
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CHAPTER III
SECURE ACTIVE HOST-BASED MONITORING
3.1 Motivation
As malware has become increasingly sophisticated over the past several years, it is no
longer unusual to see it disable critical security services on a victim’s machine. Re-
searchers responded to this threat by moving security services into different virtual ma-
chines (VMs) [69]. Techniques such as virtual machine introspection (VMI) make this
possible by bridging the semantic gap between the Security VM and other VMs running
on the same platform. In particular, VMI and related techniques have been used to build
a wide range of security tools including intrusion detection systems, memory and disk in-
tegrity checkers, and system monitors [103, 125, 89]. All of these tools share one thing in
common: each relies on passive monitoring. Passive monitoring is when the security tool
monitors by external scanning or polling. As a result, it is unable to guarantee interposition
on events before they happen.
This fundamental limitation of passive monitoring means that it is not a sufficient tech-
nique for implementing a full-featured anti-virus, intrusion detection, or intrusion preven-
tion system. Previous efforts to implement these types of systems within a Security VM
have resorted to implementing the systems with crippled functionality. What was missing
in these systems was the ability to do active monitoring. Active monitoring is when the
security tool is actively notified of system events when they happen, instead of polling to
find out after the fact. When a critical system event occurs (e.g., execution reaching a hook
or a particular hardware event), it will interrupt execution and pass control to the security
tool. Active monitoring can be done both inside and outside of the system being monitored.
Each location offers tradeoffs in security and visibiliy.
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In order to achieve the best visibility, active monitoring should be performed by placing
hooks inside the untrusted User VM. However, this type of active monitoring is challenging
in the types of virtualized security architectures used in recent research. The problem is
that it requires security-critical code inside untrusted User VMs. Since a major reason for
moving to a virtualized architecture is to remove security-critical code from the untrusted
User VMs, this feels like a step backwards. Properly protecting this code is sufficiently
challenging that some researchers have attempted to avoid the problem altogether [88],
resulting in systems that can only detect attacks, not prevent them. Furthermore, recent
work has focused on providing strong protections for the entire kernel code [155], but
these do not protect kernel data so they are insufficient for protecting entire applications. If
this were the end of the story, then security in virtualized architectures would be limited to
passive monitoring and the resulting security tools would remain crippled.
In this chapter, we introduce the Turret framework1 that combines both types of active
monitoring with passive monitoring to create a general secure active monitoring solution
for security applications. We show how the monitoring mechanisms can be implemented
and protected. Any system that uses active monitoring, including any future advances in
the field, can benefit from the added protections that our work provides. The primary
research contribution of this work is a framework to perform secure, active monitoring in
a virtualized environment. We show design techniques that allow installation of protected
hooks into an untrusted User VM. These hooks will trap execution in the untrusted User
VM and transfer control to software in the Security VM. We also show design techniques to
perform active monitoring from outside of the untrusted User VM. These techniques utilize
hardware interrupt events such as network packets or user input from keyboards and pointer
devices as active monitoring triggers. Finally, we show how active monitoring can leverage
passive monitoring to create a generally applicable framework for security applications.
1We call our framework Turret (pronounced Tûr'̆ıt) after the small towers that were used in medieval
castles for military lookout and fortification.
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Ensuring the security of this system is non-trivial. Our design is a departure from tradi-
tional secure systems work in that we place hooks inside the untrusted User VM, without
layering them directly on top of trusted code. By limiting the functionality of the code
placed inside the untrusted User VM and providing specialized protection mechanisms, we
are able to ensure the security of this approach. The functionality removed from the un-
trusted User VM is then implemented in the Security VM, so the overall functionality of the
system is not reduced. The protection mechanisms can be deployed as needed so that the
system only uses more costly mechanisms when required. Using these techniques, we are
able to thwart attempts by malware to disable security applications that use our monitoring
framework. We provide a security analysis of our architecture in Section 3.6.
3.2 Background Information
3.2.1 Previous Approaches
Virtualization technology has made it possible to provide security services with better pro-
tection by isolating them into separate, protected VMs. Research on techniques like mem-
ory and disk introspection [69, 125] have shown how to leverage this isolation to securely
monitor a system’s state. Virtual machine introspection (VMI) works by having a Secu-
rity VM map the physical page frames of an untrusted VM into its own address space.
It allows security applications to have complete visibility over another virtual machine’s
raw memory state. Using VMI, higher-level code and data structures can be semantically
reconstructed to provide an abstract view of the system’s state. While VMI has many
applications, it is fundamentally limited because it can only perform passive monitoring.
Therefore, introspection alone is not sufficient for applications that rely on active monitor-
ing, such as anti-virus tools and host-based intrusion prevention systems.
Recent work on malware analysis [87, 117, 186] uses a form of VM-based active mon-
itoring to intercept and analyze the run-time behavior of malware in a controlled environ-
ment. Although active monitoring is an integral goal of such systems, the requirements
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and usage scenarios of these systems and our system differ, making malware analysis ap-
proaches unsuitable for use on production systems.
Malware analysis systems are primarily designed to monitor a large and comprehen-
sive set of activities inside the User VM at a very low-level. This approach is feasible for
two reasons. First, the offline fashion in which this analysis is normally done makes per-
formance and run-time overhead a non-issue for such systems. Second, the fact that it is
done in a staged, controlled environment, means that the collected low-level data can be
directly mapped to the malware’s activity with few false positives. In a production setting
such as ours, the performance impact created by such systems make its use impractical.
Furthermore, the low semantic level in which events are captured makes it difficult to infer
the higher-level data needed to make security decisions.
In malware analysis, another important requirement is that the analyzer and the active
monitor must remain hidden from the malware. This means that they should not introduce
any noticeable side-effects in the malware’s execution environment, as this could cause the
malware to intentionally alter its behavior in an effort to thwart analysis attempts. However,
in our production setting, we are only concerned with the protection and effectiveness of
our monitoring components.
3.2.2 Xen Hypervisor
The Turret framework is designed to be sufficiently flexible to be compatible with a wide
variety of execution environments. These include various virtualization platforms, co-
processor platforms, and TPM platforms. However, the implementation of any such frame-
work requires attention to low-level details, and as such it requires some effort to port it
between platforms. For the purposes or our prototyping and testing, we choose to build
Turret using the Xen virtualization platform [16]. In this section, we provide background
information on the features of Xen that are most relevant to the Turret framework.
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3.2.2.1 Xen Overview
Xen supports both the para-virtualized and the fully-virtualized methods of system vir-
tualization. Para-virtualization consists of altering the guest OSes by replacing sensitive
instructions that cannot be virtualized with special hypercalls, that is, calls that are made
directly to the hypervisor. This approach has the advantage of providing good perfor-
mance, since no trapping is done, and also allowing virtual machines to run on top of
non-virtualizable architectures (such as x86) [138]. Nevertheless, one drawback of par-
avirtualization is that the guest OSes must be modified. For this reason, Xen also supports
fully-virtualized systems which allows it to run unmodified OSes by using the Intel VT-x
and AMD-V technologies.
Xen uses a split VM architecture, meaning that regular guest OSes are kept in unpriv-
ileged VMs (referred to as user domains or domU), and a single administrative VM exists
(referred to as dom0). Dom0 can be seen as a VM level extension of Xen in which all of
the management functionalities are located. It has complete access rights to all VMs being
run and also works as a device driver proxy for domU’s virtual devices.
The hypervisor itself is a simple and thin software layer whose main job is to guarantee
proper isolation between VMs, performing minimal resource management. This isolation
is quite robust, since Xen relies directly on hardware-level protection mechanisms and has
a much narrower interface than a standard operation system (e.g., Linux), leaving less room
for programming errors or bugs that could result in isolation violations.
3.2.2.2 Memory Management
One of the key tasks for a hypervisor is to partition the system memory between each VM.
Xen achieves this using three levels of memory: machine, physical, and virtual addresses.
The machine addresses are the actual addresses used by the hardware and managed by the
hypervisor. The physical addresses are what each guest OS uses. This first abstraction
allows the hypervisor to assign non-contiguous memory regions to a VM. As far as the
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VM is concerned, the physical addresses are the addresses used by the hardware. In reality,
these addresses are translated by a lookup table in the hypervisor into machine addresses.
The third type of address is a virtual address, which is used the same way in the OS as
traditionally used in OSes.
Both machine and physical addresses are often referred to in terms of a machine frame
number (MFN) and a physical frame number (PFN). These numbers refer to a single page
of memory, which are typically 4kB bytes each2. A complete address is given as both an
MFN or PFN and an offset into that page of memory. Using this scheme, Xen provides
tables to convert from MFN to PFN and PFN to MFN. These tables are called M2P and
P2M, respectively. Similarly, the running OSes use a page table (PT) to convert between
virtual addresses and machine addresses. Xen protects these PTs in order to ensure the
memory isolation between VMs. A para-virtualized OS must invoke a hypercall to modify
its PT and a fully-virtualized OS will trap into the hypervisor when it attempts to change
its PT.
3.2.2.3 Inter-VM Isolation
The hypervisor maintains distinct memory regions for each VM through PT management,
as described above. However, there is still a need for some communication between VMs.
For example, dom0 maintains the virtual hardware devices that are used by each domU.
Therefore, every hardware event including keyboard events, mouse events, network pack-
ets, etc. are sent through dom0. Given the presence of this communication, one cannot
argue that the isolation between VMs is complete. Instead, we refer to this isolation as
being controlled. There are a limited number of ways to communicate between VMs so
these communication channels can be carefully audited. Furthermore, Xen contains built-
in mandatory access control (MAC) hooks that allow one to specify an appropriate inter-
VM communication policy [146]. The narrowness of Xen’s interface with each VM allows
2Here we refer to the x86 architecture where memory pages are usually 4kB, but can also be 2MB or
4MB.
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for this policy to be much more simple than a typical OS-level MAC policy. As a result,
we can have greater confidence that the policy and the interface are implemented correctly,
and that the inter-VM isolation is sufficiently controlled to prevent an attacker from passing
malicious code between VMs.
3.3 Security Requirements and Threat Model
We designed the Turret framework using a set of self-imposed design and security goals.
This section introduces these goals in their idealized form. Later, as we describe Tur-
ret’s implementation details, we explain the compromises that had to be made to realize
this framework. Understanding the idealized goals described below provides a foundation
for understanding how the implementation compromises impact the overall security of the
framework. We perform this security analysis in Section 3.6.
3.3.1 Design Goals
The Turret framework is based on six high-level design goals. In a general sense, these
goals can be seen as typical good programming guidelines, or good security guidelines. For
example, some of our goals could be seen as specialized versions of Saltzer and Schroeder’s
classic security design principles [148]. This is intentional, as our goal was to leverage
known design principles in order to build a robust monitoring framework. With this in
mind, we identify the following six goals:
1. No superfluous modifications to the hypervisor. The hypervisor should remain as
small and simple as possible since it is part of the TCB. If a hypervisor includes
the necessary primitives to support the monitoring framework, then it should not be
modified. If a hypervisor lacks the necessary primitives, then the modifications made
should be what is minimally required to support the monitoring framework.
2. No superfluous modifications to the VM or the user OS. Modifications to the user
OS (i.e., the OS being monitored), are problematic. Without careful attention to
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security, the user OS and any malware running in it can tamper with this code. One
of the key reasons why virtualization is attractive for secure, active monitoring is the
controlled isolation between VMs. Placing monitoring code within the same OS that
is being monitored bypasses this isolation. Therefore, this requirement encourages
all monitoring code to remain in an isolated VM unless such a restriction makes it
impossible for a monitor to gather the necessary information. In these situations, the
monitoring code must be strongly protected to ensure that an attacker can not tamper
with or circumvent the code.
3. Small performance impact. An excessive performance impact can render a mon-
itoring framework worthless. This requirement ensures that the monitoring frame-
work does not prevent the user OS from performing its intended functions. The
performance impact is measured as any reduction in performance of an application
caused by the monitoring software. Ideally this impact is both small and consistent,
but some initialization costs may be required.
4. Rapid development of new monitors. New monitors may be needed to address new
types of attacks. Furthermore, it is advantageous to keep the monitor code simple
to limit the opportunity for introducing errors into the monitors. The monitoring
framework should provide APIs that are used to develop new monitors. Therefore,
satisfaction of this requirement means that the APIs should be designed in a way that
simplifies the job of the monitor developer.
5. Ability to monitor any data on user OS. Monitors should have a full view into the
user OS. The monitoring framework should not be limited to providing information
about a small part of the user OS. For example, an ideal memory monitor should be
able to view all memory on the user OS. Likewise, an ideal disk monitor should be
able to view all data going to and from the disk device. While this ideal may not
always be possible, the more information a monitor can view, the harder it is for an
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attacker to evade detection.
6. Target OS cannot tamper with monitors. If the user OS can tamper with the mon-
itors, then the possibility exists for malicious code to tamper with the monitors. For
this reason, all of the monitors should be isolated or protected from the user OS. This
is related to requirement (2), above. However, here we require that all monitor code,
regardless of its location, be protected from attack. If all monitor code is in an iso-
lated VM, then this is not difficult. If some monitor code must be placed outside of
the TCB, then additional measures must be taken to protect that code. The extent of
these measures will depend on the nature of the code being protected. In summary,
the protection of the monitoring components should follow as closely as possible the
formal requirements established in Section 3.3.2 for secure active monitoring.
We note that the last requirement does not enforce complete adherence with the formal
requirements raised in Section 3.3.2 due to the difficulty of preventing all possible attacks,
as will be discussed in Section 3.6.2. It does, however, significantly raise the bar and
prevents the majority of attacks against active monitoring security tools.
3.3.2 Formal Requirements
In this section, we present a formal model that generalizes security applications performing
active monitoring by placing hooks in a system to initiate actions when specific events
occur. We use this model to analyze possible attacks on such applications under a powerful
adversary that controls the entire system and identify a list of requirements that an ideal
secure monitoring approach should satisfy in order to defeat such attacks. These formal
requirements drive the design of the active monitoring hooks in the Turret framework.
Figure 1 illustrates our model. Consider a security application A(C,D) with code C
and data D that wants to actively monitor the occurrences of a set of events E occurring
inside a machine M. Suppose that the application depends on libraries or OS subsystems
denoted by L(C′,D′) for its execution. In our model, we generically represent events as
36
Libraries, OS and 
other dependencies
L(C',D')














Legend of attacks: 
A1: Bypass hook
A2: Modify event context
A3: Tamper with security application
A4: Tamper with dependencies
A5: Tamper with response
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Hook He
Figure 1: Formal model of secure active monitoring shown with potential attacks.
activities occurring sometime along the execution of the kernel or a user process, which are
handled by event-handlers that exist in the system. Any event e ∈ E is actively intercepted
by placing a hook He in the control flow path between the point of the event occurring
and the point where handling the event is finished. The purpose of the hook is to initiate a
diversion of control-flow to the security application. Depending on where the security ap-
plication resides, this diversion can be a straightforward control transfer, a process switch
or even an inter-VM communication. Therefore, we use a generic notation Ne to represent
the notification call to the security application. The context information Ie about the event
and the hook is sent along with the notification. We express the behavior of the security
application for the particular instance of the event as B(Ie), which may include performing
checks, processing models, generating logs, determining appropriate responses, etc. Fi-
nally, the response of the security application is denoted by R(Ie), which are actions carried
out on the system, including updates to the state of the system or modifications in execution
flow.
We can identify several classes of attacks on various aspects of the active monitoring
model. The first class of attacks (A1) disables or bypasses the hooks He or tampers with
the notification mechanism, so that Ne is not invoked. Attacks (A2) can target and modify
the context information Ie, providing the security application with an altered view of the
occurred event e. In addition, some attacks may change the behavior B(Ie) exhibited by
application on receiving Ie. These include attacks that modify the security application A
and its code C and data D (A3), or any of its dependencies L (A4). Attacks (A5) may alter
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the response carried out by the security application by intercepting and modifying it.
The requirements for a secure active monitoring architecture that defeats the attacks are
as follows:
1. Ne is triggered if and only if e occurs legitimately.
2. Ie is not modifiable between the occurrence of e and the invocation of Ne.
3. B(Ie) of the security application is not maliciously alterable.
4. The effects of R(Ie) on the system are enforced.
The first requirement states that an attacker should not succeed in circumventing hooks
or generating spurious notifications. The second requirement ensures that an attacker can-
not modify the context information Ie before invocation of Ne to alter or hide information
regarding the event e. The third requirement ensures that the functionality of the security
tool itself is not maliciously altered, defeating all attacks that tamper with the application
process or any underlying subsystems it depends on. The fourth requirement ensures that
the responses on the state of the system are always carried out as intended without letting
the attacker modify them.
Assuming that an attacker has complete control over the system M, a security applica-
tion that executes in the same machine with the same privileges as the attacker is unable
to satisfy the above requirements. This is because the attacker can disable any protection
mechanism and have complete access to the hooks, the application and its dependencies.
By having higher privilege levels than the attacker, a hypervisor based approach can in-
corporate certain protections that the attacker cannot disable. Even in this scenario, if the
security application is in the same VM as the attacker, it is hard to satisfy the third re-
quirement. Since the application is running on subsystems controlled by the attacker, the
run-time behavior of these subsystems along with the application needs to be protected,
which may result in having to protect a large portion of the kernel. Although systems
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like SecVisor [155] may be sufficient to protect the kernel code, they are not suitable for
protecting kernel data. This motivates our architecture of having the security application
execute in a separate security VM, which is isolated from the attacker.
3.3.3 Threat Model and Assumptions
We make the standard assumptions seen in most other virtualization security architec-
tures [56, 68, 69, 91]. The hypervisor and Security VM are part of the trusted computing
base (TCB) and the User VM is not. Therefore, malicious code can only affect the User
VM. The hypervisor is ideally designed to be a small software layer that is both verifiable
and secure. The hypervisor ensures isolation between the Security VM and the User VM,
providing protection for security applications. Note that attacks such as Blue Pill [145] are
not possible because a hypervisor using virtualization extensions is already installed as part
of our architecture. Similarly, the SubVirt attack [100] is not possible because it was not
designed to handle nested virtualization.
Beyond these general assumptions, we make some more specific assumptions for dif-
ferent portions of the framework. First we consider the runtime security of software placed
in the User VM (e.g., software hooks). In order to focus on this problem, we assume that
the machine can undergo a secure boot [9]. Furthermore, we assume that the User VM
undergoes an initialization after boot. This initialization procedure will start the compo-
nents, protect them, and provide for any additional security configuration. After the VM is
initialized, it enters a running state where it is assumed to be subject to malicious software
and other attack attempts.
Next we consider the active monitoring event handlers in the Security VM. In order
to assure the integrity of our security software, we assume that it has a trusted execution
environment (such as that provided by a secure vitrualization environment or a platform
implementing trusted computing [161]) that is isolated from malicious software running in
the user environment. This trusted execution environment is created through the controlled
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isolation provided by the hypervisor. This is why we consider both the Security VM and
the hypervisor to be part of the TCB.
Finally, because our solution uses virtual machine introspection (VMI) to extract user-
generated content and determine the meaning of hardware input events or hook events, we
must assume that the layout of the operating system (OS) and application-level data struc-
tures we examine have not been altered. This assumption, which we call the introspection
assumption, is common to most current VMI-based solutions [69, 91, 126]. It also repre-
sents a fairly high bar for the attacker because modifying the layout of these data structures
would require updating all code in the system that uses them. Otherwise the affected OS or
application would no longer function properly.
While the introspection assumption was necessary to complete the work presented in
this thesis, it may not be suitable for all environments. For example, in high security
situations, security applications may not want to assume anything about the layout of the
data structures within an operating system or its applications. In these situations, it is
not currently possible to extract rich semantic information about the running system (e.g.,
locations of widgets on the screen or the DOM tree from a web browser) because there
is no way to verify the integrity of the system’s data or code. Christodorescu et al. [36]
are working to address this problem by building semantic knowledge from the hardware,
which serves as a root of trust. Approaches such as this increase the trust in a small amount
of data obtained through VMI, but leave the majority of the information with an unknown
level of trust. Hopefully this balance will continue to shift as more researchers address this
problem.
In our threat model, we assume that the attacker can compromise the user’s OS and
any application running inside it. Aside from the restrictions implied by the introspection
assumption, he is free to execute arbitrary code, but cannot violate the security isolation
provided by the trusted execution environment. We also assume that the attacker does not
have physical access to the host, and hence cannot manipulate hardware events before they
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reach the guest OS. Finally, we assume that the attacker cannot make modifications to the
hardware (e.g., by flashing firmware, in order to generate fake hardware inputs). These
assumptions reflect a realistic attacker who has successfully infected a user’s system with
malware and obtained administrative privileges.
3.4 The Turret Framework
Turret is a virtualization-based framework designed to facilitate the monitoring of an oper-
ating system and all of its applications and data at runtime. Turret provides active monitor-
ing, which is needed to interpose and enforce security decisions on specific system events.
Turret also ensures that the security-critical software components are protected from any
form of tampering or circumvention.
3.4.1 Overview
Examples of applications that can benefit from Turret include anti-virus tools, anti-spyware
tools, control flow-based intrusion detection systems, spam prevention tools, click fraud
prevention tools, and nearly any other software tool that performs active or passive monitor-
ing. The potential applications span beyond the realm of security tools and includes system
administration, performance analysis, and software testing. All of these applications share
a high-level operational flow that is supported by Turret. First, active monitoring produces
some form of event notification (e.g., a hook in the user OS or a hardware event). Next, the
application learns more about this event using some form of passive monitoring. Finally,
some action is taken in response to the event (e.g., writing a log entry or stopping the event
from proceeding).
The Turret framework is illustrated in Figure 2, with components of the TCB repre-
sented in gray. As shown in this figure, active monitoring can take several different forms.
Applications that require fine-grained event notification can place hooks in the User VM
that send hook events to the Security VM. Alternatively, or in addition, applications can
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Figure 2: High-level view of the Turret framework and its core components.
monitor network traffic originating from or destined to the User VM.
There is a fundamental difficulty in conciliating protection and flexibility with active
monitoring. The greatest flexibility comes when hooks are placed inside the untrusted User
VM, which in a traditional scenario would make them prone to tampering by intruders with
system-wide privileges. Solving this fundamental conflict is one of Turret’s contributions.
At a high-level, it does this by splitting the security application into two VMs and using a
special memory protection mechanism to guarantee the integrity of the hooks. As shown
in Figure 2, Turret includes two VMs: the untrusted User VM and a Security VM that is
part of our TCB.
Since the User VM is untrusted, software placed inside it requires special protection.
This can be difficult to achieve if the components are too large or too integrated with the
surrounding OS, so we keep them to the minimum required. These include the hooks for
intercepting events, and a small specially-crafted trampoline code to pass events signaled
by the hooks to the hypervisor. These components are self-contained and simple enough
that write-protecting their memory footprint is sufficient to guarantee their correct behavior.
We add a special mechanism to the hypervisor to provide these memory protections, along
with an inter-VM communication functionality used for event passing. These additions,
which we have implemented, are small to reduce the likelihood of introducing bugs into
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the hypervisor.
Applications that don’t need the added flexibility of placing hooks inside the User VM
can opt to only use hardware and network events. In this case, the entire security application
is contained within the Security VM, allowing the isolation provided by the hypervisor to
improve the security posture of the security application.
The Security VM contains the core of the active monitoring application, where the pro-
cessing and decision making associated with its functionality is done. Techniques such
as virtual machine introspection can be used as part of this decision making to gather ad-
ditional information about any of the event notifications. After a decision is made, the
security application can perform any number of actions such as preventing the continuation
of a function call in the User VM, writing a log message, or denying outbound network
traffic.
As an example scenario, an anti-virus application would place its signature matching
and containment algorithms in the Security VM, whereas its monitoring hooks would go
into the guest VM. These hooks would be triggered whenever certain monitored events
were executed by the User OS, and transmitted to the security VM by the trampoline with
the aid of the hypervisor. The anti-virus’ core engine would receive these events and use
introspection to enrich them with contextual information, which would then be processed
by its signature matching algorithms and heuristics. After reaching a decision, it would be
sent back to the guest VM’s trampoline, where a response measure is carried out, such as
preventing a process from loading or a file from being written to disk.
The remainder of this Chapter will focus on the software components that enable se-
cure, active monitoring in the Turret framework. This includes components in the Security
VM, User VM, and the hypervisor. Chapter 4 will provide more details on the memory
analysis techniques that enable useful passive memory monitoring through virtual machine
introspection, as depicted in Figure 2.
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3.4.2 Security VM Components
Most of the software necessary to support the Turret framework resides in the Security VM.
The only software not in the Security VM is that responsible for installing and protecting
fine-grained hooks in the User VM. Applications that do not require this fine-grained active
monitoring can operate completely within the Security VM. The key benefit to placing
software in the Security VM is that it is more difficult for malicious software in the User
VM to attack it.
Each VM is largely isolated from other VMs through software-based isolation provided
by the hypervisor. However, this isolation must not be complete because the Security VM
requires access to the User VM’s runtime state. Furthermore, the User VM requires some
interface with the hypervisor in order to interact with the system’s hardware. Different
deployment scenarios (e.g., home user versus military installation) operate under different
threat models. For the most secure settings, these interfaces must be minimized and audited
to maintain the security of the Turret framework. For less secure settings, it may be suffi-
cient to deploy Turret using an off-the-shelf virtualization solution. In either case, we refer
to the isolation between VMs as controlled isolation to emphasize that it is not absolute
and that it must be managed to ensure adequate security.
This controlled isolation makes it very challenging to deploy useful security tools in the
Security VM. This section describes how the Turret framework overcomes the challenges
related to accessing the information needed to support security applications, including both
active and passive monitoring techniques.
3.4.2.1 Virtual Machine Introspection
Virtual machine introspection (VMI) is the technique of viewing information about one VM
from inside another VM. In the case of the Turret framework, it is used to view information
about the User VM from within the Security VM. This is strictly a passive monitoring















This software is available as part of the
open source Xen virtualization platform. 
Section 3.4.2.1 introduces the XenAccess
virtual machine introspection library. 
Chapter 4 discusses memory analysis.
Chapters 5-6 discuss applications that
utilize the Turret framework.
Figure 3: Turret’s virtual machine introspection capabilities are provided by the XenAc-
cess Library. We originally created XenAccess to support this research, it is now available
as an open source project at http://www.xenaccess.org.
scan memory for viruses) or to supplement event information for an active monitoring
application.
In order to provide VMI capabilities to the Turret framework, we developed the Xe-
nAccess Library. As shown in Figure 3, the XenAccess library is designed to operate in
the Security VM using the XenControl and XenStore libraries that are provided with Xen.
Building on top of these libraries, XenAccess provides both read and write access to the
runtime memory state of the User VM. Applications using XenAccess can access this mem-
ory using virtual addresses from the User VM’s kernel or from any of its applications (i.e.,
by specifying both the virtual address and the process identifier).
After requesting a specific virtual address, applications receive a pointer to the re-
quested page of memory, mapped from the User VM, along with the offset into that page
for the requested address. This low-level access leaves the application to interpret the data
within each page of memory. A better solution, as depicted in Figure 3, is to place another
layer of abstraction between XenAccess and the application. This memory analysis library
can use domain-specific knowledge to extract useful information from the User VMs mem-
ory as described in Chapter 4.
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3.4.2.2 Hook Event Listener
Hook events are the notifications that originate when the User VM triggers a hook installed
in its kernel space. Section 3.4.3 provides details about how the hooks are installed and
protected. In this section, we consider the complementary software that receives these
notifications.
The Security VM contains the back-end components for processing hook events. This
includes a kernel-level driver and a user-space security application that receives the hook
events. The security application is where the decision-making functionality of the monitor-
ing solution is implemented. It can be any software component that makes use of Turret,
such as an anti-virus tool or a host-based IDS. The kernel-level driver is the communica-
tions agent responsible for relaying hook events between the User VM and the security
application. These include hook notifications transmitted by the User VM and relayed by
the hypervisor, and decisions sent by the security application to the User VM.
3.4.2.3 User-Initiated Hardware Event Interposition
As stated above, the Turret framework requires the ability to interpose on hardware events
for one form of active monitoring. Virtualization has a similar requirement because these
events must be multiplexed between the virtual machines running on a single computer.
Building off of this invariant, the framework taps into the location where this multiplexing
occurs. This ensures that applications using the framework have access to every hardware
event. This mechanism amounts to a keystroke (and mouse event) logger running in the
Security VM. However, unlike many keystroke loggers that are designed with malicious
intent, we utilize knowledge of these events to improve the system’s security.
It is important to emphasize that the hardware events received by the framework come
directly from the hardware without passing through the User VM first. In most virtualiza-
tion environments, this is handled in one of two ways. In Type I virtualization (where a
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hypervisor runs directly on the hardware), the hardware interrupts go directly to the hy-
pervisor and then they are either multiplexed from within the hypervisor or passed to a
special virtual machine that multiplexes the events. In Type II virtualization (where a host
operating system runs directly on the hardware), the host operating system receives the
hardware interrupts and then multiplexes them to the virtual machines that are simply run-
ning as processes within the host operating system. Either way, the key point is that these
hardware interrupts are received by the framework before being received by the User VM.
This means that malicious software in the User VM will not be able to forge or modify
any hardware events. The Turret framework builds on this property to ensure the overall
security of the system.
3.4.2.4 Transparent Network Interposition
The final type of active monitoring supported by Turret is driven by network traffic. This
traffic is redirected to a transparent proxy. The proxy can perform content analysis on
the outgoing network traffic at the network layer or the application layer. It can use the
receipt of a particular network packet as an active monitoring event. It can also determine
if outgoing network traffic is authorized to leave the system. Similarly, Turret can analyze
incoming network traffic; both for generating active monitoring events and for enforcing a
security policy.
3.4.3 User VM Components
In traditional systems, all applications are run within a single operating system. The User
VM fills the same role as this traditional operating system by running all applications that
are not considered to be part of the TCB. The only exception is for the hooks and trampo-
line that are placed in the User VM to achieve some of the active control and monitoring
capabilities provided by Turret. Any application can be run in the User VM since it runs
a full featured operating system. With this in mind, the Turret framework can be used to
protect a wide variety of systems including servers and desktop systems.
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One of the key capabilities in the Turret framework is the ability to insert protected
hooks throughout the operating system running in the User VM. These hooks can be jumps
placed inside program code, redirections within jump tables, or any other technique that
transfers control of execution. Hooks, or some other form of active monitoring, are required
for any security software that stops malicious code prior to it doing any damage. This is
because other techniques can only monitor by polling and are unable to guarantee detection
at arbitrary locations in the code. With the protected hooks and other active monitoring
techniques, there is a guarantee that the security software can evaluate an action before
allowing it to happen. In the case of the protected hooks, this guarantee is provided by our
memory protection mechanism, as described in Section 3.4.4.
When triggered, hooks redirect the system’s control flow to another User VM kernel
component, the trampoline. The trampoline is a specially-crafted piece of code that acts as
a bridge between the hooks and the security driver running in the Security VM. It passes
arguments from the hooked function to the hypervisor’s inter-VM communication channel,
which then delivers them to the security domain. The trampoline is also responsible for
receiving commands from the Security VM to execute actions requested by the security
software. As the rest of the User OS kernel is untrusted, the trampoline and the hooks
must be protected from tampering. This need imposes several restrictions on the design
and implementation of the trampoline. First, it must be completely self-contained. This
means that its functionality must not rely on any kernel functions or global variables, since
these may be compromised. It must also execute atomically at each round, in order to
prevent scenarios in which race conditions are used to circumvent the monitor. Finally,
the trampoline’s usage of data elements must be completely non-persistent (i.e., not rely
on data that was generated in previous hooks activations). As our protection mechanism
currently does not support the protection of data regions, not following this requirement
would make the usage of such data prone to tampering.
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3.4.4 Hypervisor Components
Our framework requires two special features from the hypervisor: protection of User OS
components and specialized inter-VM communications. The hypervisor modifications re-
quired to support these features are small, based on our implementation, which reduces the
probability of introducing vulnerabilities into our TCB.
3.4.4.1 Guest OS Component Protection
The protection mechanism is one of the key pieces of Turret, as it guarantees the integrity
of the user-space components of the framework. Unlike other framework components such
as the VMI library and security application, which are isolated by the framework’s inher-
ent design, the hooks and the trampoline are situated in the User OS’s untrusted kernel.
Therefore these components require special protection to prevent an intruder from tamper-
ing with their behavior. This type of tampering could involve the omission or forgery of
events, or disabling the monitoring solution. Because the trampoline is self-contained and
the hooks are jumps or function pointers, marking each hook’s memory as read-only is
sufficient to prevent tampering.
A straightforward solution adopted by several OSes to write-protect memory regions
is to simply guarantee that the corresponding entries in the page tables used by processes
are marked with the appropriate permission – read-only, in this case. Although useful to
prevent certain classes of failures, such as memory corruption bugs, this approach is not
suitable for a security scenario. As we assume that the intruder can take control of the
kernel, she can simply modify the page tables to disable these protections. Going a step
further, if a protection agent is used by the OS to prevent direct modifications to page tables,
the intruder could instead disable the agent to then alter the page tables. This argument can
be inductively generalized to any number of protection stages and the bottom-line is simple:
if the protection mechanism is based entirely in a single domain that is controlled by the
attacker (e.g., the User OS kernel), it can be disabled.
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In a virtualized architecture, the hypervisor is an ideal place to implement such pro-
tections for two reasons. First, as we assume it is part of our TCB, it cannot be tampered
by a malicious user. Second, as part of its job in virtualizing the hardware, the hypervisor
has complete mediation power over the memory mappings used by the VMs running on
top of it. Our framework leverages this control to obtain a flexible, fine-grained memory
protection mechanism. It is used to write-protect the hooks and the trampoline in the User
OS’s memory, so that no tampering can occur with these components. A graphical repre-
sentation of this protection is shown in Figure 2. The strength of this protection derives
from the strength of the TCB itself: the only way an attacker could undo it would be to
compromise the hypervisor, which we assume cannot be done.
Our approach of protecting the hooks and the trampoline inside the User VM is generic.
It does not rely on any features provided by the User OS. The complete mediation capability
of the hypervisor over memory mappings of the User OS is sufficient. However, since the
placement of the hooks may vary between different User OSes for the same events, the
solution must take OS-specific architecture into account, and depending on the placement
of hooks and the trampoline, different memory locations and data structures would need to
be protected.
3.4.4.2 Inter-VM Communication
As our framework requires components located in different VMs to communicate, inter-
VM communication functionality is needed. The trampoline code in the User VM must
send the events it captures from the hooks to the Security VM, and the reverse path must
also be traversed by replies sent from the Security VM. As virtualization inherently pre-
vents VMs from directly interacting with each other, the implementation of such functional-
ity must involve the hypervisor. The key property of the Turret communication mechanism
that makes it different from existing generic mechanisms is that in Turret, the hypervisor
must delay returning to the User VM until a response is available from the Security VM. A
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benefit of this design is that the User OS will not be executing while we process the hook,
which provides stronger guarantees for the system.
3.4.4.3 Related Work: Page-Level Memory Trapping
The Turret framework provides for fine-grained active monitoring using hooks placed in-
side the User VM. It also allows for active monitoring based on interposable hardware
events in the Security VM. A related form of active monitoring allows the security appli-
cation to set page-level trap events for User VM memory. This technique results in the
security application being notified when the User VM accessing a given page a memory in
a given way (e.g., accessing a page directory with write permissions). While not as fine-
grained as placing hooks directly inside the User VM, this technique has the advantage of
being easier to secure and easier to deploy across a wide variety of user operating systems.
Page-level memory trapping has been demonstrated in the Ether malware analysis research
project [50] and is available in VMSafe [173], a VMI library for VMWare products.
Page-level memory trapping could be easily integrated into the Turret framework. It
would involve an additional change to the hypervisor, along with a supporting API within
the Security VM. Once in place, it could serve as yet another active monitoring technique
that could be leveraged by security applications.
3.5 Turret Implementation
The primary goal for the Turret framework is to satisfy the design goals and security re-
quirements discussed in Section 3.3. We chose Xen as a virtualization solution because
it is a Type I hypervisor; it runs directly on the hardware, allowing for a solid foundation
to the TCB. It also already includes an infrastructure suitable for some of our monitoring
needs, so that changes to the VMM can be kept to a minimum (design goal (1)). Likewise,
by building on top of Xen’s infrastructure, we only require changes to the User OS for
fine-grained active monitoring hooks, allowing us to satisfy design goal (2). To prevent the
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target OS from tampering with the monitors and satisfy design goal (6), we place the mon-
itors in a different VM than the User OS. Active monitoring hooks are protected separately,
as discussed in Section 3.5.5. Finally, we desire a framework that can monitor any data on
the User OS in order to satisfy design goal (5). Turret currently provides passive monitor-
ing capabilities for the entire memory space in the User VM, along with active monitoring
capabilities for user input events, network events, and hooks placed directly in the User
OS kernel. While this is not an exhaustive list of all data associated with the User VM,
Chapter 6 demonstrates that this is a sufficiently useful set of data and events to build a
wide variety of meaningful security applications. We examine Turret’s adherence to design
goals (3) and (4) in Sections 3.7 and 3.8.
Figure 2 shows a high-level view of the Turret architecture. In this section, we will look
at the implementation details of several key aspects of this architecture. First we look at
the virtual machine introspection library. Next we discuss the framework mechanisms for
receiving notification of hardware events and network traffic. Next we discuss the hooks
and trampoline that can, optionally, be installed in the User VM to provide fine-grained
active monitoring. Then we discuss the inter-VM communication mechanism required to
support the hooks and trampoline. Finally, we discuss the memory protection mechanism
required to protect the hooks and trampoline.
The Turret framework utilizes functionality included with Xen in order to reduce the
implementation overhead and adhere to design goal (1). At this point it is important to
emphasize that while we acknowledge that Turret’s functionality and its adherence to our
design goals and security requirements are partially based on the infrastructure already pro-
vided by Xen, the Turret framework and the principles supporting it could be implemented
on other virtualization platforms as well. The core functionality needed in the hypervisor
includes mapping memory between virtual machines, protecting arbitrary memory regions
in the User VM, and viewing VM-specific metadata (e.g., running kernel version). This
functionality could be added to any modern virtualization environment, if it is not already
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there, allowing for support of the Turret monitoring framework.
3.5.1 Virtual Machine Introspection
Virtual machine introspection involves accessing the memory of one VM from another.
Xen provides a function in the XenControl Library that is used for this purpose and this
functionality could be added to other hypervisors using a small amount of additional code.
In Xen, the function xc_map_foreign_range(), maps the memory from one VM into
another. After the memory is mapped, it can be treated as local memory, providing for
fast monitoring capabilities. However, this function only operates using low-level machine
frame numbers (MFN) to reference memory locations. In order to be useful to monitoring
applications, this access needs to be done at the higher level abstraction of virtual addresses
or even using symbolic information (e.g., exported kernel symbols). The primary goal of
our virtual machine introspection library, which we call XenAccess3, is to provide this
higher level abstraction in order to facilitate passive memory monitoring.
In order to convert a XenAccess API call into a call to xc_map_foreign_range(),
XenAccess must perform several memory address translations. This requires additional
information about the User OS which can be obtained from the XenStore, a database of
information about each VM, and interpreted using some knowledge of the target operating
system’s implementation. The steps needed to convert a kernel symbol or virtual address
into a memory mapped page are discussed below.
XenAccess is primarily implemented in C as a shared library with 3345 source lines of
code (SLOC). XenAccess makes use of the XenControl Library (libxc) and the XenStore
Library (libxenstore). The current version supports Xen versions 3.0.4 through 3.4.0
and works for both para-virtualized and fully-virtualized VMs.
3The source code for XenAccess is available – for anyone who may be interested in extending this work
or validating our results – at http://www.xenaccess.org.
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3.5.1.1 XenAccess API
XenAccess uses the xc_map_foreign_range() function to view the memory of another
VM. Using this function eliminates the need to modify the hypervisor or the User OS,
satisfying design goals (1) and (2). This function can be used to map a memory page from
the User OS using its MFN. XenAccess uses this function for raw memory access and then
builds up from there using address translation tables in the hypervisor and the User OS. For
example, to convert a PFN to a MFN, XenAccess uses lookup tables that are provided by
Xen. To convert a virtual address to a MFN, XenAccess uses the PTs in the User OS.
The XenAccess API contains a rich set of functions for accessing the User VM’s mem-
ory. Each of these functions falls into one of the category of functions described below:
• xa_init_*(): The init functions initializes access to a specific VM given a VM
name or identifier. It returns a pointer to an instance structure that is used for mak-
ing subsequent calls to XenAccess API functions. All calls to xa_init_*() must
eventually call xa_destroy().
• xa_destroy(): Destroys an instance structure by freeing any associated memory
and closing any open handles.
• xa_access_*(): The access functions map a memory page from the User VM into
the local address space, and return a pointer to this memory. API users can specify
which memory to map by specifying the machine address, physical address, kernel
virtual address, kernel symbol, or user virtual address. This memory must be un-
mapped manually with munmap().
• xa_read_*(): The read functions are convience functions wrapped around the ac-
cess functions. Each read function will return a 32-bit or a 64-bit value from memory
in the User VM, given a particular memory address. These functions are useful for
extracting short chunks of data (e.g., pointer values or counters) without the extra
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code overhead associated with the access functions.
• xa_translate_kv2p(): This function performs a page table lookup of a kernel
virtual address using the User VM PTs.
There are also some additional convenience functions for performing common tasks
such as converting a kernel symbol to a virtual address or accessing the kernel data structure
holding process information (i.e., task_struct in Linux or EPROCESS in Windows).
All users of the introspection library must begin with a call to one of the xa_init_*()
functions. These functions initialize the xa_instance struct which holds information
that is used throughout the introspection process. Any work that can be done “up front”
and cached is held in this structure. This includes locating the address of the kernel page
directory, initializing a handle to libxc, initializing a pointer to a PFN to MFN lookup
table, determining if the domain is paravirtualized or fully virtualized, and more. Once a
user is done with the library, a call should be made to xa_destroy() to free any memory
associated with the xa_instance struct.
After initializing the xa_instance struct, one can use any of the other API func-
tions listed above. Here we explain some representative functions in more detail. Starting
with the simplest, the xa_access_kernel_va() function takes a kernel virtual address
and returns a pointer to the memory page holding that address along with the offset to the
specified address within the memory page. This address translation requires a PT lookup,
which requires XenAccess to load three memory pages4. First, the page directory is loaded
to find the location of the PT. Next, the PT is loaded to find the location of the address.
Finally, the memory page holding the address is loaded and this page, along with an offset
to the address, is returned to the user. Returning a shared memory page contributes to the
good inter-VM memory copy performance shown in Section 3.7, which helps to satisfy
4A virtual address lookup may require loading a different number of memory pages depending on the
address translation mode in use by the User VM. Three pages are required for the most common case of an















Using Introspection To View A Kernel Symbol
(1) The security application requests to view a kernel
symbol.  (2) XenAccess finds the virtual address for
the kernel symbol.  (3) Kernel page directory mapped
to find correct PT.  (4) PT mapped to find correct data
page.  (5) Data page returned to XenAccess Library.
(6) XenAccess returns a pointer and offset for the
data page to the security application.
Figure 4: Steps needed to map a kernel memory page based on a kernel symbol using
virtual memory introspection.
design goal (3).
The xa_access_kernel_sym() function, shown in Figure 4, requires one extra step
beyond the virtual address translation described above. This step is to convert a kernel
symbol to a virtual address. XenAccess performs this conversion using the exported kernel
symbols associated with the kernel from the User VM. If the User VM is running Win-
dows, the kernel export table is available in memory. If the User VM is running Linux,
this information is extracted from the kernel’s System.map file. Either way, XenAccess
scans this kernel exports until it finds the symbol that the user requested. It then proceeds
with a virtual address access using the address associated with the kernel symbol. Since
under Linux this operation requires performing a lookup from a file on disk, it is consider-
ably slower than the xa_access_kernel_va() function, but the results are cached so the
average case is fast as discussed in Section 3.7. Further performance improvements could
be achieved by memory mapping the file or moving the costly file read operations into the
xa_init_* functions.
The final function that we will discuss is xa_access_user_va(). This function pro-
vides access to user space memory. Page table lookups for a virtual address in user space
are essentially the same as kernel space. The main difference is that we must lookup the
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location of the page directory associated with the process. Recall that for kernel space, the
location of the page directory is cached during library initialization, but the page directory
locations for each process can change as processes come and go. To lookup the page di-
rectory for a process, XenAccess scans the kernel task list looking for a process with the
given process identifier. Upon finding a match, the page directory can be obtained from
the task_struct or the EPROCESS structure in kernel memory, under Linux or Windows
respectively. Using this page directory, the remainder of the virtual address translation is
the same as previously described for the kernel.
3.5.1.2 Using Cache To Improve Performance
Since XenAccess must use memory from the User OS and the hypervisor to perform ad-
dress translations, these operations can be costly. Therefore, XenAccess uses a least re-
cently used (LRU) cache to store the results of the address translations. This is similar to a
translation lookaside buffer (TLB). However, in the case of XenAccess, we also cache ker-
nel symbol names since disk access is always a slow operation. This caching is critical to
achieving acceptable performance and satisfying property (3), as discussed in Section 3.7.
One risk associated with such a cache is that the information may become stale over time
(e.g., a memory page can be swapped to disk, or a process terminated). For this reason,
one idea for future work in XenAccess is to support cache flushing, either through a simple
API call to allow the user to handle the cache or through an automated internal mechanism
that flushes the cache if a value in the cache results in a failed memory page mapping.
3.5.1.3 Using OS-Specific Information
A kernel virtual memory address can be converted to a MFN without any knowledge of
the OS in the User VM. This is because the address conversion is specific to the processor
architecture and not to the OS. A PT lookup, which is required to perform this address
conversion, starts by obtaining the address of the page directory. This information is stored
in one of the control registers, CR3, of the User VM CPU context. Starting with the page
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directory, one can complete a PT lookup and, therefore, find the MFN associated with any
virtual address on a host. However, it can be difficult to determine what virtual address to
access.
Identifying virtual addresses that are interesting requires some knowledge about the
OS. One artifact of compiling a Linux kernel is the System.map file. This file is a listing
of symbols exported from the kernel along with the virtual address of each symbol. Using
this file, combined with the ability to access arbitrary virtual addresses, one can view and
modify data such as the system call table, interrupt descriptor table, Linux kernel module
(LKM) list, task list, and more. In Microsoft Windows, exported symbols are available
in debugging libraries and in ntdll.dll. Of course, making use of these data structures
requires knowledge of the data layout inside each structure. In Linux, this is determined
by inspecting the source code and using technical references such as the kernel books by
Bovet and Cesati [26] or Love [109]. In Windows, much of this information is available
in technical references as well [143]. However, the broad field of locating, interpreting,
and extracting useful information from memory – known as memory analysis – is still very
young. We discuss this problem in greater detail in Chapter 4.
3.5.2 Hardware Event Interposition
In a default Xen installation, all hardware events pass through the administrative VM
known as dom0, before being sent to a User VM. Within dom0, Xen creates an abstract
model of the hardware devices to present each User VM with a common hardware inter-
face. This model, known as the device model, is implemented in Xen using a modified
version of Qemu [20]. Since the Turret framework uses dom0 as the Security VM, we can
simply tap into the hardware events as they pass through the device model.
We inserted code in two places in the Qemu device model, which is written in C, to
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extract keyboard and mouse events. At each of these locations, the code first opens a con-
nection to a FIFO server (described below). Once the connection is established, the key-
board or mouse information is serialized and sent to the FIFO server. The information sent
includes the key or mouse button associated with the event, whether the button was pressed
or released, and the screen coordinates associated with the event (only for mouse events).
In addition, we perform a screen capture of the User VM using the vga_hw_screen_dump
function in Qemu. The location of this screen capture file is sent along with the other event
information. The screen capture is made available to applications using the framework and
can be used for a variety of purposed including to assist in verifying user intent. After
sending this information, Qemu waits for a reply before passing the event to the User VM.
These events are all received by a FIFO server that is part of the security application.
The FIFO server is another process that is receiving these hardware events through an
interprocess communication (IPC) channel. In this case, the IPC is performed through a
UNIX named pipe. Under this design, the security application can setup a FIFO server to
receive the events if it is interested in them. If it does not need the events, then it does not
setup the server and the device model works as it normally does. If it does want to receive
the events, then the device model connects to the server and sends the events.
Beyond keyboard and mouse events, the Turret framework can also use network events
for active monitoring. The default setting in Xen is for all network traffic to pass through a
virtual network bridge in dom0. Using standard network inspection tools, we can view all
network traffic to and from the User VM. Each network packet can be treated as an active
monitoring event. Or, alternatively, an intermediate proxy can reconstruct application-level
semantics from the network stream and create events based on this higher-level abstraction
(e.g., a transparent SMTP proxy can reconstruct an outgoing email message before sending
the event notification to the security application).
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3.5.3 Hooks and Trampoline
Detecting malware on today’s systems requires monitoring events as they happen. This,
in turn, requires placing hooks throughout the system being monitored. These hooks are
usually numerous and placed throughout the kernel to detect operations such as process
creation, writing to disk, network activity, and inter-process communication. The Tur-
ret framework is capable of placing hooks anywhere within the kernel of the guest OS.
Hooking standard system calls requires the memory protections described in Section 3.5.5.
Placing hooks in other locations requires additional protections as described in Section 3.6.
Regardless of the hook location and its protections, the implementation of the hook pro-
cessing system is the same.
The hooking techniques for Turret can be use in any operating system. However, our
implementation focuses on Windows as this is the most commonly used user operating
system. In order to describe the hooking process in a concrete manner, we describe how
it works for one particular system call in Windows. The NtCreateSection system call
is the used to create a new process and is therefore interesting from a security viewpoint.
The mechanism required to hook this system call is the same as hooking any other system
call and very similar to hooking an arbitrary location within the kernel. Furthermore, the
techniques used to process this hook are similar to what one would use for processing any
hook.
In order to install the hook into the kernel API NtCreateSection, we implemented
a Windows kernel driver called hookdriver.sys. Upon installation, which happens dur-
ing the User OS initialization, the driver creates a trampoline code section, modifies the
appropriate system service descriptor table (SSDT) entry to point to it, and informs the
hypervisor to activate necessary memory protections for the hook. The driver’s imple-
mentation has 324 source lines of code (SLOC), and the trampoline occupies 89 bytes of
memory.
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The trampoline code is placed in a page of memory allocated from the nonpaged mem-
ory pool by calling the kernel function ExAllocatePoolWithTag. This ensures that the
trampoline is always available, and will never be swapped to disk. The trampoline code
section is copied from within the driver’s code base to the newly allocated memory region.
In order to modify the SSDT, we first identify the index of the NtCreateSection service.
Then we identify the base of the SSDT using the kernel symbol KeServiceDescriptorTable.
We then create the hook by placing the address of the trampoline in the appropriate entry af-
ter storing the old service routine’s address (i.e., the location of the actual NtCreateSection
function) in a pointer. This pointer is placed in the newly allocated memory region along
with the trampoline code, so that it is protected from malicious modifications.
Once the hook is placed to point to the trampoline code, the driver initiates a notifi-
cation call using a VMCALL to the hypervisor to inform the installation of the hook and the
address range of the newly allocated memory region. This information is used to secure the
indicated regions using the prot_range hypercall described in Section 3.5.5. This entire
process is completed during the secure initialization of the User OS.
3.5.4 Inter-VM Communication
When the trampoline code from the User OS makes a VMCALL into Xen, it is sending a
signal asking Xen to assist with inter-VM communication. In the Turret framework, inter-
VM communication is facilitated by Xen with signaling from the VMs performed through
hypercalls. We added a new hypercall to Xen, turret_op, that is callable from both the
User VM (via a VMCALL instruction) and the Security VM (via a direct hypercall). This
hypercall takes two arguments. The first argument is a command. If the command requires
a parameter, it is sent as the second argument. In the Security VM, the security application
issues its hypercalls using a security driver. The security driver, described in more detail
below, is a generic hypercall pass-through provided with the Turret framework that will











Figure 5: The information flow path from Xen, through the security driver, to the security
application and back are all event driven to provide good performance when processing
hook events from the User VM.
The TURRETOP_security_register command saves a memory address of the buffer
used to exchange information between Xen and the security driver. The other two com-
mands are slightly more complex.
The TURRETOP_guest_hook command builds a struct to send as a request to the
security driver. This struct contains a unique identifier for the request and information
about the hook event (e.g., hook number, associated Windows handle, or process id). This
struct is copied to the security driver’s shared memory region and then a virtual interrupt
is sent to the Security VM. This virtual interrupt, which is implemented using Xen event
channels, is a signal to the security driver to process the hook information in its shared
memory region. At this point, the command waits at a barrier until a reply is provided by
the security driver. After the reply is provided, it is returned causing the VMCALL instruction
to return, which allows the User VM to continue normal operation.
The reply from the security driver is signaled with the TURRETOP_security_response
command. Upon receiving this command, Xen gets the reply value by copying a struct
from the security driver’s shared memory region. Next, the command makes this reply
available to the hook command and breaks its barrier.
These three commands, implemented as a single hypercall, are all that is needed to
support the inter-VM communication for the Turret framework. They were implemented
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Figure 6: The page protection scheme leverages the propagation of page table entries
(PTEs) from guest space to hypervisor space to protect memory pages.
by adding 127 SLOC to Xen.
The security driver is designed to pass information up from Xen to the security applica-
tion, and down from the security application to Xen as shown in Figure 5. No information
processing or decision making occurs within this driver. This is an intentional design choice
because it is harder to implement and change kernel-level code. As new features are added
to this system, changes will typically only be made to the security application.
Since the security driver is designed to run in the Linux kernel, it is implemented as a
Linux kernel module (LKM). The LKM is installed automatically when the security appli-
cation is started. During initialization, the LKM sets up a shared memory region, a proc
entry and its handler, and a virtual interrupt handler. The shared memory region is used
to pass data between the security driver and Xen, as described above. The proc entry re-
ceives data from the security application and the virtual interrupt handler receives signals
from Xen. The security driver is 182 SLOC and should not require any changes when new
hooks are added to the system.
3.5.5 Memory Protection
We leveraged Xen’s memory management subsystem when building the memory protec-
tion mechanism. The primary goal of memory management in Xen is to virtualize each
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guest OS’s view of memory and enforce isolation between the OSes. In fully-virtualized
VMs, Xen does this using a technique called shadow paging. This technique maintains two
versions of page tables for each VM: guest page tables (GPTs), which are controlled by the
guest; and shadow page tables (SPTs), which are controlled by the hypervisor. The guest
OS handles its GPTs the same as it would in a non-virtualized setting. The main difference
is that the GPT’s mappings translate virtual addresses to an intermediate layer of addresses,
called physical addresses. Physical addresses virtualize the memory view of a guest OS,
similar to the way virtual addresses work for processes. SPTs provide direct mappings
from virtual to machine addresses, which are the addresses used by the hardware. There-
fore, the SPTs are used by the hardware to translate addresses for the guest OS while Xen
maintains consistency between the GPT and SPT. When an entry is added or changed in a
GPT, Xen translates the physical address into its corresponding machine address, performs
any necessary adjustments, and then updates the corresponding SPT. This process is called
page table entry (PTE) propagation. Under this model, Xen controls the actual machine
frames used by each VM, while also providing each guest OS with the illusion that it has
full control of the memory.
Our memory protection mechanism protects arbitrary memory regions with a byte-
sized granularity. It is composed of two main parts. The first is implemented in the
_sh_progatate function, which controls the propagation of entries from GPTs to SPTs.
The second is implemented in the sh_page_fault function, Xen’s page fault handler.
Our mechanism adds 78 SLOC to Xen, satisfying our design goal of making only minimal
additions to it.
The first part, illustrated in Figure 6, implements the core technique behind our pro-
tection mechanism. At this location we intercept the propagation of entries between the
GPTs and SPTs, and then write-protect designated frames of the User OS’s physical mem-
ory. This can happen whenever an entry is modified in a GPT, either legitimately or by
an attacker. Since Xen has full mediation over propagation and is isolated from the the
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Figure 7: The page protection scheme leverages Xen’s page fault handler to make sure it
can be done with a byte-sized granularity by emulating the memory write.
User OS, such protection cannot be circumvented. We store a list of the memory regions
that require protection, which we call the protection list. Each time an entry is propagated
from a GPT to an SPT, this list is searched for the entry’s physical frame. If it is found,
its corresponding shadow copy is marked as read-only. This prevents the User OS from
performing any further modifications to this page frame.
By itself, this technique only provides page-level protection, which is problematic if a
page contains protected and writable regions. The second part of our mechanism extends
this technique to provide byte-level protection. Its operation is illustrated in Figure 7. Each
time a page fault occurs due to a failed write, we check the target’s virtual address, which
is stored in the cr2 CPU register. Next, we check the protection list to see if the target
address requires protection. If it does, a page fault exception is propagated to the User
OS, preventing the write attempt. If not, then the User OS is attempting to write to a non-
protected region of a frame that contains a protected region. In this case, we emulate the
write operation for the User OS.
We added a new hypercall, prot_range, that can be called from the security applica-
tion running in the Security VM to initialize the protection list. This is done during the
architecture’s initialization, as soon as the hook and the trampoline are placed inside the
User OS. Additional memory ranges can also be added to the list at run-time, if desired.
Each time an update is made to the list, the shadow page cache is erased to eliminate out-
dated mappings and force the re-propagation of new mappings. Since most applications,
including our prototype, only add items to this list during initialization, there is no runtime
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performance impact on the system.
This combination of page-sized memory protection and write emulation allows us to
efficiently implement the protection of arbitrary memory regions of the User OS, with the
granularity of a single byte. In our prototype, we used this mechanism to protect several
memory regions in the User OS. The first was the NtCreateSection hook placed in the
SSDT, a 4-byte long function pointer. The second was the trampoline, a segment of code
consisting of 89 bytes in a memory page allocated when the architecture is initialized.
Additional components that require protection to prevent hook circumvention are discussed
in Section 3.6.
3.6 Security Evaluation and Analysis
New security frameworks should, ideally, be secure against current and future attacks. In
this section we evaluate how the various pieces of the Turret framework work together to
ensure the security of the application in the Security VM along with all of the components
required for its proper operation, including the hooks and trampoline code in the User VM.
We start with a practical look at how existing attacks can impact Turret. Then we perform
a more abstract analysis of Turret’s security against an unrestricted adversary.
3.6.1 Current Attacks
Several components of the Turret framework are sufficiently new that there are no current
attacks that will effect them. In particular, all of the software components in the Security
VM are protected by the isolation provided by the Xen hypervisor. Altering or disabling
these components would require exploiting a software vulnerability in Xen. Only a few
such vulnerabilities have been discovered, and these are always a result of software bugs
that can be easily patched. Furthermore, this type of attack is outside of the scope of our
threat model as discussed in Section 3.3.3.
Within the User VM, malicious code could try to hide or obfuscate data in memory
from the XenAccess virtual machine introspection library. While no current attacks are
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known to do this, the attack seems technically plausible. We note that such attacks are also
outside of the scope of our threat model, but we will discuss them briefly in Section 3.6.2.
The attacks within the scope of our threat model include anything that an attacker can
do from the User VM. Within this context, we are primarily concerned with attacks against
the hooks and trampoline code. There are current instances of malware that perform context
flow attacks to circumvent hooks placed within the OS kernel. Below we consider how this
style of attack would impact the Turret framework.
3.6.1.1 Attacking User VM Hooks
An essential component of a successful attack is to evade detection by either hiding itself
or by disabling defensive measures altogether. Many malware today incorporate features,
similar to Agobot [168], to disable commercial anti-virus programs. Earlier methods in-
volved process termination system calls for known anti-virus process names. However,
most anti-virus programs incorporate hooks into process termination and creation routines
to monitor their usages patterns for self-defense [165]. In addition, hooks are placed into
events such as file/disk access or Windows registry updates for detecting malicious up-
dates to the system. To defeat such systems, malware programs incorporate various rootkit
methods [83] that can remove such hooks to successfully disable anti-virus tools prior to
infection. A recent work [185] allows automatic analysis of the hooking behavior of mal-
ware by identifying the modified code and data structures. A large number of malware
place their own hooks in order to hide their processes, drivers, files (e.g. the FU rootkit, NT
rootkit etc.) and their malicious changes in the system or backdoors (e.g. Uay Backdoor).
A classification of rootkits can be found in [144].
As described above, a technique used by attackers to defeat commercial anti-virus tools
is to replace the hooked function pointer in the SSDT to either the original function pointer
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(disabling the hook) or to a malicious function pointer that in turn calls the original one (hi-
jacking the hook). In order to perform this attack, the malware must have detailed knowl-
edge of the internal workings of these tools. Since these kinds of low-level attacks must
be specially crafted for the target security tool to be effective, we were not able to test our
memory protections with pre-existing attack code. Instead, we developed a synthetic attack
that performs the hook hijacking attack using the same technique used by rootkits.
In our implementation, the initialization procedure in the User VM installs a hook in the
SSDT. This hook is effectively changing a function pointer so that calls to NtCreateSection
are redirected to our trampoline code. This hooking procedure is identical to that used by
commercial security tools (e.g., anti-virus products) on the market today.
Our test system consisted of the User VM running with the trampoline and hooks ini-
tialized. To ensure the synthetic attack works properly, we then ran it without any memory
protections enabled. During this test, the synthetic attack worked as expected, hijacking the
hook and effectively preventing any execution of the trampoline code. Next, we repeated
the test with the memory protections enabled. This time the synthetic attack failed to com-
plete its installation because it was unable to change the write-protected entry in the SSDT
and the trampoline code continued to execute normally.
This test shows that the memory protections work properly. Similar attacks could be
constructed to modify the trampoline code, the pointer to the SSDT in the system service
dispatcher, or the pointer to the system service dispatcher from the IDT. However, these
attacks would also fail because these regions of memory are also protected by our system.
3.6.2 Future Attacks
In this section we consider how malicious software could attack the Turret framework once
attackers have an understanding of how the framework operates. We start by briefly consid-
ering some attacks that are outside of the scope of our threat model in order to understand
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how challenging it would be to perform these attacks. Then we compare framework’s im-
plementation of the hooks and trampoline code in the User VM to the formal requirements
presented in Section 3.3.2 to understand how well this code in the User VM is protected
against future attacks.
3.6.2.1 Attacking Virtual Machine Introspection
While our threat model makes an introspection assumption stating that the OS and application-
level data structures in the User VM memory have not been altered, it is still instructive to
consider what it would take to perform this type of attack. The most security critical data
is located in the User OS kernel, and this is also the most difficult data to alter. Altering
the data can take one of three forms. The first is to simply change the data in place. This
would result in the security application getting faulty information, but it would also impact
the operation of the User OS that relies on this data. A second option would be to modify
the format of the data structure. This would invalidate the security application’s knowledge
of the data layout and prevent it from accessing the data it needs. However, doing so would
also require modifying all of the code in the running User OS that accesses this data to
understand the new format. Modifying the kernel code on-the-fly is challenging and risks
detection. Finally, the data could be moved to a new location in memory (perhaps in ad-
dition to altering it’s format). Again, this would disrupt the security application, but also
require changes to the running User OS. Given the challenges of modifying kernel data to
hinder the use of VMI, we believe that this type of attack is unlikely.
Application-level code can be attacked in all of the same ways as the kernel, however
here the task is somewhat easier on the attacker if the application can be restarted without
arousing suspicion. This can often be done by simply crashing the application and forcing
the user to restart. Given the current state of software reliability, most users will not suspect
malicious activity in this scenario. By restarting the application, an attacker can more easily
alter the data layout of that application in memory (e.g., by replacing the application’s
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binary on disk before the user restarts it). However, in this case there are alternative security
techniques that could detect such alterations and prevent the application from starting.
While there have been some concerns in the literature over the use of VMI for security
oriented applications. Our analysis here shows that the introspection assumption appears
to be valid for typical user scenarios.
3.6.2.2 Generating Malicious Hardware Events
Our threat model also indicates that an attacker can not access, or modify the hardware (in-
cluding the firmware associated with the system’s hardware). However, if an attacker could
modify the hardware, then it is plausible for an attacker to generate or suppress hardware
events. If an attacker can interfere with the specific events that are used by the security
application to perform active monitoring, then the attacker could avoid detection. How-
ever, that attacker would need to ensure that critical hardware events were still delivered
to the User VM or the malicious software would quickly be detected (e.g., if the keyboard
appeared to stop working because malware overwrote the keyboard firmware to suppress
the delivery of key stroke events).
A more plausible scenario would be for an attacker to specially craft network traffic to
exploit a vulnerability in the security application. For example, if the security application
was parsing network packets and the parsing code contained a vulnerability then an attacker
could potentially exploit that vulnerability. This style of attack is very realistic however it
has limited scope and impact. The software vulnerability could be patched and the attack
would no longer work. In general, software vulnerabilities such as this can happen but they
do not necessarily represent a flaw in the framework design.
3.6.2.3 Attacking User VM Hooks
In the Turret framework, all of the software in the Security VM are inherently protected
from any type of disabling or tampering (attacks A3 and A4 in Figure 1) initiated from











Figure 8: Various forms of attacks aimed at circumventing the fine-grained active moni-
toring hooks installed by Turret in the User VM.
application that makes use of Turret will be in the Security VM, and therefore integrated
with the TCB. As such, the only option for an attacker would be to target the guest-space
infrastructure (attacks A1, A2 and A5 in Figure 1) on which the security application relies
on for active monitoring.
We first discuss various forms of A1 attacks illustrated in Figure 8, which are aimed
at circumventing our monitoring infrastructure. They work by maliciously modifying the
User OS components and the system structures that they depend on. In case of the SSDT
hook and the trampoline, disabling or tampering with such components (attacks A1.5 and
A1.6) would mean maliciously altering their memory state. For example, the hook could be
replaced by another that points to a malicious function, or the trampoline could have critical
parts of its code (such as the VMCALL) erased. Attacks of this type against the hook and
the trampoline are effectively blocked by our architecture, as we write-protect their memory
region. This fact has been empirically verified in the experiments we conducted, presented
in Section 3.6.1. We can also generalize this property to any type and number of hooks in
the kernel, as our hypervisor-based memory protection is done at the byte level and can be
applied anywhere in kernel code or data.
Other types of circumvention attacks illustrated in Figure 8 involve manipulating certain
kernel structures which control the kernel’s flow of execution between the moment at which
the NtCreateSection event happens and the hook is triggered. In the case of our SSDT
based hook, the IDTR register (A1.1), the system’s IDT (A1.2), the system call dispatcher
(A1.4) and current address translation structures (A1.3) can be targeted. The latter includes
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the GDTR register, the GDT and the current page table. These registers and structures are
defined by the x86 architecture. The first three determine the flow of execution immediately
after a system call is triggered by the int CPU instruction. In our prototype, we write-
protect the IDT and the system call dispatcher code in memory, nullifying attacks A1.2 and
A1.4. Such protections have no negative side-effects, as these structures are normally not
supposed to be modified at run-time. For the IDTR, we were unable to implement a similar
kind of protection, as changes to this register cannot be trapped by a hypervisor using Intel
VT-x. Instead, we check its contents for modifications at every exit from the guest to the
hypervisor. These exits (called VM exits) happen at least at every context switch, making
attacks targeted at this register extremely difficult to succeed due to the short window of
opportunity. However, for the AMD SVM platform, this attack is not a concern because
changes to the IDTR are trapped by the hypervisor.
A more sophisticated type of circumvention can be done by manipulating the GDTR,
the GDT and the system’s page tables, as these are used in the translation step between the
IDT and the system call dispatcher (attack A1.3 in Figure 8). An attacker could tamper with
such structures to manipulate the address translation, and redirect the flow of execution to
a different physical address, containing malicious code. Memory introspection is affected
by a similar issue, as it normally uses page tables inside the User OS to perform memory
translation. Although possible, such an attack would nevertheless be considerably difficult
to implement in this particular case, as the dispatcher shares a single 4MB page with the
rest of the Windows kernel. To succeed, an attacker would thus need to relocate a large
critical portion of the kernel without detection—a considerable, if not impossible effort.
In situations where such an obstacle is absent, a general solution to this problem would
involve monitoring individual shadow page table entries to ensure that they always point to
specific, known good locations.
In addition, a notification should be sent by the trampoline only if an event happens,
that is, an intruder should not be able to send bogus notifications. This could be done, for
72
instance, by explicitly invoking the trampoline or jumping into arbitrary locations inside it
(for instance, the VMCALL). Although this condition is not addressed by our prototype,
we recognize it as a significant issue. One possible solution would be to first control the
origin of branches by marking the memory region where the trampoline code resides with
the non-execute (NX) bit. By doing so, every access to the trampoline would generate a
fault, allowing us to check if the EIP value (the location from which the call was made)
corresponds to an authorized hook location. If not, then we would know that the attacker
is trying to make a bogus call to the trampoline and block it. The cr2 register could also
be monitored, which would allow us to check the destination of the branch, and enforce
a single entry point into the trampoline code. This would in turn block any attempts of
branching into arbitrary locations of the trampoline code.
Other types of attacks can be avoided by disabling interrupts system-wide during the
execution of the trampoline. This ensures that no other kernel thread is executed before the
VMCALL. This guarantee, combined with our assumption that this system is running on a
single processor, ensures that no one can change the monitored thread context to bypass the
hook. Therefore, the code execution from the occurrence of the event up to the notification
sent by the trampoline cannot be preempted.
This technique also automatically prevents A2 attacks, as interrupt disabling prevents
an attacker from modifying any context information from the moment the event happens to
the moment a response is received by the trampoline. Attack A5 is also prevented since the
code responsible for carrying it out is already protected in the trampoline, and the fact that
interrupts are disabled guarantees that its execution cannot be preempted. Although the
triggering of non-maskable interrupts (NMIs) could circumvent the interrupt disabling and
break the desired execution atomicity, we expect these to occur only during hardware fatal
errors. By assuming the use of a single CPU core per VM in our prototype, we avoid the
scenario in which an attacker could use a second core to explicitly send an NMI to the one
running trampoline code and interrupt the execution flow. This assumption also prevents
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the occurrence of other race conditions involving multi-core architectures.
We acknowledge that some of the anti-circumvention techniques mentioned above are
very specific to the type of hooking implemented. In particular, the kernel code and data
structures that link the actual system call event to the SSDT hook itself, are relatively few
and easy to protect, enabling us to create a protected chain. But in a more general scenario,
where hooks can be placed in code or arbitrary data structures, creating an equivalent pro-
tection chain can be more complicated. By patching kernel code whose execution precedes
the execution of a code hook, for instance, an attacker could jump around it. Existing so-
lutions, such as SecVisor [155], could be integrated with our architecture to guarantee the
kernel’s code integrity and avoid this type of circumvention. Data hooks in arbitrary kernel
data structures present a more interesting challenge because of data’s volatile nature. But
existing approaches like passive monitoring of kernel control data structures [131], media-
tion of changes to kernel data structures [183] and semantic integrity checking [130] could
be used to raise the bar for an attacker. Although these techniques certainly help mitigate
the more generic circumvention problem, their kernel-pervasive nature would add a signif-
icant performance impact to the overall architecture. In this case, a compromise between
security and performance exists, which permits each application to make an appropriate
tradeoff given its needs.
3.7 Performance Evaluation
This section focuses on select micro-benchmarks that highlight the performance character-
istics of the Turret framework. We discuss performance results for both passive monitoring
and active monitoring. We discuss macro benchmarks and other application-specific per-
formance tests later, in Chapter 6. Our tests show that the performance impact imposed by
the Turret framework is very reasonable, adding only small latencies to the system perfor-
mance and user interactions. We feel that these latencies are acceptable given the security
benefits afforded by the Turret architecture.
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Figure 9: Performance of three memory access functions in XenAccess for a paravirtual-
ized (PV) and hardware virtualized (HVM) VMs. Both cache misses (-M) and cache hits
(-H) are shown. All times are in µsecs.
We performed the testing on a system with a dual core 2.33 GHz processor with 2MB
L2 cache per core (Intel Core Duo T2700). The system had 2 GB of RAM, and an 80 GB
7200 RPM hard disk drive. The Security VM (dom0) was assigned 2 processor cores, and
the User VM was assigned one processor core.
3.7.1 Passive Monitoring
Each performance measurement in this section was performed using the gettimeofday()
function, which has a micro-second granularity. Times were measured by recording the
time immediately before and after the function being measured. The difference between the
two times was recorded. This measurement was repeated for 1000 times for each test. We
choose 1000 measurements because this was sufficient to minimize the standard deviation
for a given set of measurements under this setup. Additional measurements did not improve
the precision.
The data in Figure 9 show the average time to complete the specified function call.
The cache hit columns represent the results with the LRU cache enabled. The cache miss
columns represent the results with LRU cache disabled. The simplest case is shown on
the left of this graph. The xa_access_kernel_va() function must map three memory









































Figure 10: Time for monitor to read memory through introspection.
seen with the LRU cache. The time for xa_access_kernel_sym() is dominated by the
operation to lookup the kernel symbol. This operation is a lookup inside a file on disk,
which is costly. With a cache hit, the symbol to machine address mapping is stored in
the cache, making the performance similar to xa_access_kernel_va(). The last access
function is xa_access_user_va(). This function must traverse the task list in the domU
kernel to locate the page directory for the process virtual address. This explains the slower
performance for the cache miss. On a cache hit, this traversal is not needed, performance
is essentially the same as xa_access_kernel_va().
After the memory is accessed, the next step is to read from or write to that memory. As
seen in Figure 10, this operation is fast compared to mapping the memory. These perfor-
mance results show the time required to memcpy() data from kernel memory in the target
OS. In general, we found that data is copied into a data monitor at a rate of approximately
1kB / µsec. Figure 10 shows that memcpy() performance for PV and HVM VMs is essen-
tially the same. The variance in these measurements can be attributed to experimental noise
given the precision of our timing mechanism and the small measurement times. Looking
at the cache hit values in Figure 9 and the memory copy performance, the memory intro-



















Figure 11: Hook performance is shown in the three charts. The traditional hook shows
the time for processing a hook locally. The Turret (best case) shows the time for just
sending a notification to the Security VM. The Turret (with processing) shows the time for
processing the hook in our prototype application, using introspection to lookup file names
from handles. All times are in µsecs.
overall system performance.
The performance results for VMI provide some insight into the types of applications
that are best suited for introspection. The best applications map a single or small number
of memory locations and view them over time. These types of applications only perform the
slower page table lookup operation(s) a small number of times, while performing the faster
read and write operations throughout the life of the application. Conversely, applications
that frequently map new memory locations may suffer a performance hit with introspection,
but may still be viable depending on the number of monitors working at a given time and
whether their address lookups result in cache hits. The size of the LRU cache is adjustable
and can be tuned to meet an application’s needs.
3.7.2 Active Monitoring Using Hooks
Hook processing is the key operation where the Turret framework will differ in perfor-
mance from a traditional architecture. Therefore, our benchmark measurements look at the
time required to process a single hook in the Turret framework and compare that with a tra-
ditional architecture. To measure the hook processing time with the Turret framework, we
instrumented the trampoline code. We retrieved the value of the processor’s performance
counter before and after the VMCALL instruction. The processor’s performance counter was
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obtained using a function provided by Windows, KeQueryPerformanceCounter. The
difference between these two measurements represents the time needed for inter-VM com-
munication and hook processing within the security VM. However, this measurement is
noisy. It can be influenced by cache effects, VM scheduling, physical interrupts, CPU
frequency scaling, and other loads on the system. We took several steps to minimize the
influence of this noise in our measurements. First, we pinned each VM to its own CPU
core. Next, we disabled unnecessary services in the Security VM. Then we disabled CPU
frequency scaling in the BIOS.
After the system was prepared as indicated above, we measured the hook performance
across five runs, where each run included 1000 measurements. The 5000 measurements
were combined into a single data set. Then we performed a standard statistical analysis
to remove the outliers, since there was still some noise in the measurement. Our analysis
computed the inner-quartile range (IQR) of the data set and defined outliers to be 1.5 times
the IQR above the third quartile and below the first quartile. After removing the outliers,
the computed mean on our data was 28 µsecs to just send a notification to the Security VM
and 175 µsecs when the security application used introspection to lookup file names from
handles.
To measure the hook processing time for a traditional architecture we developed a sys-
tem that processes the hook inside the User VM. The kernel code in this system is the same
as the Turret framework except that instead of executing the VMCALL instruction to process
a hook, we send an event to a user-space application. This application performs the same
check as our prototype, looking up the file handle to check the associated file name. The
system was prepared and the tests were run the same as for the Lares architecture test. Af-
ter removing the outliers, the computed mean on our data was 17 µsecs. The results from
each of these tests are shown graphically in Figure 11. These graphs, known as boxplots,
show the IQR as a gray box. The median value is denoted with a horizontal line through
the box. And the range of the remaining nonoutlier data is shown as lines extending above
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and below the box.
Two major factors contribute to the differences in the performance of Turret versus a
traditional architecture. First is the fact that it takes more time to exit the User VM, send a
signal to the Security VM, and perform the software address translations needed for VMI
than it does to perform the same tasks locally. This factor contributes to the overhead for a
single hook event. The second factor is more subtle. When everything is processed locally
as in the traditional architecture, there is no security benefit to processing data inside the
kernel versus in application space. Since only a subset of the calls to NtCreateSection
are associated with the file handle of a new process execution attempt, the traditional archi-
tecture can use the result of the ObReferenceObjectByHandle function in the windows
kernel to filter out the hook events that do not need additional processing. Using this tech-
nique, only a subset of the hook events are sent to user space for processing. However,
in the Turret framework, we do not trust any local functions in the Windows kernel. So
every hook event is sent to the Security VM for processing. This example is specific to the
hook that we implemented, but a similar situation may exist for other hooks as well. This
trade-off raises the mean time required for hook processing in the Turret framework, but
also increases the security of our framework by reducing dependencies on untrusted code.
While our benchmarks show that Turret is slower than traditional hook processing, we
also provide a significant improvement in security. The overall performance of a given
application will ultimately depend on the number of hooks it uses in addition to its use of
introspection and other techniques to collect data for processing each hook. Our experience
with the example application and the performance results presented in this section suggest
that applications using Turret can perform similarly to applications using traditional archi-
tectures.
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3.8 Discussion and Future Work
One of the design goals for Turret was to enable the rapid development of new security
applications. While writing a meaningful security application is never trivial, the moni-
toring framework should not impede the development process. In this section we provide
some concrete examples of how security applications interact with the Turret framework,
specifically for passive monitoring. These examples are designed to demonstrate the utility
of Turret. They do not represent a complete security application. In Chapter 6, we provide
an in-depth discussion of several security applications that utilize the Turret framework.
3.8.1 Using Passive Monitoring
Using introspection, XenAccess – one of the libraries provided by Turret – can view and
modify data in memory of a running OS. The example below shows how to use XenAccess
to view a listing of the linux kernel modules (LKM) installed in a running instance of
Linux. Additional examples in the open source release of XenAccess show how to list
running processes, view arbitrary memory pages, view the memory of a particular process,
and dump the entire User VM’s memory into a file.
The LKM listing example uses the xa_access_kernel_sym() function to list the
LKMs installed into the User VM kernel. This only requires 44 SLOC. Listing 1 shows the
code for this example. The code follows a linked list in the User VM kernel memory using
introspection. It starts by loading the memory page containing the head of the list, which
is found using the modules kernel symbol. This address points to a module struct.
This structure contains a circular doubly linked list that points to the rest of the modules.
Therefore, the code proceeds by loading the memory page addressed by the next pointer
all the way down the list. For each structure, the module name is accessed by creating a
pointer to its offset, and then it is printed to stdout. Since the linked list is circular, the
code ends when it finds a pointer back to the head of the list.
80
Listing 1: Source code for an example that lists all running LKMs in the User VM kernel.
All error checking code has been removed for clarity.
x a _ i n i t _ v m _ i d _ s t r i c t ( dom , &x a i ) ;
memory = x a _ a c c e s s _ k e r n e l _ s y m (& xai , " modules " , &o f f s e t ) ;
memcpy(& next_module , memory + o f f s e t , 4 ) ;
l i s t _ h e a d = nex t_module ;
munmap ( memory , x a i . p a g e _ s i z e ) ;
whi le ( 1 ) {
memory = x a _ a c c e s s _ k e r n e l _ v a (& xa i , next_module , &o f f s e t ) ;
memcpy(& next_module , memory + o f f s e t , 4 ) ;
i f ( l i s t _ h e a d == next_module ) {
break ;
}
name = ( char *) ( memory + o f f s e t + 8 ) ;
p r i n t f ( "%s \ n " , name ) ;
munmap ( memory , x a i . p a g e _ s i z e ) ;
}
i f ( memory ) munmap ( memory , x a i . p a g e _ s i z e ) ;
x a _ d e s t r o y (& x a i ) ;
Since this example is accessing and displaying OS-specific information, it requires OS-
specific knowledge. In this case, the knowledge falls into two categories. First, we must
know that the modules symbol points to the beginning of a linked list that will provide the
information that we need. Second, we must know the offsets within the module struct
needed to access information such as the next pointer and the module name. Requiring
this type of information is common for introspection applications. For this example, the
information needed was available in both the Linux source code, and Bovet and Cesati’s
kernel book [26]. When viewing Windows memory, both the Microsoft Windows Debugger
(i.e., WinDbg) and Russinovich and Solomon’s book [143] are useful references.
The example above is straightforward and provides a quick understanding of XenAc-
cess’s introspection capabilities in operation. Other monitors are not much more complex.
For example, we developed an application that monitors for changes in the system call ta-
ble (110 SLOC) and an application that monitors the integrity of an installed LKM (172
SLOC). The security applications of these types of monitoring are clear in areas like intru-
sion detection and integrity checking, and have been well explored in literature. XenAccess
makes these types of applications possible by providing memory access at the proper levels
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of abstraction. Based on our experience building XenAccess introspection monitors, we
feel that the part of the Turret framework satisfies design goal (4).
3.8.2 Using Active Monitoring
The Turret framework provides several ways to perform active monitoring. Using hardware
events, or network traffic is relatively easy. Placing hooks in the User VM kernel is more
difficult, requiring kernel-level development to control the hook and the associated tram-
poline code. The application examples in Chapter 6 describe these techniques in greater
detail. Here, we describe the process for receiving hardware event notifications within the
Security VM.
After the Turret framework is installed, hardware event notifications are continuously
sent to a FIFO inter-process communication channel (IPC). To receive these events, the
security application must implement a FIFO server that listens for, and processes, each
event. This FIFO server can be written in most programming languages, allowing for
flexibility in the design of the security application. Listing 2 shows a basic fifo server for
processing hardware events that is written in C.
Installing kernel hooks is more challenging. This requires the following high-level
steps. First, we need to determine the correct location to place a hook. This could involve
source code analysis or reverse engineering. Next, we need to determine how to properly
protect the hook. In some cases this can be done by rooting the hook’s protection to a
hardware event, as shown in Figure 8. In other cases, it may require more complete kernel-
level protections. Finally, we need to install the hook and activate the protections. Each
of these steps are highly specialized, and must be performed for each new hook added to
the User VM. While this is a large burden, the benefit is the ability to perform fine-grained
monitoring on specific events inside the User VM.
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Listing 2: Source code for receiving hardware events from the Turret framework. Each
incoming event is processed in a separate function called message_handler.
FILE * f i f o = NULL;
char r e a d b u f [ BUF_SIZE ] ;
s t r u c t p o l l f d f d s ;
f i f o = fopen ( FIFO_FILE , " r " ) ;
f d s . fd = f i l e n o ( f i f o ) ;
f d s . e v e n t s = POLLIN ;
whi le ( 1 ) {
i n t r e t = p o l l (& fds , 1 , −1) ;
i f ( r e t > 0){
memset ( r e a d b u f , 0 , BUF_SIZE ) ;
i f (NULL == f g e t s ( r e a d b u f , BUF_SIZE , f i f o ) ) {
i f ( f e o f ( f i f o ) ) {
c o n t in u e ;
}
p r i n t f ( " f g e t s  f a i l e d ,  e x i t i n g \ n " ) ;
break ;
}
m e s s a g e _ h a n d l e r ( r e a d b u f ) ;
}
e l s e {




f c l o s e ( f i f o ) ;
3.8.3 Future Work
The passive monitoring portions of Turret are currently well established. These techniques
are implemented in the open source XenAccess Library, which has received significant use
for over three years. With this in mind, the primary future work for this portion of Turret is
to automate some of the setup and configuration steps, allowing for more rapid deployment,
and to achieve wide scale adoption of the technology.
The active monitoring techniques are currently research prototypes. In particular, work
is needed to automate the process of protecting and installing the User VM hooks. In
addition, security applications would benefit from the ability to install protected hooks in
user-level applications. Looking at the hardware event driven techniques, work is needed
83
to understand and mitigate the impact of virtualization aware hardware. As virtualization
becomes more popular, hardware manufacturers are creating network card, video cards, and
other devices that communicate directly with each VM instead of using an intermediary
control VM. This could make it more challenging to perform monitoring based on these
hardware events.
Looking further into the future, it would be interesting to consider how the Turret frame-
work monitoring techniques could be offered as a service to VMs running under the cloud
computing model. Currently, we assume that the software doing the monitoring had privi-
leges to view all of the VMs on the platform. However, in a cloud computing model, a user
may have several VMs that are running – perhaps even migrating – across multiple hyper-
visors. In this setting, it would be useful to be able to offer the user monitoring capabilities
that are restricted to the VMs owned by the user. This could be partially addressed through
the use of mandatory access control, but the general solution remains an interesting open
problem.
3.9 Summary
Stepping back to look at the six design goals for a robust monitoring solution, we note
that Turret satisfies each of these requirements. (1) The Turret framework requires only
small changes to the Xen virtualization platform. These changes are used to implement
memory protections and a communications channel for the hooks placed in the User VM.
(2) Using the capabilities provided by Xen, the only code inserted into the User VM is the
protected software hooks and the supporting trampoline code. And these minor additions
are only required for applications that need this level of fine-grained active monitoring. (3)
Our performance testing, discussed in Section 3.7, shows small overheads for the Turret
framework components, making these capabilities effective for a variety of monitoring ap-
plications. The micro-benchmarks look promising and we demonstrate that viable security
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applications can be build using Turret in Chapter 6. (4) Our example code shows that de-
veloping security applications that use Turret is straightforward, with a minimal learning
curve. The one exception to this is the placement of hooks in the User VM, which requires
more advanced knowledge. We noted that this is a problem that should be addressed in
future work. (5) While our existing library implementation can view memory and receive
event notifications, the Turret framework is easily extensible to collect any type of data
from the User VM. (6) Finally, leveraging the protections provided by the hypervisor, Tur-
ret can be sufficiently isolated from the User VM, reducing the possibility of tampering by
malicious software.
One of the key benefits to the Turret framework is the ability to perform active mon-
itoring from a protected location. Active monitoring is needed to support state-of-the-art
host-based security applications such as intrusion detection and anti-virus tools. However,
as recent research has focused on moving security applications into an isolated VM, the
resulting architectures do not support active monitoring. Turret addresses this problem
by giving security tools the ability to do active monitoring while still benefiting from the
increased security of an isolated VM. Our security analysis shows that Turret provides se-
curity suitable for deployment on production systems. And our performance evaluation
shows that Turret’s overall impact on system performance is small. The Turret framework
is generally applicable to any application that requires secure active monitoring.
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CHAPTER IV
IMPROVING VMI’S RESILIENCE TO SOFTWARE CHANGES
4.1 Motivation
One of the key data sources viewable using virtual machine introspection (VMI) is mem-
ory. However, the memory view available through VMI is low-level, typically just a raw
view of the system’s virtual address spaces. The layout of data within this memory space
is dependent on the specific software running within the virtual machine, and will likely
change with different versions of the software. For this reason, applications built using
VMI today are often restricted to working with a specific software version and are not eas-
ily ported to other systems. This limitation has forced VMI to remain a research novelty
rather than a commercial success.
The field of memory analysis is focused on addressing this problem. In general, there
are three major problems to solve to enable general memory analysis applications: (1) lo-
cating data, (2) parsing data, and (3) interpreting data. Locating data involves finding where
specific data structure instances are located in memory. Parsing data involves breaking the
data structure into smaller pieces where each piece is a single type. And interpreting data
involves determining the semantic meaning of a particular type within the data structure.
The key problem that we address in this chapter is how to locate data structures in
memory. Using virtual machine introspection or a coprocessor-based monitoring solution,
we cannot leverage existing APIs to provide information about the target system. For
example, instead of calling a function that provides a list of the currently running processes,
we must locate the data structures in memory that hold this information. Likewise, instead
of calling a function that provides a list of open network connections, we must locate the
data structures in memory that hold this information. After locating the data structures,
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we must also be able to interpret their contents in order to extract useful information from
them. In this work we focus on the task of locating the data structures while noting that the
interpretation problem has been partially addressed by previous work [44].
Locating a specific data structure in memory is not necessarily difficult. Tools exist for
locating certain data structures that have obviously unique characteristics [152]. However,
not all data structures are as easy to identify. What is needed is a general solution to this
problem. The challenge is to provide a single technique that can be used to model and
identify any data structure in memory that is needed by the security application. Simple
heuristics that work for specific data structures are not useful in this setting because the
application developer can not be expected to identify such heuristics for each data structure
that is needed. Such heuristics may not even exist for all data structures. This problem is
challenging because a viable solution must be general enough to work with all data struc-
tures, yet accurate enough to correctly identify the data structures across multiple software
versions.
Our solution starts by building a model for each data structure that we want to find. This
model is created automatically by training the software with samples of the data structure
along with samples of other portions of memory. Specifically, we use a supervised machine
learning algorithm to build this model. The training set can contain multiple versions of the
data structure, ensuring that the resulting model has the generality needed to operate on a
wide variety of target software versions. After building the model, the security application
is deployed. When the application needs to locate specific data structures on the target
system, it initiates a search by testing a sample region of memory against the model. Once
found, the locations of the data structures are saved into a database to allow for quick access
in the future. If the target software is updated, or the data structures change locations for
any other reason (e.g., restarting an application), then the database is updated by repeating
the initial search procedure.
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4.2 Previous Techniques
Memory analysis is a rapidly developing research area and many existing tools can provide
useful information about the memory of a running system. However, the fundamental
drawback to all of the existing techniques is that they lack generality. Each technique is
specially constructed to work for a specific software version. Therefore, software patches
can potentially incapacitate a technique, rendering it useless until it can be updated to
work with the new software version. Even with this limitation, the techniques listed below
represent the current state-of-the art and have enabled a wide variety of useful applications
ranging from computer forensics to runtime system security.
4.2.1 Hard-Coded Values
The simplest approach to locating and parsing data structures is to hard code the location
(i.e., virtual or physical address) and offset values. Often, for a given version of an operating
system or application software these values are consistent on different machines and at
different times. Finding the appropriate values in the first place typically involves reverse
engineering, source code analysis, or vendor-provided debugging symbols. This technique
is commonly used because it is easy and effective. Example applications that use hard-
coded values include XenAccess [125] and Volatility [177].
4.2.2 Heuristics
A wide variety of tools have also been developed to extract specific pieces of information
from memory images using basic heuristics. Schuster’s PTFinder [152] finds processes and
threads in Windows memory dumps by doing a linear scan of physical memory, looking
for a constant pattern of bytes found in the process and thread data structures. Further
work focused on finding data structures allocated in a region of Windows memory known
as pool memory. Data structures allocated from the pool are tagged with a four byte ASCII
identifier as well as size information, which allows them to be easily found in memory.
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Burdach presented a technique for finding information of forensic value in memory dumps
of Linux [28] and Windows [29] by using a combination of symbol information (in Linux)
and heuristics (in Windows).
4.2.3 Debugger Tools
For some operating systems and applications, it is also possible to use debugging sym-
bols provided by the software vendor to extract information about data types. Microsoft,
for example, provides type information in their PDB (Program DataBase) file format.
These debug symbols can be used with a number of tools supplied by Microsoft, such
as WinDbg [114] and the Kernel Memory Space Analyzer [115]. However, the type in-
formation provided is not complete, so there are some data structures that cannot be found
using debug symbols alone. In addition, user applications (if they provide debug symbols
at all), typically distribute PDB files with type information stripped.
4.2.4 Code Analysis
FATKit, a memory analysis framework created by Petroni et al. [132], uses static analy-
sis of application and operating system source code to build models of the data structures
used. These models can then be overlaid on images of memory to provide meaningful in-
terpretations of the raw data. This technique of extracting data types from source code was
also later used by Petroni [131] to examine stored function pointers and detect malicious
modifications to kernel control flow. Unfortunately, the source code of most programs and
operating systems remains closed, so this technique is only useful in limited circumstances.
Another work that applies machine learning to the problem of finding data structures is
the work of Cozzie et al. [44]. Their approach uses unsupervised learning to classify mem-
ory regions into potential data structures, as well as attempting to determine the types of the
members of each data structure. This could be used in conjunction with our techniques in
two ways: either as a post-processing step to reduce false positives produced by the Hidden





























Figure 12: An overview of the major steps needed to locate data structures in memory. The
training steps produce a hidden markov model (HMM) describing the data. The evaluation
steps locate instances of the data structure from a new data set.
found with our method. In a similar vein, Walters describes a technique called memory
informatics [178] that applies the bioinformatics-inspired techniques from protocol infor-
matics [19] to automatically find data structures in memory. Unfortunately, the details of
this method are not available, so we were unable to compare its performance with ours.
4.3 Locating Data Structures Using Machine Learning
This section describes the technical details of our approach to the problem of locating data
structures in memory. Since our approach utilizes machine learning, we provide some in-
troduction to these concepts throughout this section. We describe each step of our solution
including building training data sets, building the classifier, refining the results with a post-
processing step, and using the final results to identify data structures in memory. Figure 12
shows an overview of our solution.
For the purposes of describing how our system works, we will use a running example
throughout this section. The running example describes how each of these steps would be
used to locate the EPROCESS data structure from a Windows system. This is an instructive
example because it highlights the main features of our system. However, the same tech-
niques could be applied to locating any data structure within any operating system, in both
kernel and application-level memory.
Our technique is best suited to data structures that are large enough to model accu-
rately. On both Windows and Linux, most of the security critical data structures are very
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Figure 13: Slicing memory data to create instances with a sliding window. In this example,
the sliding window size is 4 bytes and the interval is 2 bytes.
large. Examples from Windows include EPROCESS (608 bytes), ETHREAD (600 bytes), and
FILE_OBJECT (112 bytes). Examples from Linux include task_struct (1360 bytes) and
mm_struct (448 bytes). All of these sizes are subject to variation based on different soft-
ware versions, but these values show the general size of these data structures.
4.3.1 Preparing Data For Training
The first step is to collect and label raw memory data from the systems that we want to
use for training. Training on data from multiple versions of the target software allows the
resulting classifier to have the generality necessary to work across a large number of target
software versions. Looking at the EPROCESS example, we need positive samples (e.g.,
samples of the EPROCESS structure) and negative samples (e.g., samples of other areas of
memory) from different versions of Windows. Finding positive samples requires knowing
where data structures are located in memory. This ground truth information is generally
obtained by reverse engineering the memory layout.
The input to the training procedure is a series of instances that are each composed
of various features. We build the instances by “slicing” memory using a sliding window
with a size equal to the data structure and an 8 byte interval. For example, when slicing
memory for the EPROCESS structure on Windows XP Service Pack 2, the sliding window
size is set to 608 bytes, which is the length of this data structure. The first instance is
obtained from the first 608 bytes of memory (physical address 0 through 608), then the
next instance starts 8 bytes later (physical address 8 through 616). We continue to create
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instances throughout memory using this technique. This slicing technique is demonstrated
in Figure 13. Note that even though we train on the size of the data structure in one version
of the target software, our choice of classification algorithm allows us to still detect this data
structure from other versions of the target software. This is true even with small numbers
of insertions and deletions in the data structures. See Section 4.3.2 for more details.
Each instance is then broken into features. In order to minimize the semantic knowledge
needed for parsing the features, we let each byte in the instance be a different feature with
a numeric value between 0 and 255. This results in a large number of features for each
instance. In order to build a model of these instances, one would typically need a huge
quantity of data due to the “curse of dimensionality” [21]. In our EPROCESS example, we
have 608 features that each have 256 possible values. However, our experimental results
show that this system has a high accuracy, even with a relatively small training data set. We
believe that this is because many of the dimensions in the data set are actually unrelated
to the classification task. One could further explore this using feature selection algorithms,
however our goal was to simplify the training process as much as possible and our technique
of including all the data as features yields acceptable results.
After breaking each instance into single-byte features, the final data preparation step
is to label the instances. Using the results of our reverse engineering effort, each instance
receives a label indicating if it is the data structure that we are learning or not. These labels
provide the ground truth that is used in building a model of the data.
Training data sets are prepared by slicing the memory from different versions of the
target system’s software. Returning to our EPROCESS example, a training data set that
includes instances from both Windows XP Professional Service Pack 2 and Windows 2000
Professional Service Pack 4 provides sufficient information to detect the EPROCESS data
structure on any version of Windows 2000 or Windows XP.
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4.3.2 Selecting and Training the Classifier
With the training data prepared, the next step is to create a model that can differentiate
between positive and negative instances. This type of model is called a classifier. Choosing
an appropriate algorithm for the classifier was challenging for this problem. Each instance
is large and contains many features. And their training data files can be extremely large
(e.g., tens of gigabytes). Many of the standard machine learning algorithms could not
operate efficiently on this data set; often running out of memory or taking days to build the
classifier.
The key insight that led toward a solution for this problem is that a data structure in
memory is defined by a loose set of rules. For example, the data structure may have an int
followed by a char pointer and so on. Within the context of a given data structure, each
of these data types will typically have one of a small number of possible values or range of
values. Combining this information for the entire data structure, one can view this data as
loosely conforming to a grammar.
Hidden Markov Models Hidden Markov Models are commonly used in natural lan-
guage processing because they provide a good model of a language’s grammar. Viewing
a data structure in memory as having its own grammar, we used the k-means [163] and
Baum-Welch [18] algorithms to build a HMM that represents the positive instances in our
training data. Since the HMM models the positive instances, it can be built using only the
positive instances as input. This provides a significant benefit as it will reduce the amount
of data required for training.
Another benefit of using a HMM to model the data is that it is resilient to changes
in the data structure. Different software versions may exhibit minor variations, including
insertion and deletion of values that may change the length of the data structure. In these
cases the HMM will still be able to evaluate the data because the HMM does not restrict
the size of instances that it can model. This flexibility, combined with the other benefits
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mentioned above, make HMMs a good choice for modeling data structures in memory.
The k-means algorithm groups the data into initial clusters, which are used to initial-
ize the values of the HMM. The clusters are initially chosen randomly, and then refined
based on the natural centroid locations in the data. Since we are only using k-means to
determine initial values for the HMM, we only perform one iteration of this refinement
process and do not need to wait for convergence. The input to the k-means algorithm is
the positive instances from our training data set and the value for k, which determined the
number of clusters to use. We choose k = 50 experimentally using both cross-validation
and performance metrics to find a suitable value. The output from this step is an initialized
HMM.
The Baum-Welch algorithm starts with this initialized HMM and refines it to be more
accurate using multiple iterations. Baum-Welch uses a dynamic programming approach
known as the forward-backward algorithm to calculate the probability of observation se-
quences based on the current HMM. The HMM is refined through a generalized expectation-
maximization algorithm that iteratively refines the HMM parameters to find a more opti-
mal HMM. Given that the probabilities for a given observation sequence can be small,
and given that we are working with long observations sequences, we used a modified ver-
sion of Baum-Welch that uses scaling to prevent underflows in the probability calculations
[135]. The output from the Baum-Welch algorithm is an HMM that describes the positive
instances from our training data set.
The HMM that we create using this technique is very accurate. Our evaluation results
show a false positive rate around 2.3% and a false negative rate near 0% (see Section 4.3.5
for a complete discussion of our results). However, memory data is highly unbalanced. For
example, a training data set may contain tens of thousands of negative instances and less
than 50 positive instances. Given this unbalanced data, we can have more false positives
than true positives when using only the HMM classifier. The solution is to use a post-



















λ = state sequence
Figure 14: The evaluation steps for unknown instances. Here we show the linked list
post-processing algorithm, but other post-processing algorithms may be used as well.
step further reduces the false positive rate. In the case of the EPROCESS data structure,
this post processing step reduces the false positive rate to around 0.103% as described in
Section 4.3.5.
4.3.3 Classifying Unknown Data
After the training is complete, we have a classifier that can be used for classification, which
requires data to be prepared the same as it was for training, with the single exception that
the data does not need to be labeled. Using the HMM classifier we can determine which
instances from the data set are samples of the data structure that we wish to locate. The
remainder of this section describes the details of how the evaluation process works.
Using the HMM Classifier The data is first evaluated using the HMM classifier. While
we refer to it as a classifier, the HMM by itself is not a classifier. Instead, it is a description
of a HMM that represents the positive instances. To use the HMM as a classifier, we use
the following steps:
• Determine a numerical score for each instance indicating the likelihood that the given
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instance can be described by the HMM. This score is determined as part of our eval-
uation and is described in more detail below.
• The instances with higher scores are likely the data structure represented by the
HMM. The instances with lower scores are likely not the data structure represented
by the HMM. Determine a threshold value to separate these two classes of instances.
• Using the threshold value, classify each instance as positive (score is above the
threshold) or negative (score is below the threshold).
We calculate the numerical score for each instance using a two step process. First, we
determine the most likely state sequence in the HMM for a given instance using the Viterbi
algorithm [170]. For the second step, we could calculate the combined probability of the
state transitions in this sequence to use as the score, but this has some limitations. This





where Ai j is the transition probability from state i to state j, qobs is the emission probability
of observation obs in state j, and λ is the most likely state sequence computed above. Using
this equation, if there is a single state along the path that has a 0% emission probability for
the given observation, then Pλ would equal zero. This scenario is plausible given that our
training data may be incomplete (e.g., the training data may not enumerate all possible
options for all variables in the data structure). However, a score of zero is not useful for
classification purposes.





Note that the probability calculation for each state remains the same, but now we com-
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Figure 15: A histogram showing the distribution of instance score values for an evaluation
of the EPROCESS data structure. The bar heights are represented on a logrithmic scale due
to the unbalanced nature of the scores.
score calculation avoids the problem outlined above, while still allowing high probability
instances to have a higher score.
After scoring each instance, we must determine which instances should be classified
as positive and which instances should be classified as negative. This decision requires
establishing a threshold value that will be used to separate the two classes of data. Figure
15 shows that the distribution of scores is lopsided. This is to be expected because the data
set is unbalanced. With this in mind, the threshold value should be determined such that it
will classify the large number of low scores as negative. For this reason, we compute the







In this equation n is the total number of instances in the data set and xi is the ith instance.
Intuitively, we can see that the mean score value will be weighted toward the smaller values
in the distribution given the large number of smaller values. This allows for the values in
the tail of the distribution to be included in the positive instances. Our empirical results
support that the mean is a good threshold value, as discussed in Section 4.3.5.
For many categories of data structures, we can use a post processing step to reduce
the number of false positives, as described in Section 4.3.3. For other data structures, the
results can be used directly as described in Section 4.3.4.
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Figure 16: Data structures connected by a circular, doubly-linked list. Note the invariant
that each previous pointer has a matching next pointer, and each next pointer has a matching
previous pointer.
Post-Processing Post-processing is useful when we know an invariant about the data
structure that we are trying to locate. One common invariant with data structures is that
many are members of a linked list. Other invariants may include specific header informa-
tion, pointers to shared data structures, or constant-valued data. In this section we focus
on linked list detection because this is quite common and the detection technique can work
across a variety of linked list implementations.
Our linked list detection will work for any doubly linked list implementation where
the next and previous pointer values are stored adjacent to each other in memory. This
is a common implementation technique and it is seen in the Windows kernel, the Linux
kernel, and a large variety of application-level software. The invariant that we exploit is
that for each next pointer there should be exactly one previous pointer with the same value.
Likewise, for each previous pointer, there should be exactly one next pointer with the same
value. This invariant is strictly true for circular, doubly linked lists as shown in Figure 16.
However, a minor alteration to the algorithm can detect non-circular lists as well.
Our post-processing algorithm for linked list detection works without any prior knowl-
edge beyond what is described above. It does not need to perform any address translations,
nor does it need to know where in the data structure the previous and next pointers are
located. The algorithm works in two stages. First it identifies the location of the previous
and next pointers. Next it determines which instances are contained in a linked list at those
pointer locations.
To find the location of the previous and next pointers, we test each possible location in
the data structure. For each offset within the data structure, we test how large of a linked list
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could be formed if that offset were the correct location for the linked list pointers. This test
is done by searching for the number of instances that satisfy the invariant. To ensure that
the items we find do form a single linked list, we follow the flink values and ensure that
this traversal touches each instance in the list. To avoid performing address translations, we
do not completely resolve the flink pointer values. Instead, we match the last 12 bits of
the pointer address with a corresponding value in the set of potential list items. This works
due to the semantics of virtual addresses on the x86 architecture. We assume that the offset
that forms the largest linked list after this verification step is the correct offset.
After we have determined the correct offset, we search all of the positive instances from
the classifier-based evaluation to see which ones satisfy the invariant. The instances that
form a linked list are assumed to remain positive and we change the classification of the
others. The net result of this post processing step is a reduction in false positives. Similar
post process procedures could be derived for other invariants, based on the type of data
structures that are being located.
4.3.4 Using The Results
After the classification and post-processing steps are complete we have a list of positive
instances. In practice, this is a list of the physical address locations of the data structures
that we need to operate a security tool. Most security applications will access these data
structures frequently to perform integrity checks and to identify malicious activity. How-
ever, as discussed in Section 4.3.5, the process of finding each of these data structures takes
some time to complete.
The solution to this problem is to store the results from the costly classification and
post-processing operations into a database where they can be accessed quickly, as needed.
This solution works because data structures tend to be initialized in one location in memory,
and then stay in that location until the system is turned off. In fact, the memory locations
are often the same after a system reboots and reinitializes its data structures if the system
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software has not been updated. Using this strategy, we suggest the following initialization
procedure for security tools using memory analysis:
• At startup, check the database for any pre-computed data structure locations. If lo-
cations exist, use them. If locations do not exist, then run the classification and
post-processing steps to initialize the locations in the database.
• If at any time the locations taken from the database do not work (e.g., the security
tool is unable to obtain the correct information from these locations), then repeat the
initialization procedure and save the new results into the database.
• Optional: The classification models and post-processing algorithms can be updated
as needed to refine these steps or to add support for new major software versions.
For example, a single model may work for all versions of Windows 2000, Windows
XP and Windows Vista, but may need to be updated for future major releases of the
operating system. These updated models can likely be trained on pre-release versions
of the software, ensuring that the security tools will provide proper coverage as soon
as the new software is released.
Using this strategy, our techniques for locating security critical data structures can be inte-
grated into memory analysis based security tools, providing a straightforward way for these
tools to work across multiple target software versions.
4.3.5 Accuracy and Performance Evaluation
We performed experiments on memory images obtained from different versions of Mi-
crosoft Windows, as described in Section 4.3.5.1. We identified three data structures that
provide data from the operating system kernel to use for our testing. These data structures
provide information about the processes (EPROCESS) and threads (ETHREAD) running on
the system, and open files (FILE_OBJECT).
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Table 1: Accuracy of our technique for determining the location of data structures in mem-
ory. This table shows results for the HMM classification used alone.
HMM Classification
Accuracy False Positive False Negative
EPROCESS 97.891% 2.112% 0.000%
ETHREAD 98.666% 1.337% 0.068%
FILE_OBJECT 96.606% 3.401% 0.000%
Table 2: Accuracy of our technique for determining the location of data structures in
memory. This table shows results for the HMM classification used in conjunction with
post-processing that identifies data structures that are members of a linked list.
With Post-Processing
Accuracy False Positive False Negative
EPROCESS 99.894% 0.103% 3.125%
ETHREAD n/a n/a n/a
FILE_OBJECT n/a n/a n/a
For each of these data structures we performed the training and evaluation steps to
measure how accurately the classification and post-processing techniques can identify the
data structures in memory. We also measured the time needed to complete each of these
steps in order to show the performance characteristics of the system. The remainder of this
section provides details about our accuracy and performance evaluation.
4.3.5.1 Accuracy
Our data sets include memory images from a variety of versions of Microsoft Windows as
enumerated below:
1. Windows 2000 Professional (no service pack)
2. Windows 2000 Professional (Service Pack 4)
3. Windows XP Professional (Service Pack 2), image 1
4. Windows XP Professional (Service Pack 2), image 2
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5. Windows XP Professional (Service Pack 2), image 3
We worked with one memory image for each of the different Windows 2000 versions, and
three memory images for the Windows XP version. We built each training data set using
two different images. The first training data set, train1, was created using data sets (2)
and (3). The other training data set, train2, was created using data sets (3) and (4). Then
we evaluated the accuracy of both train1 and train2 using data sets (1) and (5). The end
result was two sets of accuracy scores for each data set; one using train1 and one using
train2. Table 1 shows the average of the results from each of the test runs for each data
structure.
For each data set, we must determine the ground truth information. To determine the
ground truth information, we started with “clean” data sets (i.e., data sets acquired from
a fresh installation of the operating system that is known to be free of malware). Next,
we used existing memory analysis tools to identify the data structure locations [177, 152].
These tools rely on heuristics that were determined through reverse engineering. They are
well suited to determining ground truth information for specific software versions, but they
do not provide the generality that our technique provides. We used the information from
these tools to label the data set as described in Section 4.3.1. The labels are used for training
and for measuring the accuracy of the evaluation steps.
The results in Table 1 show that the HMM classification step is able to consistently and
correctly classify a large portion of the data set as negative instances while maintaining
a 0.0% false negative rate. Our post processing step shown, which focused on linked list
detection, was able to significantly reduce the false positive rate although it occasionally
introduced a small number of false negatives as shown in Table 2. The ETHREAD and
FILE_OBJECT data structures are not part of a single linked list, so we did not perform any
post processing on them.
In Section 4.3.4 we discussed how the classification results can be used in a security ap-
plication. With this usage scenario, it is important to consider the impact of false positives
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on the application. A false positive indicates that we have falsely identified a memory loca-
tion as being an instance of the data structure. The security tool can handle this information
in a variety of ways. For certain data structures, the security tool can discard the false pos-
itives after performing some additional analysis on the data. For example, if an EPROCESS
data structure does not have the proper values in it’s fields (e.g., no process name, or no
pointer to a valid handle table), then it can be safely assumed to be a false positive. Future
research could help to identify the exact information that must be in a given data structure
in order for it to be valid. These invariants could then be used to make this filtering process
more robust.
In other cases, there may be no way to remove the false positives. However, for many
security applications this will have a minimal impact. For example, it may simply result
in the application performing extra security checks. The false negative metric is more
important for most security applications. Our false negative rate is very low, ensuring that
the correct data structures are identified and that attacks on the target system will not be
missed.
For applications that require perfect accuracy (no false positives and no false negatives),
our system is still a valuable tool. Previously, the reverse engineering effort to locate each
data structure required analyzing a huge quantity of information to find a few instances of
the data structure in memory. However, in addition to being useful at runtime for security
applications, our technique can be useful to assist engineers in locating the data structures
in memory. Instead of following a series of pointers or searching for the data structures
across a large space in memory, engineers can use our tool to direct their search to a few
specific memory locations.
While our experiments focus on different versions of Windows kernel memory, the
same techniques will find data structures in memory from applications and other operating
systems. This is because our technique makes no assumptions about the memory. The
HMM is trained to identify sequences of bytes, and any piece of software will represent its
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data using bytes in memory. This invariant holds regardless of the language the software
was written in, the libraries used to build the application, or the operating system running
the application. Furthermore, this invariant holds for systems running in virtual machines
or systems running directly on the hardware. Finally, this invariant holds for a wide variety
of computer architectures including x86, PowerPC, and SPARC.
4.3.5.2 Performance
We performed all of the training and evaluation on a system with a 2.33 GHz quad-core
processor with 4 GB of DDR3 1333 MHz memory. Since the evaluation calculates the
score for each instance independently, the evaluation steps could be performed in parallel.
Our evaluation routine divided the data set into four parts, and then evaluated each part on
a different processor core. This parallelization provided approximately a 2-times speedup
for the overall evaluation performance.
We measured the time to complete the training, evaluation, and post-processing steps
for each of our experiments. Training is very quick because it operates only on positive
instances. The training step completed in an average of 16 seconds. Evaluation requires
an average of 58 milliseconds per instance, and post-processing requires an average of 425
milliseconds per instance. Note that post-processing only occurs on the positive instances,
so the overall time required for this step is small. The typical snapshot of Windows ker-
nel memory contains approximately 100 MB of data, which is approximately 1.3x107 in-
stances. Therefore, analyzing the entire kernel memory space takes approximately 4 days.
The time needed to analyze the kernel space should be viewed as a worst case scenario.
Many applications use much less memory than the kernel, so evaluation would be consid-
erably quicker for these cases. Either way, it is important to note that this evaluation step is
only performed when discovering the data structure locations for the first time. The typical
runtime scenario for security applications using memory analysis would be to access the
data locations from a database, as discussed in Section 4.3.4.
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4.4 Discussion and Future Work
VMI relies heavily on memory analysis. And current memory analysis techniques are brit-
tle, unable to survive a software upgrade on the target system. The work presented in
this chapter is a first step toward addressing this problem through memory analysis tech-
niques that are sufficiently general to work across multiple software versions, while still
being precise enough for practical use. However, this work is still preliminary. Additional
testing, analysis, and refinement are needed to fully understand the applicability of these
algorithms.
Additional testing would use more datasets to verify the algorithms performance across
different software versions. This could include various major versions, service pack lev-
els, and patch levels for Windows. It could also include other operating systems such as
Linux, Mac OS X, BSD, Solaris, etc. And it could include application-level software on
all of these systems. For each of these datasets, one could perform additional analysis.
This analysis could consider the algorithm performance for different data structures to de-
termine if accuracy is influenced by factors such as data structure size, type, or entropy.
Finally, algorithmic refinement would look at all stages of the algorithm – but especially
the initialization and post-processing steps – to identify a technique that works well across
all datasets.
Even with this additional refinement, since this is a machine learning approach, we can
never expect to achieve perfect accuracy. For some security applications, this is a prob-
lem. In these cases, the only solution would be to use memory analysis techniques that are
error-free. The two primary options in this domain are using static analysis of the source
code or vendor-provided symbolic information to interpret data in memory. However, some
security applications and many non-security applications can provide useful results with-
out perfect accuracy. In these cases, or when source code or symbolic information is not




Memory analysis techniques are critical to the success of new security application archi-
tectures that use VMI. These techniques are also required to detect advanced malware that
operates entirely within memory, without ever writing to disk. The work presented in this
chapter provides a starting point towards addressing the issue of locating security critical
data structures in memory, which is one of the key challenges facing memory analysis ap-
plications today. Unlike previous work in this space, our system aims to work across a wide
variety of data structures, types of software, and operating systems. Properly trained mod-
els will locate a data structure, even when the target system has received software patches
that make changes to the data structure.
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CHAPTER V
GYRUS: A VMI-BASED SECURITY FRAMEWORK
5.1 Motivation
Computers are often compromised and then used as computing resources by attackers to
carry out malicious activities such as DDoS, spam and click fraud. Distinguishing between
network traffic resulting from legitimate user activities and illegitimate malware activities is
a very challenging problem because many of the activities performed by modern malware
(e.g., bots) are similar to activities performed by users on their desktop computers. For
example, users send email and malware sends spam; users view web pages and malware
commits click-fraud; and instead of using a customized or a rarely used protocol that would
arouse suspicion, malware is known to tunnel any malicious traffic through commonly used
protocols such as HTTP to give it the appearance of legitimate application traffic. This can
be accomplished by the malware running the application protocol or injecting itself into
a legitimate application. Furthermore, malware can mimic user activity patterns, such as
time-of-day and frequency, and can morph and change tactics in response to detection
heuristics and methods to hide its malicious activities and traffic.
As a result, existing security technologies such as firewalls, anti-virus, intrusion detec-
tion and prevention systems, and even botnet detection systems such as BotHunter [77]
and BotMiner [76], all fail or have a significant capability gap in detecting and stopping
malicious traffic, particularly where it is disguised as legitimate application traffic. For ex-
ample, host-based application firewalls allow traffic from legitimate applications and thus
cannot stop malicious traffic from malware that has injected itself into a legitimate appli-
cation. Previous research projects such as BINDER [45] and Not-A-Bot [78] aimed at
distinguishing user-intended network traffic based on timing information of user input lack
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the precision necessary to identify traffic created by malicious code injected into a legiti-
mate process and sent shortly after a user input event.
Since malware or bots are not human users by definition, their traffic is not directly
initiated by user activities on a host. Thus, if we can have the infallible observation that
the traffic is not user initiated, or in other words, that the data is not what the user has
intended or authorized the application to send, we can detect it as malicious traffic and
stop it from leaving the host. Based on this insight, we propose a new approach to detect
and stop malicious traffic that is disguised as legitimate application traffic. Our framework,
named Gyrus1, is an efficient and robust approach based on virtual machine introspection
techniques that use hardware events combined with memory analysis to authorize outgo-
ing application traffic only if the data was really what the user on the system intended the
application to send. With Gyrus, a host can prevent malware from misusing networked
applications to send malicious traffic even if the malware runs an application protocol cor-
rectly or injects itself into a legitimate application.
Our approach is based on the simple premise that malware can not reproduce hardware
events coming from the keyboard or the mouse. Building from these events, our Gyrus
framework interprets a user’s intent based on his interactions with the desktop computer and
the semantics of the application that receives the user inputs. This intent is then dynamically
encapsulated into a security authorization that the framework uses to distinguish legitimate
user-initiated application traffic from illegitimate malware-initiated traffic that appears to
be from the application.
Gyrus is by design application-aware. That is, for each networked application (e.g.,
email and web browsing) that may be misused by malware to send and hide malicious
traffic, Gyrus understands the semantics of that application’s user input and how this input
maps to data that the user intends the application to send out. Gyrus also understands the
cases where the application is allowed to automatically send traffic (e.g., sending previously
1The fusiform gyrus is a part of the human brain that performs face and body recognition.
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composed messages or auto-fetching or refreshing a web page) that has been implicitly au-
thorized due to previous user actions or application start-up or configuration activities (see
Section 6.2 for more details). In other words, Gyrus provides the ground truth information
that links user intent with the observed application traffic from a host. This information
can then be used to facilitate a wide variety of security policies, often in conjunction with
existing security technologies. For example, in a high security setting with a well known
and restricted software installation base (e.g., a bank or government), Gyrus could be used
in conjunction with whitelisting, firewalls, and intrusion prevention systems to prevent un-
intended network traffic disguised as legitimate application traffic from leaving the network
security perimeter. In this case, Gyrus would require application knowledge for host ap-
plications that use the network in response to user input, as described in Section 6.2. For
home users, or other low security settings, Gyrus with built-in knowledge of the most com-
monly used networked applications (such as email, instant messaging, and web browsing)
could be used to filter the outgoing network traffic in these application protocols to stop
the common channels of malicious traffic such as spam, click fraud and tunneled traffic,
significantly reducing a compromised machine’s overall utility to malware.
The primary contributions to this thesis include (1) the Gyrus framework that enables
secure monitoring of user interactions with applications on the host and detecting and stop-
ping malicious traffic from leaving the host disguised as legitimate application traffic, based
on the key insight that malicious traffic is sent by malware without user consent whereas
legitimate traffic is typically initiated by a user input or command; (2) the use of virtual
machine introspection and memory analysis to precisely determine the expected applica-
tion behavior based on user input events, in particular, what traffic data the user intends
the application to send out; and (3) the demonstration of the viability of Gyrus by imple-
menting the framework along with support for applications in Windows XP, as described in
Chapter 6. Our prototype currently supports email and web browsing and can be extended
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to include instant messaging and voice-over-IP, effectively covering the most common net-
work applications.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses previous research
efforts with goals that were similar to Gyrus. Section 5.3 discusses the security require-
ments for any framework driven by hardware events. This section also presents our threat
model and security assumptions. Section 5.4 introduces the Gyrus framework, which is
followed by a description of our implementation in Section 5.5. Then, building on the
Gyrus framework, Chapter 6 details our experiences using Gyrus with email clients and
web browsers to combat spam and click fraud, respectively.
5.2 Previous Techniques
Gyrus is most closely related to previous work on identifying human intent. It is also
closely related to a variety of host and network security technologies in that they share
similar high-level goals. We discuss each of these areas below to show how Gyrus improves
on the current state-of-the-art and to provide some background context for our work.
5.2.1 Identifying Human Intent
Gyrus shares the goals of two previous research projects: BINDER [45] and Not-A-Bot [78].
Both of these projects aimed to identify the user’s intent and then use that knowledge to
block or classify network traffic. BINDER’s key assumption was that “outbound network
connections made by a process that receives user input a short time ago is user intended”.
Building on this assumption, the only technique used to determine user intent in BINDER
was the timing between user input to a process and network output from that process. Ma-
licious software can easily defeat such systems by injecting code into an existing system
process and sending network traffic shortly after that process receives user input. Another
drawback to BINDER is that the system was deployed within the user’s operating system,
leaving it vulnerable to attack by malicious software. The Not-A-Bot (NAB) [78] project
builds on BINDER using code protected by a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [75] to mark
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outgoing traffic as human-generated if it occurs soon after a hardware input event. NAB
suggested that this packet marking could be used to give priority to user generated traffic
on the network.
Both BINDER and NAB determine user intent using only timing information. Gyrus
is more discriminating, using application knowledge to determine the precise traffic that
results from user input events. BINDER does not protect its software from attack, whereas
Gyrus uses a virtualization-based architecture to provide a trusted execution environment.
NAB requires changes to all user applications to support attestation of network traffic;
by contrast, the Gyrus framework works with existing commodity operating systems and
applications, improving host security without invasive modifications. Finally, because both
BINDER and NAB use the recency of hardware input to decide if traffic is legitimate,
they cannot handle asynchronous network traffic, such as an email that is queued while
the network is down and sent much later. Gyrus has no such limitations. Instead, content-
specific authorizations are created when the user initiates the action that will result in a
network send.
Another related system, Siren [25], injects specially crafted synthetic user input into an
idle operating system. This input corresponds with a well defined network output, allowing
the system to monitor for any unexpected network output. Siren’s goal is to identify mali-
cious software that hides its network output by sending at nearly the same time as regular
user output. However, the synthetic user input can manipulate the computer’s state when,
for example, a user steps away for a short period of time. Gyrus is able to achieve the same
security goals without these usability drawbacks.
Other security systems have attempted to distinguish human actions from those of mal-
ware. The most widely known of these is CAPTCHA [174], which challenges the user
to prove that she is human by solving hard computer vision problems. This approach is
inappropriate in our context, however, as it would require explicit interaction to authorize
a given network event. Our solution, by contrast, implicitly approves human-generated
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network traffic by linking it to the hardware events that generated it.
5.2.2 Detecting and Containing Malicious Activity
Prior work on malware detection and containment is largely complementary to our work.
We do not claim that Gyrus should replace existing security infrastructure such as firewalls,
whitelisting, intrusion detection systems, and anti-virus systems. Instead, we believe that
Gyrus augments these systems to improve one’s overall security posture by linking user
intent with observed network traffic.
Traditional network firewalls [35] filter traffic based on Internet protocol (IP) addresses,
network ports, or other network-level attributes. Application firewalls such as ZoneAlarm [2]
or VMWall [162] can also filter traffic based on which process it came from. Whitelisting
can be useful in creating appropriate firewall policies such as limiting the applications
that can send traffic [1] or identifying authorized recurring traffic signatures [23]. Gyrus
augments these capabilities by providing a framework to filter traffic based on a user’s
interactions with applications.
Gyrus also complements other security infrastructure including intrusion detection sys-
tems (IDS) [124, 63], intrusion prevention systems (IPS) [154, 153], and anti-virus soft-
ware [165]. IDS and IPS systems represent a broad class of tools that detect and prevent
malicious activity on networks. These systems use a variety of detection algorithms rang-
ing from signature to anomaly detection [11], and frequently use statistical or machine
learning approaches to combine multiple detection features [106]. Beyond BINDER and
Not-A-Bot, we are unaware of any IDS or IPS system that incorporates user intent as a
feature in its analysis. Our framework could be used to improve these systems through
the addition of this information. Finally, given that anti-virus software is known to have
incomplete detection capabilities [122], Gyrus can help to provide a defense in depth strat-










Hi = {h2, h3, h5}
content(Hi) = 'ADS'
e1 = HTTP GET
e2 = EMAIL 'ADS'




Figure 17: The formal requirements for a security framework driven by hardware events. A
sequence of hardware events H results in a set of network protocol events E. In particular,
the subsequence Hi = {h2, h3, h5} causes an email to be sent (e2). The security monitor
intercepts hardware and network events.
5.3 Requirements and Threat Model
In designing Gyrus, our goal was to build a framework that is applicable to a wide variety of
realistic deployment scenarios. This section describes the specific high level requirements,
along with the threat model and assumptions that we used in designing our framework.
5.3.1 Requirements
Our goal is to identify network traffic that results from human activity on the host. More
formally, we have a set E of monitored network protocol events, such as HTTP GET re-
quests and SMTP email sends, and a sequence H of hardware input events, such as key
presses and mouse clicks.
For each e ∈ E, we must decide whether it was generated by human input or by au-
tomated means. This is equivalent to asking if there is some subsequence Hi ⊂ H such
that:
Hi → e (4)
and
content(Hi) = f (content(e)) (5)
That is, (4) e was sent as a result of Hi, and (5) the content produced by the hardware
events in Hi is the same as the content observed in e, modulo some well-defined transfor-
mation f (e.g., adding headers or applying compression). Informally, to permit a particular
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event e, we must establish that it was caused by Hi and that its content is the same as what
the user entered. Figure 17 shows an example of how these values are set as a user interacts
with his computer.
In practice, a security application may not be able to satisfy these precise requirements.
For example, in the Not-A-Bot paper Gummadi et al. [78] note that in order to validate the
content of an email based on keystrokes, one must find a matching subsequence from all
observed key presses and match it against the version seen on the network. Moreover, a
simple subsequence is not sufficient. Clicking the mouse might move the cursor back to a
previous point in the message, causing subsequent keyboard input to appear earlier in the
outgoing email.
Our approach sidesteps the problem of directly validating outgoing content based on
hardware input by assuming that it is possible to securely view the current state of the
machine using introspection. This affords us a richer view of the user’s inputs, and allows
us to create an approximate binding between observed network traffic and user action.
5.3.2 Threat Model and Assumptions
In order to provide assurance that network traffic leaving the host is human-generated, we
must make several assumptions. First, we assume that our system sees hardware events
before the monitored OS, and that such events cannot be forged by an attacker. Second,
in order to assure the integrity of our security software, we assume that it has a trusted
execution environment (such as that provided by a secure virtualization environment or a
platform implementing trusted computing [161]) that is isolated from malicious software
running in the user environment. We chose to use a virtualization-based environment for
these purposes. The Trusted Computing Base (TCB) for our system is composed of the
hypervisor and all of the software in the Security Virtual Machine (VM), which includes
the Gyrus framework.
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Finally, because our solution uses virtual machine introspection (VMI) to extract user-
generated content and determine the meaning of hardware input events (e.g., to distinguish
a click on the send button of an email client from clicks elsewhere), we must assume that
the layout of the operating system (OS) and application-level data structures we examine
have not been altered. This assumption, which we call the introspection assumption, is
common to most current VMI-based solutions [69, 91, 126]. It also represents a fairly high
bar for the attacker because modifying the layout of these data structures would require
updating all code in the system that uses them. Otherwise the affected OS or application
would no longer function properly. These updates would be challenging to perform and to
hide.
In our threat model, we assume that the attacker can compromise the user’s OS and
any application running inside it. Aside from the restrictions implied by the introspection
assumption, he is free to execute arbitrary code, but cannot violate the security isolation
provided by the trusted execution environment. We also assume that the attacker does
not have physical access to the host, and hence cannot manipulate hardware events before
they reach the guest OS. Finally, we assume that the attacker cannot make modifications
to the hardware (e.g., by flashing firmware, in order to generate fake hardware inputs).
While Chen did demonstrate the feasibility of such firmware attacks [32], they are easy
to prevent by requiring signed firmware updates. Furthermore, this attack is only viable
on select high-end devices with reprogrammable firmware. These assumptions reflect a
realistic attacker who has successfully infected a user’s system with malware and obtained
administrative privileges.
5.4 The Gyrus Framework
The Gyrus framework design requires three key functionalities in the underlying system:
the ability to interpose on any hardware events of interest (see below for details, but at least
keyboard and mouse events are required), the ability to view the user system’s memory, and
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Figure 18: A hardware input event (1) starts the process of adding an authorization to the
database (2-3). After the event is processed by Gyrus, it is sent to the User VM (4). Finally,
a process in the User VM generates network traffic (5) that is approved or denied based on
authorizations in the Gyrus database (6-7).
the ability to interpose on the user system’s network traffic. In addition, the system must
provide these functionalities in a secure execution environment. Therefore, with proper
hardware support, the Gyrus framework could be implemented using virtualization, a co-
processor card, or a TPM-based system. For simplicity of presentation, in this thesis we
focus solely on the framework design for a virtualized environment.
Figure 18 shows the major components of our framework. It is designed to leverage a
virtualized environment where the security components reside in one virtual machine and
the user performs his everyday work in another virtual machine. This configuration has
been commonly used in recent security research [69, 91, 126] and provides the benefit of
controlled isolation between the User VM and the Security VM. One key aspect of Gyrus
is that there is no need to modify any software in the User VM. Because the framework’s
software is in the Security VM and virtualization provides isolation between the VMs, it
is very difficult for an attacker to compromise the security of the framework. Chapter 6
provides a more thorough analysis of Gyrus’ security.
The framework is completely driven by hardware events. Looking in Figure 18, the ini-
tial event comes directly from the hardware (1). Note that the figure only shows keyboard
116
and mouse events for simplicity, but this initial event could also come from the network,
disk, or any other piece of hardware. This event comes to the Security VM, and the frame-
work performs several actions before sending it to the User VM. These actions identify if
the event is one that we care about, and if it is then the framework performs application-
specific memory analysis using VMI to create an authorization (2). The authorization is
placed in a database (3) and the event is passed to the User VM (4).
After sending the initial hardware event to the User VM, the framework waits to receive
a network event from the User VM. We ensure that no modifications are needed within
the User VM by using transparent network redirection to send any network traffic that
requires an enforcement check to a transparent proxy (5). This network redirection allows
the framework to inspect the network traffic without any configuration changes, software
patches, or any other modifications in the User VM. When the network traffic reaches the
transparent proxy, the framework searches the database for an authorization matching the
network traffic (6). If an authorization exists, then the network traffic is allowed to reach
the external network and the user’s application works as expected (7). However, if there is
no authorization, then the network traffic is rejected.
The framework tasks can be grouped into three major components: hardware event
interposition, dynamic authorization creation, and enforcement. We provide more details
on each of these framework components below.
5.4.1 Hardware Event Interposition
As stated above, the Gyrus framework requires the ability to interpose on hardware events.
Virtualization has a similar requirement because these events must be multiplexed between
the virtual machines running on a single computer. Building off of this invariant, the frame-
work taps into the location where this multiplexing occurs. This ensures that Gyrus has ac-
cess to every hardware event. This mechanism amounts to a keystroke (and mouse event)
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logger running in the Security VM. However, unlike many keystroke loggers that are de-
signed with malicious intent, we utilize knowledge of these events to improve the system’s
security.
It is important to emphasize that the hardware events received by the framework come
directly from the hardware without passing through the User VM first. In most virtualiza-
tion environments, this is handled in one of two ways. In Type I virtualization (where a
hypervisor runs directly on the hardware), the hardware interrupts go directly to the hy-
pervisor and then they are either multiplexed from within the hypervisor or passed to a
special virtual machine that multiplexes the events. In Type II virtualization (where a host
operating system runs directly on the hardware), the host operating system receives the
hardware interrupts and then multiplexes them to the virtual machines that are simply run-
ning as processes within the host operating system. Either way, the key point is that these
hardware interrupts are received by the framework before being received by the User VM.
This means that malicious software in the User VM will not be able to forge or modify any
hardware events. Gyrus builds on this property to ensure the overall security of the system.
5.4.2 Dynamic Authorization Creation
The most complex part of the framework is dynamically creating an authorization for a
network event, given the initial hardware event. Although this process is application-
dependent, Gyrus follows the same high-level steps for each application. The first step
is to determine if the particular hardware event in question is one that Gyrus is interested
in. For example, we are only interested in events that generate network traffic that we
want to control. For some applications, network traffic may be generated by a particular
keystroke (e.g., pressing the ENTER key), a key combination (e.g., pressing the CTRL key
and the ENTER key at the same time), or by clicking the mouse in a particular location (e.g.,
clicking on a button to send an email message). For keyboard events, this check can be
performed by analyzing the particular keystroke in question along with which application
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is in focus in the User VM. The in focus application is the program that the window man-
ager is currently sending keystroke events to, and can be determined through analysis of the
user operating system’s memory state using VMI. For mouse events, this check can be per-
formed by analyzing the mouse event’s coordinates, the application window on top at the
coordinates, and the user interface (UI) widget located under the coordinates. Again, this
information can be obtained using VMI. This step requires specific knowledge of the user
operating system’s window manger. We provide further details of these memory analysis
steps in Section 5.5.
Once we know that the hardware event is going to trigger a network event that we need
to authorize, the next step is to create the authorization. Ideally, the authorization should
be as specific as possible in order to prevent malware from benefiting from it. For example,
an authorization that simply allows one email message to be sent whenever a user clicks
on the UI component to send an email is not sufficient. In this example, malware could
use that authorization to send its own email before the user’s message is sent. By making
the authorization more specific, such problems can be avoided. In the case of the email
example, instead of allowing any email to be sent, we should only allow an email with
a specific recipient, subject, and message body. Gyrus needs an authorization creation
module to provide the application-specific network authorization for each application that
it supports. The goal of this module is to create a precise authorization using any of the
information available to it (e.g., introspection, network traffic, storage device contents, and
video card frame buffers).
Once the authorization is created, it is placed into a database where it can be retrieved
at any time to validate outgoing network traffic from the User VM. In some cases, Gyrus
may need to leave each authorization in the database indefinitely whereas in other cases
it may remove the authorizations after use or after a period of time. Such decisions are
application-dependent and allow for significant flexibility in how the framework is used.





























Dynamic Auth Creation Enforcement
Figure 19: A high-level view of the Gyrus framework logic. Gyrus can be extended to
support new applications through modules that specify logic for the three steps highlighted
in dark gray. The remaining logic is provided by the framework.
sending.
5.4.3 Enforcement
After the authorization is in the database, the initial hardware event is sent to the User
VM. At this point, the application that receives the event will generate and send some net-
work traffic. This traffic is redirected to a transparent proxy in the Security VM. The proxy
performs content analysis on the outgoing network traffic to determine if it is authorized
to leave the system. This analysis is the enforcement complement to the authorization
described above. Therefore, the Gyrus framework needs an enforcement module that per-
forms this content analysis and makes a decision based on the analysis for each application
that it supports.
5.5 Gyrus Implementation
We implemented a prototype of the Gyrus framework using the Xen hypervisor [16] and
XenAccess [127] for introspection. The Security VM was running Debian Linux 5.0 and
the User VM was running Windows XP Service Pack 2. The prototype was implemented
using a combination of Python and Java, except where noted below. Figure 19 shows the
high-level logic for the framework. There are two event-driven loops, one for authorization
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creation and one for enforcement.
Gyrus can be extended to support new applications through modules that specify logic
for the steps in Figure 19 that are highlighted in dark gray. We refer to the software that
determines if an event requires processing as the event testing module. Similarly, the soft-
ware that creates the authorization is the authorization creation module. And the software
that makes the enforcement decision is the enforcement module.
5.5.1 Hardware Event Interposition
In a default Xen installation, all hardware events pass through a special control VM known
as Domain 0, before being sent to a User VM. Within Domain 0, Xen creates an abstract
model of the hardware devices to present each User VM with a common hardware interface.
This model, known as the device model, is implemented in Xen using a modified version
of Qemu [20]. Because the Gyrus framework needs access to hardware events, we chose
Domain 0 as our Security VM. Therefore, the framework simply taps into the hardware
events as they pass through the device model.
We inserted code in two places in Qemu, which is written in C, to extract keyboard and
mouse events. At each of these locations, the code first opens a connection to a FIFO server
(described below). Once the connection is established, the keyboard or mouse information
is serialized and sent to the FIFO server. The information sent includes the key or mouse
button associated with the event, whether the button was pressed or released, and the screen
coordinates associated with the event (only for mouse events). In addition, we perform a
screen capture of the User VM using the vga_hw_screen_dump function in Qemu. The
location of this screen capture file is sent along with the other event information. The
screen capture is made available to Gyrus modules and can be used to verify user intent,
as described in Section 6.2. After sending this information, Qemu waits for a reply before
passing the event on to the User VM.
The FIFO server is another process that is receiving these hardware events through the
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interprocess communication (IPC) channel. In this case, the IPC is performed through a
UNIX named pipe. The process receiving these events is the one responsible for invoking
the dynamic authorization creation code. This process is described in the next section.
Beyond keyboard and mouse events, our prototype of the Gyrus framework can also
use network events to trigger dynamic authorization creation. The default setting in Xen is
for all network traffic to pass through a virtual network bridge in Domain 0. Using standard
passive network inspection tools, we can view all network traffic to and from the User VM.
This information is then passed into the same process that receives the keyboard and mouse
events.
5.5.2 Dynamic Authorization Creation
The dynamic authorization creation step begins when the framework receives a hardware
event, as described above. The first decision to make at this point is whether the event
should be processed. Modules register a handler that calls the event testing module to
determine if the module is interested in processing an incoming hardware event. Making
this determination for keyboard events only requires checking the specific key(s) that was
pressed and knowing which application in the User VM will receive the key event. Network
events are more complex, but many tools exist for rebuilding network frames and searching
for specific information within this traffic. The most complex scenario in our prototype is
mouse events. Typically, one must associate the mouse button pressed and its coordinates
with a specific application and UI widget where the mouse click happened. Gyrus provides
support for modules to make these determinations.
Interpreting both keyboard and mouse events requires knowing which application in
the User VM will receive these events. Using VMI, memory analysis, and knowledge of
the Windows user interface implementation, we created software that can reconstruct the
widgets and windows that are present on the screen in the User VM as shown in Figure 20.
This reconstruction allows the framework, running in the Security VM, to know critical
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pieces of information about a user’s interaction with her system.
By combining information from the Wine project [38] with our own reverse engineer-
ing of the Windows XP graphical subsystem, win32k, we developed a robust library, the
window mapper, that uses memory analysis to determine the placement, size, and stacking
order of graphical widgets on the screen. In Windows, the data structures representing wid-
gets form a tree: each window has pointers to its next sibling and its first child, as well as a
rectangle giving its top-left and bottom-right coordinates. The order of the sibling widgets
determines the z-order; if a window or widget is “above” one of its siblings, it will appear
earlier in the sibling list. Using this information allows the framework to know which win-
dow – and which application – will receive a given mouse event. We can also determine
the specific user interface widget that is associated with a mouse event. For example, using
the mouse event coordinates, the framework can determine if a particular mouse event will
click on the button used to send email or refresh a web page.
For keyboard events, we determined that win32k stores information about the window
currently in focus by storing a pointer to the currently active window in the data structure
that represents the user’s desktop. From there, we can determine which specific widget
inside a window is currently receiving keyboard input by examining its input queue. This
capability allows Gyrus to determine precisely where the window manager will send a
given keystroke. For example, this allows us to determine whether the user pressed ENTER
on the address bar or the search bar of a web browser.
For the purposes of our prototype implementation, we obtained our knowledge of the
Windows user interface implementation using reverse engineering. Although the difficulty
of reverse engineering poses a challenge to the implementation and deployment of Gyrus,
this problem is orthogonal to our current work. In Chapter 6, we discuss existing work
and future research directions that may decrease the difficulty of obtaining such application
specific knowledge.
After determining that Gyrus is interested in a particular hardware event, the framework
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Figure 20: Windows user interface widgets as reconstructed in the Security VM to assist
in mapping a given user input event to a specific application event handler.
will invoke the authorization creation module. We discuss this step in more detail in Chap-
ter 6 because it is application-specific. After the authorization is created, Gyrus inserts it
into a database and sends a reply to the device model, which passes the event to the User
VM.
5.5.3 Enforcement
The Gyrus framework’s enforcement applies to specific network protocols. This is because
each authorization in the database allows a specific piece of network traffic to leave the
User VM. To provide enforcement, the framework must interpose on all network traffic
leaving the User VM that is one of these specific network protocols. In our prototype, we
redirect traffic based on port numbers. For example, email sending is performed using the
SMTP protocol, which typically operates on port 25. Therefore, if a Gyrus module needs
to interpose on SMTP traffic, then we redirect all traffic on port 25. While more robust
techniques exist for protocol identification [55], they are beyond the scope of this thesis.
In Xen, as described above, all network traffic from the User VM passes through a vir-
tual network bridge in the Security VM. Using the iptables tools in Linux, the framework
transparently redirects the network traffic as needed based on the destination port number.
124
This traffic is redirected to a local transparent proxy that can interpret the data and make an
enforcement decision. Each enforcement module must provide its own transparent proxy
and the logic to approve or deny all outgoing network traffic seen by the transparent proxy.
As seen in the case studies in Chapter 6, the transparent proxy can be an off-the-shelf
product that serves this purpose (e.g., Squid [181] has a transparent proxy mode for HTTP
traffic). Therefore, enforcement modules usually only need to implement the actual filter or
module that performs the enforcement.
5.6 Summary
There are a variety of opportunities to extend or enhance the Gyrus framework. In this
chapter we focused on a virtualization-based design and implementation for Gyrus, but it
would be interesting to implement Gyrus on a co-processor or TPM-based platform with
the goal of reducing the TCB size. In any of these cases, the overall goals would remain the
same. Gyrus is designed to be a general purpose framework that enables security policy to
provide a direct binding between a user’s interaction with the system and subsequent hard-
ware events. These hardware events can be network traffic (e.g., to stop a spam-bot), smart
card operations (e.g., to stop malware from using credentials on a smart card), or anything
else that a security application developer desires. By leveraging this binding, security pol-
icy no longer needs to model the entire system and can instead focus on identifying a single
transformation that relates user-level information with hardware-level events.
The next chapter explores two detailed case studies of specific security applications
that we designed and built using Gyrus. After describing the application case studies, we




APPLICATION CASE STUDIES USING GYRUS
6.1 Motivation
The Gyrus framework is flexible enough to handle any applications running in the User VM
that receive user input and produce network output. However, supporting an application
requires sufficient knowledge of the application logic to build the three key modules: event
testing, authorization creation, and enforcement. For real-world deployment, we envision
Gyrus and these modules being developed and distributed by a third-party organization
such as a security vendor, similar to how anti-virus signatures are handled today.
For the purposes of testing Gyrus, we built support for two applications. Our primary
goal in selecting these applications was to demonstrate the feasibility of supporting various
types of applications and network protocols. In addition, we felt it was important to cover
the applications and features that users are most likely to use on a regular basis. To make
this determination, we analyzed data from the “Daily Internet Activities, 2000–2009” study
by the Pew Internet & American Life Project [133].
The Pew Internet study asks people in the United States what Internet-related activities
they performed on the previous day. Not surprisingly, nearly all of the activities were
performed through an email client or a web browser. These activities included sending
email, using a search engine, reading the news, checking the weather, online banking,
watching videos, and more. Some activities mentioned in the survey that involve other
client software include podcasting, instant messaging, phone calls, and peer-to-peer file
sharing.
Given this usage data, we decided to build support for an email client and a web browser
as these two classes of applications are clearly the most widely used. In addition, we
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performed a study of how to support Internet-telephony applications. The remainder of this
chapter describes the technical details of our support for each application and an evaluation
of Gyrus’ security and performance for each case study.
6.2 Application Case Studies
6.2.1 Email Case Study: Outlook Express
In order to demonstrate email application support, we extended Gyrus to support Outlook
Express on Windows XP. Our modules for Outlook Express detect when a user is interact-
ing with the application to send a message, and then extracts the message contents from
memory and places it into a database of allowed messages. When an email is seen leaving
the host, a transparent SMTP proxy checks that a message with matching content can be
found in the database of authorized messages. This allows user email to pass unhindered,
while blocking spam sent by malware on the host.
The implementation is divided into several components. First, the event testing module
gets notification of hardware events, and decides if they represent a user sending an email.
If so, the message’s contents are extracted and then validated using the screen capture, and
the authorization creation module creates an authorization allowing the message. Finally,
in the enforcement module, the outgoing message is extracted from the SMTP session by
the proxy, and the subject, sender, and body are compared with the authorization database.
6.2.1.1 Event Testing
In the event handler, the spam blocker receives notification of all mouse clicks from the
device model, as described in Chapter 5. Upon receiving a mouse click event, the window
mapper is consulted to see if the user is clicking on the “Send” button of an Outlook Express
message window. Both a “left button down” and “left button up” event on the send button
are required, with no intervening mouse button events. If the user is clicking on the send
button, the system moves on to extracting the message contents.
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6.2.1.2 Authorization Creation
To create a message-specific authorization, the message content is retrieved from both
memory and the screen capture. Using memory analysis, we traverse the internal data
structures used to represent a message while it is being composed. By reverse engineering
portions of Outlook Express, we determined that the message composition pane is actually
an instance of the MSHTML rendering engine (called Trident), which is also used by Inter-
net Explorer to render web pages. When a user enters text into the window, the MSHTML
engine dynamically updates the parsed HTML tree in memory with the new text. When the
message is sent, the rendering engine serializes this tree to HTML and sends it using the
SMTP protocol.
The parsed HTML is stored in memory as a splay tree [159], which optimizes access
to recently used nodes. The nodes of this tree are objects of type CTreePos, and each tree
node represents an opening or closing HTML tag or a text string (for the textual content of
the page markup). HTML tags are represented by CElement objects (which are accessible
from the corresponding CTreePos), which store, among other things, the name of the tag
and its HTML attributes. Text nodes have no associated CElement, and are represented
by their length and pointer into a document-wide gap buffer, a data structure commonly
used to optimize interactive edits to a buffer. Our memory analysis code replicates the
serialization process by traversing the tree and writing out the opening and closing tags,
as well as the content of any text nodes. The same approach can be used to extract plain
text email (by ignoring the HTML tags); however, we currently only implement the default
case of HTML email. We also use memory analysis to retrieve the subject and recipients
from the email client’s “To” and “Subject” text boxes.
Since an attacker can manipulate the message contents in memory, as depicted in Figure
21, we validate the memory contents using their on-screen appearance. To do this, we use
the bounding boxes of the subject, recipient, and message text from the window mapper
to crop the screen capture provided by Gyrus down to just the text we are interested in.
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Next, after upscaling and resampling the images to improve readability, we extract the text
using the off-the-shelf Tesseract OCR software [160]. OCR is not completely accurate,
however, so we use the Levenshtein edit distance [107] to compare the OCRed text with
that retrieved from memory.
If the edit distance between the on-screen and in-memory strings exceeds a configurable
threshold, the message validation fails and the message will not be placed into the autho-
rization database. If the rate of OCR errors is sufficiently high, this could cause legitimate
email to be rejected. In practice, we have found that setting an error threshold of 20% (rel-
ative to the length of the string) is sufficient to compensate for Tesseract’s mistakes. Note
that this does not create much, if any, of an opportunity for an attacker to send spam be-
cause any alteration to the email will count against the 20% in addition to the OCR errors.
Since the OCR errors approach 20% before any malicious changes to the email, an attacker
would be unable to make any meaningful changes to the email.
If greater accuracy is needed, we could turn to the work of Lasko et al. [105] and
use a Bayesian measure to estimate the probability that discrepancies between the strings
are a result of OCR errors. We also note that Tesseract is not optimized for use with
screen captures. Using an OCR algorithm that takes advantage of the fact that the image is
computer generated could improve accuracy (e.g., if the font is known, even simple image
matching might suffice to recognize individual characters). Once the message content from
memory is validated, it is placed into the authorization database, and the mouse click is
passed to the User VM.
Our current implementation uses a variety of costly operations (i.e., memory analysis,
screen capture, OCR, etc.) whenever a user clicks the send button. In Section 6.4, we show
that the combined time to complete these operations is approximately 2 seconds, and we
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Figure 21: Gyrus’ Outlook Express modules use VMI to extract data from the User VM
memory. This data is interpreted and used to create an authorization for the user’s email
message.
6.2.1.3 Enforcement
At some point later (possibly much later, if the message is composed and sent while the
user is offline), the message will be sent via SMTP to a mail server. When this occurs,
an iptables rule on the virtual network bridge redirects the network stream to the trans-
parent SMTP proxy (we use proxsmtp [176]), which calls our enforcement script. The
script parses the message according to RFCs 2822 [137] and 2045 [66] and consults the
authorization database to find messages with a matching subject and recipient.
Finally, the HTML part of the message is compared with the stored HTML from the
database by recursively comparing each HTML node’s content. The comparison between
text nodes can be done exactly, because the copy in the database is extracted from memory
and is not subject to OCR errors. Any message not found in the database is rejected with
an SMTP reject (SMTP code 554: Transaction Failed). If the message is found and the
contents match, it is allowed to be sent to the remote mail server. By placing authorizations
in the database, we allow enforcement to occur at a time later than when the user sends the
email, allowing for offline sending which improves the user experience.
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6.2.1.4 Discussion
By detecting when the user has clicked on the send button and validating the message
content against what the user sees on screen, we have confidence that we captured the
user’s intent. It is reasonable to assume that the message on screen when the user clicks
“Send” is what he intended to send. As these are the only emails we allow the host to
send, all spam is blocked from leaving the User VM when Gyrus is running. It is possible
for some of the email text to be scrolled off the screen, in which case we are unable to
completely verify the message contents in memory. We discuss the security implications
of this situation in Section 6.3.
This general procedure can also be applied to web-based email. Using knowledge of the
browser and webmail application semantics, we would use memory analysis to determine
when the user clicks on the send button in the webmail client’s composition page. As with
a standalone email client, VMI could be used to extract the message text, validate it using
the on-screen display, and place it in the authorization database. When the message is sent,
an HTTP (rather than SMTP) proxy would be used to filter outgoing webmail messages to
ensure they were generated by a human.
6.2.2 Web Browser Case Study: Internet Explorer
We also extended Gyrus to support Internet Explorer on Windows XP. These modules pre-
vent malware generated click fraud by filtering outgoing HTTP traffic. This is a much more
difficult problem than stopping spam, because the web browser provides a richer and more
varied UI (with many UI actions that could result in an HTTP request), and because web
content is more complex than email. Due to this added complexity, we currently only mon-
itor a subset of UI actions that can be used to open a URL: hitting ENTER while the address
bar has focus and clicking on a link in an open web page. However, the window mapper
provides enough information to extend the range of monitored UI events to include other




















































Figure 22: Logic followed by the authorization creation module and the enforcement mod-
ule for web browser support within the Gyrus framework. Transitions not shown return to
the starting state; these were omitted for clarity.
6.2.2.1 Event Testing
Clicking on the window and pressing ENTER on the address bar are handled by the event
testing module. Upon receiving notification of the ENTER key being pressed from Qemu,
the module uses the window mapper to see if the IE address bar is in focus. Likewise, when
the mouse is clicked, we can use the window mapper to decide if the click occurs inside
the IE content area, and ensure that no other window is covering the area the user clicked
on. As with the send button, we require that both mouse-down and mouse-up events occur
within the IE window, with no intervening events.
6.2.2.2 Authorization Creation
The case where a user types a URL into the address bar and hits ENTER is handled in much
the same way as with our support for Outlook Express. If the event handler determines that
the ENTER key was pressed when the address bar was in focus, we extract the URL and add
it to the authorization database. As with the Outlook Express authorization creation mod-
ule, we can also validate the URL from memory using the screen capture. The enforcement
module can then check the outgoing HTTP request to ensure that it exists in the database.
Handling the case where a user clicks on a link in a web page is more difficult. Because
web browsers show a rendered version of the underlying HTML, the visual representation
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of a link may have nothing in common with the request generated by clicking on it. VMI
is not useful in this case because there is no binding between the visual representation of
the link on the screen and its representation in memory. Therefore, an attacker could alter
the link target in memory, turning any legitimate user click into a fraudulent request.
To solve this problem, we turn to another source of input data: the incoming network
stream. Like keyboard and mouse events, this input data is not under the control of an
on-host attacker, and can be considered a hardware input event in the context of our frame-
work. Incoming HTTP responses are parsed and their HTML content is analyzed using
the JSoup [81] and EnvJS [136] libraries to extract URLs found in the returned web page.
These URLs are divided into two categories: automatic URLs, which represent web page
dependencies that will be automatically requested by the web browser, without any user
interaction (for example, images and stylesheets), and token URLs, which will only result
in an HTTP request if the user clicks on them.
Once the page links are categorized, the authorization creation module pre-approves
all automatic links by adding them to the authorization database. This allows the web page
to load normally for the user; all web page dependencies will be approved when the initial
HTTP response is read, so the enforcement module will allow the traffic to pass as the
browser makes additional requests to complete the page rendering. Figure 22 shows a flow
chart depicting how the authorization and enforcement steps are linked by the authorization
database.
Mouse clicks are then handled in the following way. The window mapper first checks
to see if the click is within the IE page content widget. If so, the token counter is incre-
mented in the authorization database, and the click is passed on to the guest OS. When the
enforcement module sees an outgoing HTTP request, it checks to see if the requested URL
is in the token URL database, and if there are any tokens available. If so, the request is
allowed to pass, and the token counter is decremented. This ensures that every outgoing
HTTP request is matched with a click on the web page. To further improve accuracy, we
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could also make use of the information provided by the status bar to disregard clicks that
are not on page links: when the user is not hovering over a link, the status bar will be empty,
and this invariant can be used to detect clicks that will not generate a network request.
To ensure a strong binding between the user’s interactions and the HTTP requests that
we permit to leave the machine, we track the originating web page for each link in the
database. When a new link is added to the database, we always note which page that link
came from. This extra information is used in the enforcement module, to further limit an
attacker.
6.2.2.3 Enforcement
The enforcement is performed using Squid [181] as a transparent HTTP proxy. Outgoing
traffic from the User VM is redirected through the proxy using an iptables rule. Squid
then uses the ICAP protocol [58] to obtain a decision from our enforcement module, which
is implemented as a module to the Greasyspoon ICAP Server [116]. The enforcement
module, as described above and shown in Figure 22, allows a request to go through only
if a) the URL is in the automatic link database (i.e., it is a dependency of a previously
authorized page), or b) the URL is in the token link database and there are tokens remaining.
The authorization creation module treats requests that come from addresses typed into the
location bar as automatic links; they are allowed even if no mouse click has occurred.
Thus, the first HTTP request made in the web browser will be authorized because the
user must enter it using the address bar. Subsequent requests the user makes (as well as
those made by automatic page dependencies) will be approved because the authorization
creation module will have added the links as token (or automatic) URLs when the previous
response was received. Each request is made either by clicking a link (which increments
the token counter, allowing one request per click to go through) or by entering a URL into
the address bar, so all legitimate attempts to visit a page will be allowed by Gyrus.


























Figure 23: Software components involved in processing HTTP traffic with Gyrus. The
four major software components (web proxy, ICAP server, SQL database, and server-side
browser) are all easily interchangeable in the event that a better implementation becomes
available. The shaded boxes indicate code written specifically for Gyrus as extensions to
off-the-self open source software components.
the HTTP requests permitted at any given time correspond to links on the web page the
user is currently viewing. Using the techniques described above, the enforcement module
obtains the URL from the address bar at the time the HTTP request is being processed. This
URL can, once again, be verified using the screen capture from Gyrus to protect against
the malicious modification of memory in the User VM. Using this URL, the enforcement
module will only allow the HTTP request if its originating web page matches the URL.
Given that the URL in the address bar indicates the web page a user is currently viewing,
this technique restricts the permitted HTTP requests to that page.
6.2.2.4 Discussion
Certain kinds of HTTP traffic pose special problems for our system. In particular, sites
that use SSL to secure their transactions can not be monitored by a proxy without the
encryption key. Our current implementation simply allows such traffic to pass unimpeded;
a more sophisticated implementation could extract the session encryption keys from the
browser’s memory in order to examine these encrypted network streams.
An additional complication is introduced by the highly dynamic nature of many modern
web pages. Such pages may use Javascript or other web scripting languages to modify the
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content of the page after it is rendered; in some cases, dynamic code running on the page
will even make its own HTTP requests (via XMLHttpRequest). Borders and Prakash also
consider this problem in their study quantifying information leaks in outbound web traf-
fic [24]. In order to predict the HTTP requests that will be made by a user’s web browser,
they used the Spidermonkey engine [167] to evaluate Javascript in incoming HTTP re-
sponses and extract any links from the resulting page. Although in the general case predict-
ing links computed by Javascript is undecidable, their study was able to achieve coverage
of 98.5% of traffic in practice. If complete Javascript coverage is needed, one could (at the
expense of performance) render the web page in another VM, and automate clicks on all of
the links, in order to extract all of the legitimate URLs [118].
In an effort to address the Javascript problem, we integrated a server-side web browser
into the authorization creation module as shown in Figure 23. This browser, called En-
vJS [136], is effectively the Rhino Javascript engine [166] integrated with a custom-built
DOM, which is similar to the approach used by Borders and Prakash. The Gyrus ICAP
response module, which handles all HTTP Response traffic, sends web pages to EnvJS so
that they can be evaluated with Javascript before parsing the DOM tree for links. Because
EnvJS is a relatively new project, we had limited success with this approach. Web sites,
such as http://www.facebook.com, that extensively use Javascript did not properly load
in EnvJS, resulting in a large number of false positives in our testing. We discuss the results
of our testing with this software architecture in Section 6.3.
Given the modular design of our software architecture, there are two options for im-
proving the system’s performance in the future. First, one could wait for EnvJS to mature
and become more robust at processing a wide variety of web pages. Second, one could
replace EnvJS with another browser. This second option is potentially appealing because
one could use a complete browser such as Mozilla Firefox or Google Chrome that would
include support for not only Javascript, but also Adobe Flash, Java, etc. However, this
functionality brings some extra costs as well. First, the performance of a complete browser
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implementation would be slower than a lightweight system such as EnvJS. Second, as the
browser environment in the Security VM grows larger, the security guarantees are reduced.
Browsers such as Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome are significantly larger than EnvJS
and, therefore, likely have many more vulnerabilities. Ultimately, the choice comes down
to a trade-off between performance, security, and functionality. The correct choice will
likely vary based on the setting in which Gyrus is deployed.
6.2.3 VoIP Case Study: Skype
Although email and web browsing still account for most common desktop computing us-
age, voice over IP services such as Skype have grown to nearly 400 million users worldwide
[57]. VoIP also represents an interesting test case for Gyrus: VoIP applications’ interac-
tions with the network are more complex than email or web browsing, and the binding
between user input and network traffic is not as immediately clear. In addition, one of the
most popular VoIP clients, Skype, makes use of a peer-to-peer overlay network to perform
many of its functions, which increases the variety of traffic Gyrus needs to monitor and
make decisions on.
For this thesis, we have not implemented a module to block malicious Skype traffic
(such as VoIP spam, also known as SPIT). Instead, we will briefly provide here a sketch
of what such an implementation would look like. Although the Skype protocol is officially
undocumented, details of its workings have been uncovered through reverse engineering
[49] and black box network analysis [17]. We base our analysis on the descriptions of
the Skype protocol provided by these sources. Note that although Skype also implements
an instant messaging service, we have chosen to omit it here for the sake of brevity; its
operation is conceptually similar to the SMTP case, provided the user has already logged
in.
Following the model used by Baset et al. [17], we divide Skype traffic into several cate-
gories: login, user search, call initiation/teardown, media transfer, and presence messages.
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We will also adopt their notation for the various actors in the Skype network, using SN for
a Skype Super Node, HC for the Host Cache, and SC for the Skype Client. In this section,
we will describe how Gyrus might handle each type of traffic.
An initial hurdle is the pervasive use of encryption to protect the contents of Skype
protocol messages. In order to successfully act on different messages sent by the Skype
network, Gyrus would have to be able to decrypt both outgoing and incoming messages.
In many cases, this task is not too difficult: although Skype uses RC4 to encrypt its UDP
signaling packets, the key is derived from information present in the packet (specifically,
the CRC32 of the source and destination IPs and a per-packet initialization vector), making
it possible to de-obfuscate such packets without any additional data. For TCP packets, peers
negotiate a longer-lived session key. This key is stored in the memory of the SC running
inside the User VM, and can be recovered using VMI. These techniques would allow Gyrus
to observe the decrypted contents of Skype traffic. We assume that this information is
available to Gyrus for the remainder of the discussion.
When the Skype client starts, it attempts to make a TCP connection to a super node in
order to join the P2P network. Connections are attempted to each of the SNs listed in the
HC, which is stored in a file on disk; if the host cache is missing, the SC will fall back to
a list of SNs embedded in the client binary. Once a connection to the overlay network is
made, the SC then contacts the Skype login servers (which are centralized and hardcoded
into the client) to perform user authentication. To support this phase of the protocol, Gyrus
would need to whitelist the login and connection establishment messages sent to the login
servers and the SNs in the host cache. The list of hosts to whitelist can be derived using
VMI, so this phase is supported by the current framework.
Call establishment, teardown, and user search are a good fit for the current Gyrus frame-
work. Call establishment is typically done by clicking the “Call” button while a contact is
selected. Our existing framework is sufficient to monitor mouse clicks and detect when
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they correspond to a click on the send button. Memory analysis can then be used to ex-
tract the username of the contact to whom the call is placed. The contact name can also
be authenticated by comparing it against a screen capture. The network messages sent to
initiate a call consist of an outgoing connection, either directly to the recipient or to an in-
termediate relay node. In either case, Gyrus could inspect the packet metadata to determine
the eventual recipient of the call, and verify that it matches the name stored when the user
clicked the call button. Call teardown and user search work in a similar way, and could be
handled by Gyrus.
Once a call is established, the media transfer phase of the protocol begins, in which
audio and (optionally) video data is transmitted to the call recipient. Due to the low-latency
requirements imposed by real-time conversation, it is unlikely that Gyrus would be able to
perform content analysis to verify that all the user’s voice or video data had been faithfully
passed on from the microphone or camera and onto the network. Instead, a Skype module
would likely have to employ heuristics that estimated an upper bound on the outgoing
traffic rate, based on input from the microphone and camera and knowledge of the codecs
in use. However, this would still leave some window for an attacker to replace user content
with his own while a legitimate call is in progress. To counter this threat, the Gyrus module
should periodically sample a portion of the input and resulting network traffic, and compare
them using an audio similarity measure offline. If a discrepancy is detected, Gyrus could
terminate the call.
Finally, Skype periodically sends incidental network status updates, such as contact
presence notifications and network keepalives, in order to maintain a connection to the
Skype network. As these messages are not particularly useful to an attacker who wishes to
send voice or video spam, we believe they can be safely whitelisted. With these measures
in place, Gyrus should be able to effectively prevent Skype-based spam from being sent.
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6.3 Security Evaluation And Analysis
New security frameworks should be secure against both current and future attacks. Here,
we consider both scenarios for Gyrus by running current malware samples and analyzing
the framework’s security properties. We also discuss Gyrus’ false positive and false nega-
tive rates using our prototype email client and web browser support.
6.3.1 Current Attacks
While running Gyrus with support for Outlook Express, we infected the User VM with
Spammer:Win32/Cutwail.gen!B, a spam bot. We monitored all network traffic to and
from the User VM to ensure that nothing escaped our analysis. Shortly after infection,
the spam bot started sending out a large volume of spam messages. However, Gyrus suc-
cessfully stopped all of these messages. While the spam bot was attempting to send its
messages, we also composed a legitimate email and successfully sent it. Gyrus approved
this message and allowed it to be delivered to the intended recipient. These results are
intuitive because the spam bot can not create hardware events to authorize its messages.
Since other spam bots would operate in the same manner as this one (i.e., sending spam to
remote email servers using SMTP but unable to produce hardware events), they would also
be stopped by Gyrus.
While running Gyrus with support for Internet Explorer, we infected the User VM
with a variety of click bots (one at a time) including AdClicker-AD, DR/Click.HSP.A.2,
and AdClicker-BY. Many of the bots failed immediately because they needed to obtain
command and control information using HTTP, which was blocked by Gyrus since these
requests were not initiated by the user. However, the three bots listed above utilized hard-
coded click fraud targets. Gyrus also stopped this traffic. While the bot traffic was being
blocked, we were still able to browse web pages normally using Internet Explorer. As
with the spam testing, these results are intuitive because the click fraud bots can not create
hardware events to authorize their HTTP requests.
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Both of these bots produced network traffic that is similar to human activity. However,
using the Gyrus framework, we stopped all of the malicious traffic while allowing all of the
legitimate traffic to leave the host.
6.3.2 Future Attacks
In order to understand the Gyrus framework’s susceptibility to future attacks, we return to
the original framework requirements, threat model, and assumptions discussed in Section
5.3. We start by looking at the initial hardware events that result in the creation of new
authorizations. Our threat model assumes that these events are non-forgable. However,
attacks against the virtualization architecture could result in an attacker gaining access
to the Security VM, which would allow an attacker to forge hardware events to Gyrus.
Alternatively, an attacker could modify the firmware on the system’s hardware devices to
forge hardware events. The firmware attack is challenging and would have limited impact
(requiring a new attack for each different hardware device). Therefore, the larger threat is
attacks against the virtualization architecture. For this reason, we stress that the hypervisor
is part of the TCB. Gyrus depends on the isolation provided by the hypervisor (as do all
virtualization-based security frameworks), so it is critical to ensure that it is deployed on
a hypervisor with a small attack surface area and a well audited code base. Even though
modern hypervisors have significantly fewer discovered vulnerabilities than full featured
operating systems, as additional features creep into these hypervisors, it may be prudent to
develop a custom hypervisor for use in security frameworks to provide higher assurance to
the TCB.
The next avenue for attack is manipulation of the authorization creation algorithms.
Using knowledge of the information gathered to create authorizations, an attacker could
attempt to get a malicious authorization placed into the database by manipulating data in
the User VM memory. This attack is very limited in scope. Since Gyrus validates data
from memory with other sources (e.g., network traffic or screen captures), the attacker
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would need to manipulate data in multiple places, and a user is likely to notice any visible
changes to his content. Although this attack could be made more stealthy by waiting until
the user is about to send a message (i.e., by detecting when the mouse pointer is over the
Send button in the mail client), over time the user is likely to notice something amiss and
take corrective action by cleaning his system.
An attacker could also exploit the fact that long email messages can scroll off the screen.
In such cases, the email contents in memory could be altered to append spam content to
the user’s message because the screen validation would not provide complete coverage.
However, the attacker would still be restricted to the user’s intended subject and recipients,
and would still be rate-limited by the legitimate hardware events. Figure 21 shows the
software components that an attacker would need to manipulate for this attack.
Another way for an attacker to manipulate the authorizations would be to change the
layout of memory in the User VM. Changing the locations and format of data structures
in memory would violate the introspection assumption, allowing an attacker to arbitrarily
manipulate the memory data seen by Gyrus. However, even if an attacker successfully
completed this very challenging attack, she would still need to modify the contents on the
screen or the contents of incoming network data. As described above, this would likely
lead to detection.
The final option for an attacker is to craft outgoing network traffic to bypass or pass
the enforcement step. Given the specificity of the authorizations, the attacker cannot pass
the enforcement step without actually being legitimate (e.g., sending an HTTP request to
a web page that the user was going to visit anyway, or sending an email that the user
was already planning to send). Bypassing the enforcement would require disguising the
outgoing traffic in order to prevent protocol analysis. Encryption would be sufficient for
this purpose, however this would preclude using the User VM to independently complete
the malware’s goals. Specifically, an intermediate host would have to decrypt the traffic
before sending it to the final destination, reducing the User VM’s value to the attacker.
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In summary, attackers must execute multiple challenging attacks to defeat the Gyrus
framework. This significantly improves system security compared to previous related re-
search.
6.3.3 False Positive and False Negative Analysis
Gyrus is designed to allow all user-initiated network traffic originating from the applica-
tions it supports. Therefore, a false positive occurs when any legitimate user-initiated traffic
is blocked. Running Gyrus with Outlook Express, we did not have any false positives. All
legitimate emails were allowed. Running Gyrus with Internet Explorer, we logged every
HTTP request and noted which ones were denied. For a single web page, there could be
tens or hundreds of requests to load every aspect of the page (e.g., images, style sheets,
javascript files, etc.). With our current implementation, we have a false positive rate of
81.9% when viewing the top 1000 most popular sites from Alexa. This is clearly too high
for practical everyday usage. As discussed in Section 6.2.2, most of these false positives
are a result of EnvJS incorrectly processing real world web pages. As EnvJS matures,
we anticipate that this number will decrease. Surprisingly, even with this high of a false
positive rate, in many cases web sites were still usable, only missing one or two images
(blocked due to false positives). In other cases, the blocked requests resulted in the website
not loading sufficiently to be usable.
After EnvJS matures there will still be similar problems related to supporting Adobe
Flash, Java, conditional comments, and other obscure language features. In short, to get
zero false positives, we would need the complete rendering capabilities of the user’s web
browser. We discussed the benefits and drawbacks of this approach in Section 6.2.2.
A false negative, in the context of Gyrus, is when malware is able to send network
traffic that is approved by the system. Our testing, as described above, showed zero false
negatives when we tested on existing bots. Malware designed with Gyrus in mind could
communicate using covert channels. While Gyrus does not remove all covert channels
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Table 3: Outlook Express latency introduced by Gyrus for different user interactions. All
times are in milliseconds.
User Interaction Mean Std Dev
Click while OE not running 3.8 0.42
Click with no OE compose window 23.7 0.48
Click in compose edit area 28.0 0.00
Click in compose tool bar 109.9 0.32
Click on send button 2067.6 73.17
Table 4: Internet Explorer latency introduced by Gyrus for different user interactions. All
times are in milliseconds.
User Interaction Mean Std Dev
ENTER while IE not running 2.0 0.00
ENTER while focus on search bar 2.5 0.53
ENTER while focus on location bar 456.7 10.37
Click while IE not running 3.8 0.42
Click in IE window (not web page) 28.1 0.32
Click on web page 35.3 0.95
from the host, it does significantly constrain them. All data sent from Gyrus-protected ap-
plications must conform to constraints imposed by both the user input and the application
semantics. Furthermore, since all of Gyrus-protected traffic travels through a transparent
proxy, timing-based covert channels are more challenging to implement. Therefore, with
Gyrus, an attacker would be limited to minor protocol manipulations and other low band-
width covert channels.
6.4 Performance Evaluation
We tested Gyrus on a dual quad-core Intel Xeon E5450 computer with 8GB of RAM. The
system ran Xen 3.4.2 with Gyrus patches applied to the device model code (i.e., qemu).
The User VM ran on one processor core with 384 MB of RAM. The Security VM used the
remaining system resources.
Since the Gyrus framework interposes on hardware events, the key performance metric
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that we are concerned with is the latency introduced for this added security. Tables 3 and 4
show the latency introduced for various user interactions with Gyrus running. Each Gyrus
extension performs a different amount of processing based on the current system state and
the hardware event that it is handling. For example, the smallest amount of latency is
introduced when the corresponding user applications (e.g., Outlook Express or Internet
Explorer) are not running. This is because the Gyrus extension can quickly determine that
no further analysis is needed.
Latency times that are acceptable to users, as established by prior research, fall within
the range of 50 – 150 ms [157]. Most of the latencies listed in Tables 3 and 4 fall within
or below this established range of acceptability. However, the time required for processing
when a user clicks on the send button in Outlook Express is just over 2 seconds. This is
because of the substantial amount of work performed by the authorization creation module
while handling this hardware event. As described in Section 6.2, this step involves a screen
capture, significant memory analysis, OCR operations, edit distance computations, and
database operations. Unfortunately, users are less concerned with these technical details,
and would simply find this latency unacceptable.
Given this performance problem, we investigated options for reducing the latency as
shown in Figure 24. The baseline in this figure shows the current latency, which is the
same as that reported in Table 3. The other bars show the latency imposed by alternative
options. The premise behind each alternative option was that the costly memory analy-
sis and OCR operations could be handled in a separate thread after capturing the system
state and sending the hardware event to the User VM. If we could capture the system state
quickly, then the perceived latency from the user’s perspective would be significantly re-
duced. This idea is especially viable on modern multi-core systems because the analysis
could happen in parallel, effectively imposing little to no overhead to the user. This idea
hinges, of course, on the ability to quickly capture the system state.
The system state that we need consists of a memory snapshot and a screen capture.
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Figure 24: Time required for work performed by Gyrus when a user clicks on the send
email button. The baseline shows the time for doing all analysis inline. The remaining bars
show the time required to simply save the screen and memory information, allowing it to
be processed in parallel using a separate thread. Option A uses xm save -c to perform a
memory snapshot. Option B uses the dump_memory.c example program from XenAccess.
Option C uses a modified version of dump_memory.c that stores the snapshot in memory
instead of on disk. And option D parses the page tables on the target system to only store
the pages needed for our analysis. Each option requires saving the screen buffer, which
requires an additional 122ms and is shown at the top of each stacked bar.
Our screen capture algorithm is already optimized and is limited primarily by the speed of
writing the image to disk. This operation takes 122ms, and could probably see a marginal
speedup if we instead wrote the image to memory, but this savings would be dwarfed by
the overhead of the memory snapshot. Therefore, we focused our efforts on improving the
time required to obtain the memory snapshot. Figure 24 shows performance measurements
for four options:
• Option A: Xen provides the xm tool chain as a management utility. One option for
this tool allows you to save the current state of a virtual machine, including both the
memory and CPU state. When run as xm save -c <domid> <output file>, this
tool will simply perform the snapshot and save it to a local file. This operation took
an average of 5116ms in our testing, which is slower than the baseline so it is not a
viable option.
• Option B: XenAccess, which is part of the Turret architecture discussed in Chapter 3,
includes an example tool that dumps the memory from a running virtual machine into
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a local file. This example is called dump_memory.c. This operation took an average
of 2292ms in our testing, which is slower than the baseline so it is not a viable option.
• Option C: We hypothesized that dump_memory.c could be made faster by saving
the snapshot to local memory, instead of to a file. To test this theory, we modified the
dump_memory.c example code to save the image to memory. This operation took an
average of 1258ms in our testing. This is faster than the baseline, but still not fast
enough to be acceptable to users.
• Option D: Next, we hypothesized that we could improve performance by only saving
the portions of memory that are needed in our subsequent analysis. To test this idea,
we implemented a reference program that identifies all of the physical memory pages
for a given process, then saves those pages into local memory. The task of locating
all of the physical memory pages was more costly than anticipated, resulting in an
overall average time of 1208ms in our testing. Similar to Option C, this is faster than
the baseline, but still not fast enough to be acceptable to users.
Our fastest memory snapshot technique is still two orders of magnitude slower than
what we need for this application. We believe that the only way to achieve the desired
performance is to use a copy-on-write memory snapshot technique. In theory this should
provide the level of performance that we require. However, copy-on-write support in Xen
is currently very immature and only available as an unmaintained, third-party patch [39].
We obtained this patch to test on our system. However, we were unable to achieve the
desired functionality and the patch author has thus far been unable to identify the cause
of the problem. Even so, we believe that copy-on-write memory snapshots are the correct
solution to this problem. At this point, given the general usefulness of the copy-on-write
snapshot technique, it is only a matter of time before it is incorporated into Xen in a more
robust and stable fashion.
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6.5 Discussion and Future Work
The Gyrus framework and our application support for Outlook Express and Internet Ex-
plorer all required a significant amount of software engineering. Given the inherent com-
plexities of techniques such as transparently intercepting web traffic or converting a screen
capture image into usable text with OCR, we utilized as much off-the-shelf and open source
software as possible. Overall, this approach has worked well and allowed us to achieve our
primary goals. However, based on our experiences with the system at this point, there are a
few places were we believe that replacing an off-the-shelf component with a custom-built
component could positively impact Gyrus’s performance.
One such example is with the OCR algorithm. Most OCR algorithms, including the one
we used with Gyrus, are designed for extracting text from a scanned document. Extracting
text from a screen capture is a slightly different problem. And this difference accounts
for the higher error rate that we are seeing through OCR. Replacing our algorithm with
one designed for use with screen captures should reduce the error rate, allow for tighter
tolerances in our edit distance computations, and ultimately increasing the overall security
of the system.
Another example where custom-built software could help is with the VM memory snap-
shots. As described in Section 6.4, none of the standard memory snapshot techniques are
fast enough for our application. Copy-on-write snapshots appear to be the best answer, but
this feature is not currently included with Xen. Therefore, work on this component would
not only benefit Gyrus, but also the greater Xen community.
Support for the various web technologies remains a difficult task. The current Gyrus
software architecture is well poised to benefit from any third-party advances in this field.
But this may also be an area where custom-built software and/or contribution to an open-
source project could benefit both Gyrus and the open source community.
Looking beyond our current support for Outlook Express and Internet Explorer, one of
the key challenges with Gyrus is the level of effort required to support new applications.
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Currently, this requires expert reverse engineering to understand the application semantics.
And this semantic understanding must be updated with each new software version. Tech-
niques such as dynamic software analysis can help by semi-automating the task of locating
key data structures in memory, but these are only likely to work with simpler classes of
applications. In general, we can think of the user applications as falling into one of three
classes:
1. Class 1 – Easy: Applications that can record keyboard input and network output and
have a computer program explain the transformation (e.g., instant messaging).
2. Class 2 – Medium: Applications where transformations are more complex and re-
quire additional application knowledge (e.g., email clients).
3. Class 3 – Hard: Applications where network output depends on more than just user
input and/or transformations are complex across both time and input boundaries (e.g.,
web browsers).
Using this classification, we believe that automated or semi-automated techniques for
application support are possible for both Class 1 and Class 2 applications. For example,
recent work by Jung and Clark [92] has produced methods to infer the data structures used
by applications. This would allow us to automate much of the work that, for example,
allowed us to understand that MSHTML used a splay tree for its storage of HTML content.
In addition, work done on malware analysis [156] and protocol reverse engineering [30]
has begun to produce automated techniques for inferring some higher level application
semantics as well. These advances should make the challenge of reverse engineering more
tractable and enable easier creation of new Gyrus modules.
The final deployability concern with Gyrus is related to its use of a virtualization-based
architecture. Our current system is built on Xen which is difficult to install and somewhat
limiting in its ability to work with desktop hardware and laptops. However, Xen is not
required to run Gyrus. Instead, one could engineer a small virtualization layer that is similar
149
to Blue Pill [145] that can easily install under the user’s existing operating system. This
technology exists, but would need to be adapted to work with Gyrus. The benefits of this
approach would be greatly simplified Gyrus installation and, likely, improved performance
throughout the system.
6.6 Summary
In the previous two chapters, we introduced the Gyrus framework and showed how it can
be used to distinguish between human and malware generated network traffic for a variety
of applications. By combining secure hardware monitoring with virtual machine introspec-
tion and memory analysis, we linked human input to observed network traffic and used
this information to make security decisions. Using Gyrus, we demonstrated how to stop
spam and click fraud attacks. Our evaluation demonstrated that Gyrus successfully stops
modern malware, and our analysis shows that it would be very challenging for future at-
tacks to defeat it. Finally, our performance analysis shows that Gyrus is a viable option for
deployment on desktop computers with regular user interaction. Gyrus fills an important





7.1 Summary and Contributions
In this thesis, and in the supporting research, we set out to reimagine security in modern
systems. Previously, security has been an “all or nothing” proposition. One option was to
design and build a high assurance system, which often served a small number of purposes,
at a great expense. And the other option was to use commodity products with a minimal
expectation of security. The work presented here falls somewhere in the middle. Our goal,
simply stated, was to allow the use of commodity software while providing an improved
security posture to the overall system. We achieved this goal through the use of external
monitoring techniques, in which security software is protected from attack through a small,
trusted layer of software known as a hypervisor.
Our Turret architecture builds on top of a virtualization-based architecture, allowing one
virtual machine to run security tools and benefit from a controlled isolation from the rest
of the software on the platform. Other virtual machines on the same platform run normally
and simply benefit from improved monitoring and security checking. Turret enables this
idea through a variety of mechanisms designed to facilitate secure active monitoring from
within this protected vantage point.
The monitoring capabilities provided by Turret are comprehensive. From within the
Security VM, we can view the entire memory space and any hardware events (e.g., network
traffic, hard disk reads and writes, keyboard and mouse activity, screen buffer, etc.) from
each User VM. In addition, we can install protected software hooks inside the User VM
that provide event-driven notifications about activity in that system while ensuring that
malicious software cannot disable or circumvent the hooks.
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Overall, the Turret architecture has been very successful. Portions of this architecture
were published in two conferences [125, 126]. The passive memory monitoring techniques
are now available as a freely available open source library called XenAccess. And, most
importantly, these techniques have gone on to be used in other research projects [65, 180],
commercial products [173], forensic analysis tools [27], and a variety of other domains.
The primary research contributions of the Turret architecture include:
• The XenAccess open source library, which is now the only virtual machine intro-
spection solution available for Xen (Section 3.5.1).
• The ability to perform secure active monitoring by placing protected hooks within
the User VM’s operating system (Section 3.4).
• A series of design principles to guide the creation and use of external monitoring for
security applications (Section 3.3.1).
• The integration of comprehensive and secure monitoring capabilities into a single
system (Section 3.4).
• An extensive security analysis of the Turret architecture showing that it raises the bar
for the security of commodity systems (Section 3.6).
One of the key drawbacks to external monitoring is the semantic gap problem. Without
access to the programmer interfaces (APIs) within a system, it is much more difficult to ex-
tract the information needed for security monitoring. It is called a semantic gap because the
information available is low-level (e.g., raw memory), but we desire high-level semantics
(e.g., a list of the running processes) about the system. The semantic gap is a large problem
that is beyond the scope of a single dissertation. In this thesis, we provided an overview
of the current techniques used for memory analysis in Section 4.2. Then we described a
new technique that uses machine learning to build models of data structures in memory.
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Using these models, we can locate a data structure in memory across a variety of software
versions. The primary contributions of our memory analysis work include:
• The use of hidden markov models to model data structures in memory (Section 4.3.2).
• An architecture for integration of machine learning techniques into runtime memory
analysis and virtual machine introspection (Section 4.3).
The remainder of this thesis focused on using external monitoring for a specific class
of security applications. Our application framework, called Gyrus, monitors human input
events (e.g., keyboard and mouse activity) and uses this information to apply security de-
cisions to outgoing hardware events (e.g., network traffic, smart card access, etc.). The
Gyrus framework is general, allowing for support of new applications through creation of
an event testing module, an authorization creation module, and an enforcement module.
For this thesis, we implemented support for the Outlook Express email application and the
Internet Explorer web browser by creating the three required modules for each application.
Our support for each of these applications is designed to only permit outgoing network traf-
fic when it can be directly correlated with human input events (e.g., a user clicking on the
send button in an email client, or a user clicking on a link in a web browser). The primary
contributions of the Gyrus framework include:
• A general framework for correlating non-forgeable human input events with hard-
ware events leaving a virtual machine (Section 5.4).
• Implementation and analysis of the software modules needed to extend the Gyrus
framework to support Outlook Express and Internet Explorer (Section 6.2).
• A complete security and performance analysis of the Gyrus framework showing its
benefits and limitations for real world deployments (Section 6.3 and 6.4).
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7.2 Open Problems
As is the case with any research, this thesis both solves problems and introduces new prob-
lems. Furthermore, since we are rethinking how security applications should be deployed,
there are a variety of highly practical questions regarding the usefulness, the long-term vi-
ability, and the benefits of the ideas presented in this thesis. Our research approach is to
embrace these challenges as ideas for future work, rather than to view them as obstacles
or even road blocks. Throughout this thesis we have described a variety of opportunities
for future work. In this section, we take a high-level view of the research space related to
external monitoring and identify the key open problems in this space. These problems are
both large and challenging, but success could fundamentally change system security for
the foreseeable future by allowing external monitoring techniques such as virtual machine
introspection to be more readily deployed in commercial security products.
• Solve the Semantic Gap Problem: The semantic gap problem is currently the sin-
gle largest obstacle to deploying VMI applications. In this thesis we investigated a
piece of this problem using machine learning techniques, but we also acknowledge
that this approach cannot achieve perfect accuracy and may not be suitable for all
applications. There are a variety of possibilities for solving the semantic gap prob-
lem. One option could be to partner with software companies to get the appropriate
semantic information about each program to be exposed or made publicly available.
Another option could be to develop software analysis techniques that can automati-
cally extract the necessary semantic information from source code or, ideally, binary
versions of software. A third option could be to create a public semantic repository
where reverse engineers can deposit discovered semantic information using a well
defined data format. There are potentially many other options, and the final solution
may be a hybrid of these approaches. However, without a unified solution to this
problem, VMI will never achive broad general acceptance.
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• Simplify VMI Programming: VMI code is currently very messy. As an exam-
ple, consider Listing 1. The problem is that the code is directly manipulating raw
memory resulting in both the memory layout and the software logic being embed-
ded throughout the program. This creates code that is difficult to read and difficult
to maintain. This can be addressed using a programming language that specifically
separates the code logic from the memory layout [187], or through a series of inter-
faces that progressively build higher semantic abstractions on top of the raw memory.
The correct path forward for addressing this problem is not obvious. A new language
could provide more flexibility, but may require porting a lot of legacy code. How-
ever, building new APIs can be a slow process because the end result is somewhat
rigid and a successful API will need to account for a variety of competing interests.
• Create a VMI-Specific Virtualization Platform: All of the work in this thesis was
performed on Xen, which is a server-class virtualization solution. This approach of-
fered the benefit of being able to focus on VMI, without spending time building a
new hypervisor. However, Xen may not be a practical long-term solution for VMI
applications. First, Xen is too large to provide strong (i.e., verifiable) security guar-
antees. Next, since Xen is not designed for desktop systems, its performance is poor
in these settings when things such as video processing are critical. And, finally, Xen
is challenging to install on many platforms including laptops and desktop systems. A
solution to all of these problems is to build a hypervisor that is designed specifically
to provide controlled isolation to a Security VM and to enable the Turret architecture
to operate within that VM, without a challenging installation procedure. Additional
virtualization features could be made available by allowing layered hypervisors, if
needed.
• Create Audit-Aware Software: In addition to solving the semantic gap problem, as
external monitoring becomes more popular it will become increasingly important to
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build software so that it can more easily be audited. Ideally, this should not be left to
the application developers. Instead, this should become a new feature in compilers.
A compiler could generate a program such that its layout in memory at runtime is
optimized for external monitoring. This goal could be achieved by controlling where
and how data is laid out on each page of memory and embedding semantic infor-
mation alongside data in memory. Compilers could also output all of the necessary
semantic information needed to solve the semantic gap problem. This information
could be placed in memory or added to a database repository used by VMI software.
• Enhance and Generalize VMI Libraries: As a part of our research, we made the
XenAccess library publicly available. However, this library only works on Xen and
does not include any of our secure active monitoring technologies. VMWare provides
its own VMI library, VMsafe [173], that only works on VMWare products and is
incompatible with XenAccess. So currently application developers must chose which
virtualization platform to work on at the start of their project, and changing that
decision later is difficult and costly. Ideally, we believe that XenAccess should be
expanded to include support for the secure active monitoring techniques discussed
in this thesis. In addition, XenAccess should be ported to work on Xen and KVM,
the two major open source virtualization platforms. And, finally, a common API
should be implemented as a generic VMI library that works with both XenAccess and
VMWare’s VMI library. These changes, taken together, will make VMI a commodity
service that is available on all of the major virtualization platforms. Developers can
then create one version of their VMI-enabled software and it would work on any of
these platforms. While these steps do not represent major research challenges, they
do represent important engineering challenges that will lead to the further acceptance
and adoption of VMI.
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7.3 Closing Remarks
This thesis explored the use of external monitoring to improve system security. We have
presented Turret, an extensive monitoring framework designed with security applications
in mind. Using Turret as a foundation, we explored both memory analysis techniques and
novel security applications. Looking ahead, external monitoring appears to be a promising
technique that may even change the way systems are designed and deployed in the future.
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